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ABSTRACT.
This thesis explains several economic phenomena in 
the market for spectacles which have lone confounded 
interested observers. Such phenomena include:
1. Prices of spectacles are almost completely 
uniform over the whole of West - Germany.
2. At the same time the industry is preponderately 
small scale.
Economic theory would normally explain such pricing 
and industry structure either with perfect competition 
or in terms of a high degree of cartelization. The 
existence of perfect competition is ruled out for the 
market of spectacles and a high degree of 
cartelization is not normally associated with low 
concentration ratios and small-scale enterprises. 
Thus, one is lead to suspect a high degree of 
regulation in this health sector of the economy.
As the likelihood of market failure through
externalities, asymmetry of information and natural 
monopoly is explored it becomes obvious, however, that 
regulation as severe as to cause the observed pricing 
behaviour is not called for.
The theory of taxation by regulation, developed by 
Richard Posner in 1971, offers an explanation.
According to this theory it is often in the interest
of regulators to make the regulated industry supply 
certain commodities or services at regulated prices
below cost and subsidize these by charging above cost 
for commodities which are not regulated. In the case
XV
of spectacles such cross - subsidisation may take the 
form of price discrimination. However, aspects of 
price discrimination between differentiated
commodities, although discussed in spatial economics, 
are strangely neglected by the traditional theory of 
price discrimination and the view is widely held that 
only third degree price discrimination exists in 
practice. Recent developments in the theory of price 
discrimination are presented which acknowledge that 
product differention may play a role and that second 
degree price discrimination may exist in practice.
Spectacles can be seen as differentiated commodities 
using the Lancastrian characteristics approach. They 
are then viewed as bundles of characteristics, i.e. 
they are made up of the characteristic correction of 
faulty vision which they all have in common bundled 
with additional characteristics such as prestige 
through better quality frames, comfort through light - 
weight lenses etc. An empirical investigation reveals 
that a high degree of product differentiation does 
indeed exist in the market for spectacles and that the 
complex situation can only be adequately explained if 
the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
product differentiation is introduced.
Posner’s theory is verified empirically if it can be 
shown that the prices of the different varieties of 
the differentiated commodity spectacles are 
discriminatory such that the basic commodities 
provided at regulated prices are sold below cost and 
other varieties above cost. Normally, the ’'hedonic" 
method is used to test empirically for price 
discrimination. By defining demand - based and cost -
XVI
based variables a hedonic demand and a cost schedule 
are obtained by multiple regression. Price 
differences which are due to demand influences are
then taken as proof of price discrimination.
In this vein a hedonic demand and a cost schedule 
are estimated and the existence of price 
discrimination in the market for spectacles is
seemingly established.
However, a discussion of the method reveals severe 
shortcomings:
1. The hedonic method does not incorporate the
distinction between horizontal and vertical 
product differentiation. Therefore the complex 
pricing structure cannot be adequately 
described.
2. The hedonic method produces unambiguous 
estimates of costs of differentiated commodities 
only if pure competition is assumed. However, 
in the context of price discrimination pure 
competition is ruled out by definition.
It is therefore necessary to develop and use a model 
of price discrimination which takes horizontal and 
vertical product differentiation into account and to 
employ a method of cost estimation which is valid in a 
monopolistic environment. The model developed in this 
thesis employs the Lancastrian concept of 
characteristics space and combines vertical and 
horizontal product differentiation with second and 
third degree price discrimination to show costs and 
prices in three dimensions. Prices and costs are 
measured on the y - axis, quantities of the
XVII
differentiated varieties on the x - and z - axes. 
Such a three - dimensional representation produces 
price- and cost- planes showing exactly which
varieties are sold below cost, which cover cost and 
which are sold above cost.
As already mentioned, an unambiguous estimation of 
costs is essential. The relevant cost concept is that 
of marginal cost under full adaptation. Calculation 
of marginal cost is greatly facilitated if it can be 
shown that marginal cost is constant, for then,
marginal cost equals average cost. It is shown that 
marginal cost is constant by constructing a long-run 
average cost curve and a Cobb-Douglas production 
function from data which the association of opticians 
in West - Germany has collected.
The costs of each individual differentiated 
commodity are made up of average cost and separate 
cost. Average and separate cost of each individual 
variety of spectacles were estimated in a cost study 
undertaken in the writer’s own optical practice in 
Germany by methods of conventional cost accounting 
according to advice given by the chief cost accountant 
of the Volkswagen factory at Kassel.
Costs of every pair of spectacles are thus
determined and compared to the prices of each
individual variety. It is therefore possible to 
construct the price- and cost- planes for a 
representative sample. These exhibit almost exactly 
the magnitude and shape that was predicted by the 
theoretical considerations. Thus, the empirical work 
confirms the theoretically derived predictions that:
XVIII
1. The pricing structure of the optical profession 
in Germany is highly discriminatory.
2. Provision of "National Health" spectacles is 
cross-subsidized by revenues from spectacles 
sold at unregulated prices.
IXX
Chapter 1
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPTICAL
PROFESSION.
1.1 OPTICIANS AND PROFESSIONALISM.
The optical profession in Germany is something of a 
paradox. On the one hand it can be considered a 
retail trade, as opticians in Germany almost without 
exception operate from premises exhibiting the normal 
features of retailing outlets, i.e. they offer their 
wares to the public in well-decorated shop windows, 
engage in advertising, etc.
On the other hand it is also a handicraft as 
opticans normally run a workshop in which spectacles 
are made up from rough, uncut lenses into the final 
form ready for wear. The skills required to do this 
require three years apprenticeship. In Germany, there 
is a special law governing the handicrafts 
(Handwerksordnung).1 According to this law, in any of 
the regulated trades an apprenticeship has to be 
served and an examination has to be passed at the end 
of it. By passing this examination the apprentice 
becomes ’’Geselle1' (Journeyman) and may later become 
"Meister” (master-craftsman) by passing a further 
examination. This examination is the legal 
prerequisite for setting up in business.
- 1 -
Thirdly, there emerge distinctly certain features of 
a profession, as in effect an upgrading of 
qualification requirements has taken place; contrary 
to the intentions of the craft-act only graduates of 
the four optical colleges are allowed to sit the 
master-craftsman examination as from approximately 
1980.^ a college degree is therefore required to set 
up a business or, perhaps it is better to say, a 
practice. Professional ethics are very much stressed 
by their association and by opticians themselves. The 
most striking feature, however, and the aspect in 
which they most resemble a profession, is the pricing 
behaviour of opticians.
1.2 THE PRICING BEHAVIOUR.
From an economic point of view German professions 
may be said to run legalized price-cartels. They are 
required by law to charge prices according to rates 
which are regulated in every detail. These rates are 
minimum rates - the professional may charge a higher 
price, but this always has to be a percentage of the 
prescribed rate. In fact higher charges than the 
minimum are rare: to charge prices lower than the
minimum is forbidden by law.^
Opticians do not have an official rate-structure 
like fully-fledged professions. But in effect they 
behave in the same way. This may seem surprising as 
opticians do not charge rates for the services they 
perform, i.e. for dispensing the lenses into the 
frame, for sight-tests, for adjusting spectacles etc.
- 2 -
but quote prices for a particular pair of glasses by
addins up the price of the risht lens + price of left
lens + price of frame - all service charges are
included in this quotation. Prices of lenses vary
according to the lens power, i.e. hisher lens powers
command hisher prices and they also vary accordins to
the quality of the lens as every particular power can
be supplied for instance in "basic” version or in an
"enhanced” version. Examples of such enhancements are
tinted lenses, lenses made of plastic instead of
mineral glass etc. Prices for each variety are
predetermined in recommended retail price lists
supplied by the lens manufacturers. There are no
price differences between lists of different 
5
manufacturers. Although adherence to recommended 
retail price lists is not enforcable by law in 
Germany, in reality there is no "chiselling" and no 
secret rebates are given.^ It follows that there is 
complete uniformity of the prices of spectacle lenses 
just as with fees charged by the professions in 
Germany.
Prices of frames exhibit the same features. Here 
recommended retail price lists are not provided by 
manufacturers. Instead, opticians use so-called 
"calculators"? provided by the local guildmasters. 
These are lists which display for every price at which 
the optician buys in a frame the recommended retail 
price. These "calculators" have an interesting
Q
history. They originate in price-stop legislation of 
1937^ when guild-masters at the local level were 
required by law to guide their members as to the 
"right" prices to be charged, when prices were frozen 
by National Socialist -legislation at the time.
- 3 -
"Calculators” were issued in response and revised
editions were issued from time to time. This practice
continued quite openly after the second world war
until about 1970, when, for the first time, revised
editions of the calculators were sent anonymously to
opticians. Until that time guild-masters obviously
had no reservations about possible violations of
anti-monopoly legislation. This state of affairs
becomes understandable as it was as late as 1957 that
the Federal government had enacted anti-monopoly
legislation, the "Gesetz gegen
1 oWettbewerbsbeschraenkungen" which / prohibited
horizontal price agreements. Obviously, it took the 
guildmasters more than a decennium to realize that the 
practice of sending "calculators” to guild-members was 
very probably not within the law. The administrative 
agency set up to supervise the anti-monoply law, the 
"Bundeskartellamt" has not become aware of the 
practice and has not implemented any steps to stop 
it. In the profession the feeling is very strong up 
to this date that calculators are a legitimate device 
and it is universally used to "calculate" the prices 
of spectacle frames. It has already been shown that 
prices for spectacle lenses are uniform over the whole 
country as a consequence of the use of recommended 
retail price lists and therefore it can be concluded 
that, in effect, prices for spectacles are almost 
completely uniform over the whole of Germany and 
therefore resemble the highly cartelized pricing 
structure of other professions in Germany - with the 
important proviso that this commonality of prices is 
brought about without the legal backing which those 
other professions enjoy.
Turning now to the structure of the industry a 
number of interesting features can be noted. In 1983 
6384 firms were registered with the Zentralverband des 
deutschen Augenoptikerhandwerks (ZVA), which may be 
translated as the Federal Association of Ophhtalmic 
Opticians. Of these only approximately 600 had branch 
outlets. The average turnover was DM 780000 (i,
210000). Employment per firm was 6.6 employees 
including apprentices. Although there are 4 
nation-wide chains the turnover of these does not
account for more than 9 % of total turnover of the
11industry. These figures show an industry which is
predominantly small scale with no signs of a price
leader. The statistics on the size and cost structure
of the industry collected at the behest of the Federal
1 ?Association of Ophthalmic Opticians-^ lead to the 
conclusion that economies of scale are insignificant. 
On the contrary, firms in the industry are possessed 
of a great natural ability to follow profit 
opportunities. Setting up in business only requires 
the renting of premises in a suitable location and the 
acquisition of a modest stock of frames and lenses, 
furniture and workshop equipment. Net capital 
investment on average per firm was in 1982 
approximately DM 80000 (L21500), but a viable business 
can be started with half that amount if investment on 
display furniture and workshop equipment is kept to a 
minimum. These economic characteristics suggest that 
there are no significant barriers to entry arising 
from the usually cited obstacles such as economies of 
scale, initial capital requirements etc. There is 
little evidence of absolute cost barriers.
In order to explain the observed uniformity of
- 5 -
prices it could conceivably be argued that opticians* 
firms are local monopolies in many cases.The argument 
would run along the following lines: 10000 ■ inhabitants
in a locality is the minimum required to sustain an 
optician. A local market of up to 20000 inhabitants 
would thus constitute a local monopoly, because up to 
that size there is only room for one firm. It could 
further be argued that even a local market of 40000 
inhabitants would only sustain four firms/a number of 
firms which is prone to oligopolistic cooperation. 
Almost any community which has between 10 and 20 
thousand inhabitants serves as a trade center for its 
environs which will double the market potential. Thus 
communities of a size between 10- 20000 inhabitants 
would be prone to local monopoly or oligopoly. 14.5 
percent of the population of Germany lives in the 644 
cities and villages which have 10000 - 20000
i n h a b i t a n t s . T o  this figure must be added an unknown 
but probably considerable number of instances in which 
suburbs of larger cities in fact constitute local
markets not in excess of 40000 potential customers.
*1 hTherefore in more than 644 local markets there is 
scope for local monopoly or monopolistic cooperation 
and this monopoly power would explain the observed 
uniformity of prices. However, local monopoly cannot 
explain the observed commonality of prices as, 
firstly, 61% percent of the population lives in cities 
with larger local markets and secondly, demand curves 
must be expected to vary considerably between 
different locations; i.e., between rural areas and 
cities. Supply curves will also differ because of 
differences in wage levels, rents etc. For every 
monopolist there will therefore be a different optimal 
price. What has been said about local monopolies is
- 6 -
valid a fortiori concerning local oligopolies. There, 
the difficulties of hitting and sustaining the optimal 
prices for doint profit maximisation will increase the 
propensity for different monopoly prices to exist in 
different localities even further. Local monopoly and 
oligopoly cannot explain the extreme uniformity of 
prices all over Germany.
There are, however, aspects of the regulatory 
framework of the profession which may well provide a 
satisfactory answer and it is therefore proposed to 
consider this regulatory framework next.
1.3 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK.
The regulatory environment has essentially two 
roots:
1. The legal framework bestowed by the German Guild 
system, i.e. the "Handwerkergesetz"
(craft-law).
2. The legal framework given by the German
"National Health" system i.e. the
"Reichsversicherungsordnung" (imperial state 
9
insurance act).
1.3.1 The German Guild System.
Both sets of laws can best be understood when their 
historical origins are known. To begin with the 
craft-law: As Prussia gradually assumed power over the 
greater part of Germany during the 1 9Tth century it
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introduced free trade in all its newly acquired 
provinces. An exemption was made, however, for 
handicrafts which were considered to merit protective 
legislation even then. Thus the guilds retained one 
of their most important priviliges; namely the 
monopoly of their trade. It has already been
established that any person who wishes to set up a
business in one of the regulated crafts even today is 
required to have passed a master-craftsman examination 
(Meisterpruefung). Before he is allowed to sit the 
master-craftsman examination he or she must first have 
served a 3-years apprenticeship, must have passed the 
’’journeyman-examination” at the end of it and must 
have worked for at least two years as a journeyman.^  
The guilds conduct the journeyman and master-craftsman 
examination. Legally the guilds are private 
corporations run by elected committee and led by a
chairman traditionally called "Obermeister" (guild 
master). Whereas historically it has always been an 
object of guilds and other self-regulating bodies^ to 
ration the supply of competitors through the 
examination right conferred upon them, the crafts have 
been strictly limited in this respect by the 
craft-law.It provides for supervision by a body
specially created for the purpose - the
Handwerkskammer, (chamber of crafts) for an outside 
chairman and a senior journeyman on the examination 
committee. Subjects of examination are limited by a 
description of the occupation (Berufsbild) approved by 
the Ministry of Commerce.1^
The craft-law then, does not present great obstacles
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to acquiring the qualification necessary to set up in
business. The guilds are not in a position to
restrict entry into the profession to any significant
degree. This contention is true f however, only for
the situation as it was up to 1978. As from that date
opticians have succeeded to some extent in
strengthening entry barriers by accepting as
candidates for the master-craftsman examination only
those who have before received the college degree of
’’staatlich gepruef ter Augenoptiker. ” This degree
requires attending for at least two years a full-time
college course at one of & state-run optical 
1 Acolleges10 and the examination is rather difficult. 
Although this behaviour is very probably not within 
the law. the guilds have not been challenged so far. 
The capacity of the four colleges is great enough, 
however, to limit the supply of qualified opticians 
only to a qualified extent. For instance, in 1983 398 
opticians received the master-craftsman degree.1^ 
While there are no statistics covering the average age 
at which self-employed master-craftsmen leave their 
active professional life, the following rough 
estimation is instructive. The average age of 
qualification is 25 years. At this age the
opticians’’s life expectancy was 47.3 years in 1983.20 
It is reasonable to estimate that the average 
qualified optician works for about 35 years after 
graduation. Then out of the population of
approximately 8500 active master-craftsmen21. 242
leave the profession every year. There is then, a net 
addition of approximately 156 qualified opticians per 
year. It can be concluded that the situation
~ 9 -
described represents stiffer. but does not constitute 
a significant barrier to entry. A study of the market 
for spectacles compiled at the behest of the
pp
association of compulsory sickness funds comes to
similar conclusions:
"for ophthalmic opticians there are 4 no
severe barriers to entry due to the
legislatory framework.”2^
1.3.2 The German National Health System.
The second main determinant of the regulatory 
framework governing the optical profession in Germany 
is the state insurance act
(Reichsversicherungsordnung). It, too. has its origins 
in the late 19* th century. Like most national health 
insurance systems in Western Europe the German 
arrangement goes back to voluntary, cooperative 
"friendly societies" which were founded in order to 
provide basic coverage in the event of urgent medical 
needs. Bismarck gave them vigour and the backing of 
the state by introducing the then almost revolutionary 
state insurance act.2^ The state insurance act, in 
German "Reichsversicherungsordnung" has survived not 
only Bismarck’s resignation but has been accepted and 
expanded by such divergent governments as the Weimar 
Republic, Hitler’s Reich, the Allied occupation forces
•pfi
and the Federal Republic.
The original provisions of the act as well as the 
multitude of additions by statutory act, ordinance and
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court rulings have important bearing on the economic 
behaviour of the optical profession. A development 
which had not been envisaged by its founders, however, 
is perhaps the most important. Originally the 
sickness funds which administer the state insurance 
only insured persons considered to be in need. 
Gradually, an increasing proportion of the population 
came to be thus insured, until in the 1970s the funds 
were opened to more or less all comers so that today 
94 % of the population is insured by one of these 
f u n d s . T h i s  development had the important 
consequence that it is vital to every optician to be 
allowed to supply glasses under the state insurance 
act at the prescribed conditions and prices as 
otherwise he would be without customers. The prices 
and conditions at which spectacles are supplied to 
statutory sickness funds are negotiated between the 
federal association of opticians and the associations
0 Q
of statutory funds. One might suspect that this
prerogative gives the association of opticians the 
power to keep its members in line. If only members of 
the optical association were entitled to supply 
spectacles to statutory sickness funds this would 
indeed give the association enormous power. However, 
this is not the case. The association negotiates 
prices and conditions, but anybody holding the 
necessary qualifications is entitled to supply glasses 
to the statutory funds - even if he is not a member of 
the optical association. Guilds at the local level 
supervise in cooperation with the funds whether the 
necessary qualifications are held, but if this is the 
case they have no power to exclude anybody from
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business with the statutory funds.2^ Uniformity of 
prices is not, however, the only feature of pricing 
policy. It has been shown that 95% of the population 
are members of the statutory sickness funds which pay 
for spectacles of basic quality at prices agreed upon 
by the Association of Ophthalmic Opticians and the 
several Associations of compulsory sickness funds. 5% 
of the population, however, are not so covered, and 
therefore have to buy their spectacles privately. 
They, too, sometimes buy spectacles of basic quality. 
Comparison of the prices paid by "private" patients 
and by the statutory sickness funds provides a clue to 
another feature of the pricing policy which will play 
a prominent part in its explanation. This further 
important feature is the presence of price 
discrimination.
In Table 1 the prices of lenses of different powers 
paid by statutory insurance funds are compared to 
private prices.
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TABLE 1.
Prices of Spectacle Lenses paid by Insurance 
Funds Compared to Prices Paid Privately.
Lens Insurance Private
Power Fund Prices
Prices
Diopters DM DM
+ -2 11.45 22.50
+-4 12.40 24.00
+-6 15.60 27.00
+-8 21.25 32.50
+-10 27.&5 40.50
Source: Retail Price List, Rodenstock and Price 
List of the Association of Compulsory Funds.
The prices paid by the statutory sickness funds are 
between 49% and 33% lower than private prices. The 
pricing structure of opticians is therefore 
discriminatory. The price discrimination exists 
between insurance fund prices and private prices.
Price discrimination can only be found in a 
monopolistic environment. Only regulation can explain 
this monopolistic environment. It must therefore 
appear that the regulatory process will provide an 
explanation of the occurrence at the same time of 
price discrimination and common prices of spectacle 
frames and lenses of varying powers and qualities.
How can this effect of regulation be explained? This 
leads to a consideration of the complex field of the
- 13 -
theory of regulation. In the course of this study it 
will be shown that the particular theory required is 
Posner's theory of taxation by regulation. In order 
to Justify this claim it is first necessary to show 
that other theories of the effects of regulation are 
not adequate.
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Chapter 2
THE OPTICAL PROFESSION AND THE 
THEORY OF REGULATION.
2.1 THREE "THEORIES OF REGULATION.”
On reading overviews on the subject of regulation 
one is confronted with a wealth of different accounts 
and interpretations of the subject. This is only to 
be expected in a field claimed not only by economists 
but also by sociologists, political scientists and 
scholars working in a host of related fields, some of 
whom are mentioned in the three footnotes which 
follow. 3°, 31, 32
For the purposes of this study it is proposed to 
follow an article by Richard Posner^S which admirably 
sums up the historical and current debate. Use will 
also be made of an article by Joskow and N o l l ^  and 
the important contribution of George Stigler.35
The subject has proved rather intractable to neat 
theoretical solutions. It is therefore difficult to 
identify a single "theory of regulation". There are, 
rather, two strands of thought, which, however, are 
only rarely expressed in their pure form. Usually 
both of these ideas or "theories" enter any
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theoretical formulation to some extent and any 
particular author can only be identified as adhering 
to one or the other according to the emphasis he puts 
on one of these explanations of regulation. In their 
pure form these theories would be termed:
. 1) The public interest theory.
2) The "capture" theory.
These two aspects are merged to form a third theory:
what Joskow and Noll term:
3) The "political economic" theory of regulation 
formulated by George S t i g l e r . ^ 6
2.1.1 The "Public Interest" Theory.
The "public interest" theory assumes that regulation 
is necessary to protect the consumer from abuse by big 
business, mainly natural monopolies, and in cases 
where consumers are allegedly unable to Judge the 
quality of services rendered or products purchased. 
Under this view regulatory agencies are set up in 
order to remedy these instances of market failure.
In the last two decades the "public interest" theory 
has been subjected to empirical investigation by many 
prominent economists. If this theory were valid, 
regulation would mainly be found in highly 
concentrated industries where the danger of 
monopolistic exploitation is greatest. Posner,
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however, cites a host of examples which contradicts 
this. It may well be asked why prices and entry into 
the airline industry should be fixed by the 
g o v e r n m e n t .37 The case for railroad regulation has 
been q u e s t i o n e d . E v e n  in formerly unquestioned areas 
such as medicine, the legal professions and safety of 
d r u g s ,  39 -the necessity and the beneficial effects of 
regulation have come to be seriously doubted.
2.1.2 The "Capture" Theory.
Right from the beginning of modern economic science 
there have been proponents of quite a different view, 
which for want of a better term is usually described 
as the "capture" theory of regulation. According to 
Richard Posner this theory is held by an odd mixture 
of writers which includes, among others, Adam Smith, 
Karl Marx, "Ralph Nader-type mudrakers" and political 
scientists such as Bentley.^0
Generally it can be said that the "capture" theory 
holds that regulation is supplied in response to the 
demands of interest groups struggling among themselves 
to maximize the income of their members. According to 
this theory the impetus for regulation comes from the 
industry itself. It welcomes regulation as a vehicle 
which enables it to restrict output in order to charge 
higher prices and thereby to raise its profits and 
safeguard these gains by installing barriers against 
the entry of competition.
It is alleged that industries influence legislators 
to exact legislation which has the appearance of
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serving consumer interests and which remedies "market 
failure". Under this influence the legislator passes 
legislation and sets up a regulatory agency for 
implementation. These agencies are then "captured" 
and perverted in their aim by industry so that they 
serve the interests of those whom they are supposed to 
supervise.
Such an outcome is said to be likely for several 
reasons. It is argued that a fundamental asymmetry 
exists. While the interests of industry are 
well-organized and funded, because the very livelihood 
of the firms concerned is at stake, consumer interests 
are diffused and badly organized because only a very 
minor part of their interests is touched upon, as a 
particular industry concerns only a minute portion of 
consumers* budgets. It is argued further that 
regulatory legislation is presented in the guise of 
serving consumers* interests, so that no effective 
opposition is built up against the schemes of 
industrialists to turn the regulation to their
l i i
advantage.
2.1.3 The "Political Economic" Theory.
It must be recognized, though, that any puristic 
view as to the dominance of one of these theories is 
somewhat naive. Accordingly, refinements which take 
into account the essential conflict of interests and 
the solution of these conflicts through a political 
compromise have been added. The "capture" theory thus
- 18 -
tends to shade into what Joskow and Noll term the
"political economic" theory of regulation. This
approach owes much to the path-breaking article by
II ?George Stigler. The political economic theory of 
regulation seeks to apply the basic assumptions of 
economic theory, i.e. that human beings act mainly to 
promote their self-interest. Regulation is seen as a 
means of reaching or striking a compromise between 
these conflicting interests.
Stigler’s main contribution is to apply the concept 
of demand and supply to regulation. Industry can be 
said to have a demand curve for regulation; 
legislators provide the supply curve. Legislation 
will be supplied to the point where the cost of the 
provision of regulation equals the price the demanders 
are willing to pay. Stigler goes on to test the 
political economic theory of regulation empirically in 
two instances. One test concerns highway weight 
limitations for trucks, the other occupational 
licensing. Only the results of the study concerning 
trucks clearly supports his theory. The underlying 
ideas of the test are the following:
1. The higher the influence of the agricultural 
lobby in a state the more likely is legislation 
favourable to trucking in that state.
2. The longer the average railroad haul in a state 
the less is the opposition to heavy trucks, 
because at the time of the study (1930) trucks 
competed mainly in the short-haul business with 
railways.
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3. The better the quality of a high-way system the 
more favourable to trucks will a state’s 
legislators be.
For each of U 6 states of the United States the three 
criteria enumerated above were represented by 
statistical data, i.e. strength of agricultural lobby 
was represented by number of trucks per thousand of 
farming population. Average length of haul represents 
a second explanatory datum and percentage of highways 
with high quality surface was a third. The weight 
limit in each state was taken as dependent variable 
and a multiple regression was performed of the form:
X1 = a + bX3 + cX^ + dX5
where, X^ = weight limit on il-wheel trucks 
(in thousands of pounds), X 3 = truck per 
thousand of agricultural labour force, 1 9 3 0 ,
X^ = average length of railroad haul of 
freight traffic, 1 9 3 0, X^ = percentage of 
state roads with high-quality surface.
1930.
The regression yielded the following result:
X1 = 12.28 + 0.0336X3 + 0 .0287X4 + 0.2 6 &IX3 ; R2 =
0 . 502
The three explanatory variables are statistically 
significant (T-values exceed 2) and each works in the 
expected direction. R , the multiple correlation 
coefficient is 0.52 and can therefor be taken as sign 
that over 50% of variations are explained by the 
explanatory variables. This is a good result in an 
empirical study of this kind. It can therefore be 
concluded that the pattern of weight limits on trucks
- 20 -
supports the political economic theory of regulation.
In the second study Stigler estimated a regression 
in which the likelihood of a profession to obtain the 
right of licensure was explained by four variables. A 
positive effect would be exercised by:
1. The size of the occupation.
2. The per capita income of the occupation.
3. The concentration of the occupation in large
cities.
A negative influence would be exercised by:
1. The presence of a cohesive opposition to 
licensing.
The results of this study, however, are not
convincing. The R 2 ’s, the multiple correlation 
coefficients are small, i.e. they are < 0 . 2  for ten 
out of 11 occupations tested and more than half of the 
regression coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Although Stigler puts the disappointing 
result down to the crudity of the available data, he 
appears to rather fail in his empirical application of 
the model as far as one of the main fields of 
regulation, namely the field of occupational licensing 
is concerned. Nevertheless Stigler’s approach is a 
great step forward. The emphasis is now put on the 
goals of the legislator and of the regulatory agencies 
which have to implement the legislation. It is in 
this context that the application of the principle
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that humans are seen as trying to promote their 
self-interest can be most fruitfully applied. The 
bureaucrats of the regulatory agency wish to increase 
the size and standing of their agency and also their 
own, individual reputation, as in this way salaries 
and dob satisfaction are increased. To be able to 
increase its size the agency must minimize opposition 
to its decisions. The regulator serves several 
constituencies: the industry he is regulating, the 
legislators who have to approve the agency’s funds 
which ultimately determine salaries, and other 
interest groups such as customers of the industry, its 
employees, environmental pressure groups, etc. The 
outcome is a mixture of some effects predicted by the 
public interest theory and of others predicted by the 
capture theory.
2.2 EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE OPTICAL PROFESSION WHICH 
,S.UJPFC>RTS..-THE,-MO.PERN..T.HEOJBY .OF RES_U.LA.XI.-Qff,
Turning to the optical profession the question has 
to be asked whether this modern hybrid theory of 
regulation can explain the behaviour of the industry. 
Is there a ’’public interest” case for regulating the 
provision of spectacles? Prima facie, it would seem 
that a case exists. Do the craft laws and the 
national health regulation and the agencies set up to 
implement them create entry barriers which, it might
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be suspected, are used by opticians in order to raise
prices by collusion above the competitive level and
thus to pervert the original intention of the
regulation in such a way that their own economic 
interests are served? What, then, are the aspects of 
the provision of spectacles which potentially give 
rise to market failure? They fall into 3
categories.^
1. Externalities.
2. Natural monopoly.
3- Asymmetry of information.
2.2.1 Externalities.
A popular example of an externality in health care is 
the inoculation against contagious diseases. A third 
party, i.e. someone who is not inoculated receives a 
benefit; that of reduced risk without explicitly 
choosing to do so. Similarly, it can be argued that 
road users receive a benefit if all drivers are 
optimally corrected for sight-deficiencies. When 
spectacles are priced according to prices set in a 
free market system some drivers may not acquire the 
necessary spectacles and cause an accident. There is 
an external benefit to be derived if road users were 
to compensate drivers for their outlay on spectacle 
and still remain better off. The argument is that a 
free market system will fail to bring about such
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payments. Government intervention is called for in 
order to remedy this misallocation of resources for 
instance by supplying spectacles at reduced prices or 
even free of charge.
This argument is often put forward in a defence of 
the provision of spectacles as a free good. However, 
providing the entire population with free glasses may 
be a costly way of ensuring their provision to the 
subset who are also drivers. And there is another 
problem: those who refuse to wear their glasses out of
vanity and those who do not know that their visual 
acuity is not sufficient will not be covered. A 
compulsory sight-test for drivers might be 
preferable.
There is a much more subtle definition of 
externality than that underlying the argument 
conducted so far. It must be recognized that many 
people care about the amount of health care others 
receive. The interdependence of utility of different 
consumers has to be taken into account in the 
particular situation of a health care market. It is 
acknowledged that in this situation consumers derive 
utility from the provision of health care either free 
of charge or at subsidized prices to those whom they 
consider to be in need. This argument is at the heart 
of most of the arguments for intervention in health 
care markets, developed notably by T i t m u s s . H o w e v e r ,  
even if the provision of spectacles free of charge or 
at reduced prices to members of the German national 
health insurance system is rationalized in this way
-  2k  -
the objections raised previously remain: the practical
implementation will either be uneconomical or 
ineffective.
2.2.2 Natural Monopoly.
Natural monopoly may occur in a local market which is 
so small that only one provider may supply it. An
often cited example is the general practitioner in a 
remote rural area. It cannot be denied that such a 
case may exist for spectacles but it is very unlikely 
to be so common as to cause market failure. On page 6 
it was shown that a local monopoly can occur in only a 
fraction of local markets. Even if the argument is 
extended to cover local oligopoly only 29 % o f
consumers are affected. Furthermore, the power at the
disposal of the local monopolist or oligopolist is
severely restricted because search costs are not very 
high in the case of spectacles. In most cases they 
consist of the cost of transport and time spent to 
reach the nearest city-centre. Moreover, alternative 
arrangements are feasible: i.e. in the highlands of 
Scotland travelling opticians supply the population 
with glasses. In Germany, in remote areas spectacles 
are often supplied by Jewellers or watchmakers as a 
sideline, so that even very small markets can be 
supplied.
2.2.3 Asymmetry of Information.
In health care economics it is acknowledged that the 
patient makes the initial decision to contact a doctor
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of his choice; but typically the doctor makes the 
decision on how much health care at what cost shall be 
administered. It is often argued that the ensuing 
market failure warrants correction by some outside 
agency, presumably the government. Market failure of 
this kind is possible in the case of spectacles. To 
provide an example: it is extremely difficult to
envisage what a corrective lens of high power will 
look like in a particular frame. The consumer has to 
rely almost completely on the optician’s advice as to 
the appropriate frame to house such a lens and to the 
possibilities - often at considerable cost - to reduce 
the discomfort and unsightly appearance by way of 
’’fringe treatments” . The underlying asymmetry may
well be exploited by the provider and may provide an 
explanation of discrepancies of costs and prices in 
the case of spectacles. What one should expect as a 
consequence of this asymmetry of information, however, 
is second or even first degree price discrimination of 
the type which Fritz Machlup has termed personal 
discrimination with the more or less self-explanatory 
subheadings, ’’haggle-every-time” ,
”size-up-their-income” and ”measure-the-use” ,^  This
0
is the pricing behaviour to be expected in a market 
for health care services. In a famous article Reuben 
A. Kess e l ^  showed how this situation gives rise to 
differential pricing. He describes how a surgeon has 
no reservations about charging differential prices for 
the same service, namely an appendectomy, to rich and 
poor patients. In the case of spectacles, however, 
this type of price discrimination is not observed: the
same prices are charged to all consumers and these
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prices are the same all over Germany.
The asymmetry of information therefore does not in 
itself provide an adequate explanation of the pricing 
structure. On the other hand it does support the view 
that some intervention in the market might be in the 
"public interest”. The political economic theory of 
regulation would be supported if it could be shown 
that regulation in the "public interest" occurs and 
has been used by industrialists to "capture” the 
administrative agencies set up for their 
implementation which in turn enabled the profession to 
charge monopolistically inflated prices. Such 
regulation might take the form of entry requirements.
In chapter. 1 describing the economic characteristics 
of the optical profession it was shown that entry into 
the profession is indeed limited by the qualification 
requirement and that this statutory requirement has 
been fortified in practice by the requirement to hold 
the college degree in addition. Thus it could be 
argued that Stigler*s theory of regulation is 
supported. A closer look at the entry barriers 
reveals, however, that they are far too weak to
ti ftexplain the extraordinary pricing s t r u c t u r e . A n o t h e r  
possible source of monopoly power was shown to be the 
right of licensure conferred upon the guilds not by 
law but in practice by the fact that they negotiate 
the conditions under which spectacles are supplied 
under the national health system and supervise their 
execution. It was shown, however, that their 
disciplinary power derived from this right is too weak
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to serve as an explanation for the pricing structure; 
the guilds do not possess the right to exclude firms 
as long as these firms fulfill the formal
requirements.
Another explanation of the pricing structure must 
therefore be sought. A clue is given by a further 
interesting feature of the pricing structure to which 
attention has been drawn already.^ was shown that 
considerable price discrimination exists between the 
prices of the basic variety of spectacle lenses 
charged to private patients and charged to members of 
the sickness funds which administer the German
national health service. It is one of the main 
contentions of this study that the existence of 
uniform prices in conjunction with price 
discrimination can only be explained with an extension 
of Stigler*s theory which was first clearly stated by 
Richard P o s n e r . T h i s  theory shows that under
regulation it is frequently the case that a favoured 
section of consumers is provided with goods and 
services well below cost while the remaining, 
unfavoured part of the public is "taxed** by having to 
pay prices far in excess of marginal cost. This 
theory shall therefore be described in some detail.
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Chapter 3
THE OPTICAL PROFESSION AND THE THEORY OF TAXATION BY
REGULATION.
In every-day language monopolies are sometimes said
to "tax" their customers by extracting "high" prices.
It is in conformity with this use of language that
regulatory authorities can be said to impose taxes
upon industries which they regulate by allowing them
to charge prices above marginal cost for some of the
goods and services they supply. The proceeds from
bsuch taxes then go to susidise goods and services 
which are priced below marginal cost and would 
therefore either not be supplied at all or only at 
reduced quantities under a competitive environment. 
As the prices of these goods and services are lower 
than the competitive level, output of the industry 
will be expanded not only beyond what it would be 
under monopoly but beyond what it would reach under 
competition as well. Richard Posner goes to some 
length to emphasize that it is one of the major 
objectives of government regulation to make possible 
this provision of "internal subsidies":
whereby unremunerative services or goods 
are provided, sometimes indefinitely,out of 
the profits from providing other goods and 
services."51
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Posner goes on to argue that:
"To understand properly this and other 
phenomena we must assign another important 
purpose to regulation. We can call it 
"taxation by regulation."^2
It is not always easy to identify taxation by 
regulation or internal subsidisation. Internal 
subsidisation not only requires differential pricing, 
but also that the lower priced items be provided at 
prices which do not cover marginal cost properly 
computed. The problem is perhaps most fruitfully 
addressed by first exploring what does not constitute 
internal subsidisation.
3.1 THE THEORY OF TAXATION BY REGULATION.
Very often differential pricing has its origin in 
the normal profit-maximizing behaviour of a seller 
with some monopoly power who sees a chance to increase 
his profits by price discriminating. Such 
opportunities are ubiquitous in a market economy. 
Whenever customers can be divided up into different 
groups with different price elasticities these 
differences can be exploited by applying different 
mark-ups on marginal cost.
It is not always easy to distinguish such practices 
from legitimate charging of differential prices for 
what only superficially appear to be homogeneous 
goods. An example would be resort hotels which charge 
lower prices off-season than in-season. These rebates
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are economically justified insofar as revenue raised 
from off-season customers makes a contribution to cost 
which would not be forthcoming if a uniform rate were 
charged. The matter has been fully and admirably 
discussed with respect to peak load pricing in 
electricity supply and distribution. Electricity at 
peak and off-peak times gives rise to different 
capacity costs. Price differences are justified by 
these cost differences.^
It is now recognized that it may even make economic 
sense to sell some- commodities below marginal cost in 
a competitive market. There is still support for the
view that it makes sense because such sales can be
regarded as advertising costs which will, however, 
only be carried to the point where the marginal cost 
of the advertisement equals marginal revenue from the 
resulting increased turnover in other goods sold above 
marginal cost. This is the well-known case of the
super-market or national chain selling at less than 
wholesale-price. The same reasoning applies for 
instance to the sale by Kodak of cameras below 
marginal cost in order to increase the sale of
profitable instamatic films.
A more sinister example is that of predatory pricing 
with the aim of ousting competitors and then making a 
monopoly profit which more than outweighs the previous 
losses. John D. Rockefeller was accused and convicted 
of such practices^, a case which received enormous 
publicity and has found its way into popular 
knowledge.
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However, conditions in which such strategies pay are 
not easily met and much of the debate and allegations 
on this point may have to be relegated to economic 
folklore, as recent studies have revealed.^ In all 
these cases, it makes no business sense in the long 
run to sell anything below marginal cost. This 
reasoning is only common sense as a seller can always 
increase profits or diminish losses by discontinuing 
any loss-making activity. Therefore these types of 
price discrimination do not constitute taxation by 
regulation as defined by Posner. There is, however, 
another type of price discrimination, associated with 
either natural monopoly or with a regulatory 
environment which has been the subject of much 
debate. This is the case of price discrimination in 
conjunction with increasing returns.
This case may be illustrated in the following figure 
taken from Scherer^
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Fig. 1
Marginal Cost Pricing and Price Discrimination 
under Increasing Returns,
DM
LRAC
LRMC
QUANTITY X
LRATC is continuosly falling and consequently LRMC 
lies continuously below LRAC. It is desired to charge 
price P2, where LRMC cuts the demand curve. At this 
price quantity X 2 is provided, but at a loss. One way 
of making up for that loss is to divide customers into 
two groups, if this is feasible. Those customers 
represented by demand curve D D f with reservation 
prices higher than P^ are charged price P^, taking 
quantity off the market and yielding a profit shown 
by the simply shaded area. The rest is charged price 
P2 equal to marginal cost and takes quantity (Q2 
), thereby incurring a loss represented by the 
doubly shaded area., which is compensated for out of 
the profit. Scherer is careful to conclude dryly:
"the result of such price discrimination, 
often used in public utility industries, is 
the simultaneous attainment of allocative 
efficient output levels and financial 
self-sufficiency.^
Although the statement is correct for his assumptions 
more subtle analysis is clearly required. Such 
analyses are in abundant supply; for instance Kahn^® 
covers the debate admirably. Ultimately all the
authors attempt to find a justification for
ipricediscrimination under conditions of increasing 
returns. This family of arguments goes back to the 
notion that price discrimination allows regulated 
industries to pluck the fruits of increasing returns 
to scale and thereby to produce consumers surplus as a 
free good, so to speak. The argument started with 
appendix III of Pigou1s economics of welfare. In 
paragraph 26 an intriguing diagram is shown^.
Fig. 2
A Diagram by Pigou.
The supply curve of a commodity is SS^ sloping from 
left to right indicating increasing returns to scale. 
Demand curve D D ’ for the said commodity lies
continuously below SS^. Therefore neither under simple 
monopoly nor under perfect competition would the 
commodity be produced. Pigou draws a second supply 
curve SS2 t such that at any price such as Q on that 
curve total cost of output such as OM would be covered 
assuming first degree price discrimination were
practiced, because then area SQMO = area KPMO. If 
demand curve D D 1 is of such a shape that it cuts SS2 
in a point such as Q, then, under perfect price
discrimination output OM will cover its cost of 
production, provided area RQ > area SRD. This is the 
famous case of railway services provided to thinly 
populated areas where demand would not be sufficient 
to provide enough revenue when a uniform price is 
charged, but are viable under a system of price 
discrimination. This argument is used to justify 
differential pricing under regulation in a number of 
other c a s e s . I t  is true that such conditions may be 
plausibly argued to exist for some railway lines in 
the 19th century in America’s mid-west, but more often 
than not tTiese claims are exaggerated. The conditions 
under which this model' is applicable are extremely 
stringent. The model is more likely to be correct the 
steeper the slope of SS^, i.e., returns to scale have 
to be pronounced, and the less steep D D * is at higher 
prices i.e., demand has to be more elastic at high 
prices than at lower prices. The satisfaction of both 
these conditions simultaneously is a strong 
requirement which is not easily fulfilled. But, as
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empirical estimation, particularly of the demand curve 
is difficult, those who invoke this argument can 
always claim the benefit of doubt.
All cases which are made for price discrimination on 
welfare grounds are built around the original 
suggestion by Pigou that price discrimination will 
yield results superior to perfect competition under 
conditions of returns to scale and if demand curves 
are of a particular shape. They cannot, however, lay
claim to universal applicability. Posner’s model of
taxation by regulation on the other hand provides a 
perfectly adequate, simpler and empirically verifiable 
explanation of discriminatory pricing policies under 
regulation.
What speaks most in favour of his model is the 
empirical evidence which can be brought to 
substantiate it. Recently, compelling evidence has 
been compiled about pricing behaviour by 
interstate-airlines subject to regulation by the Civil 
Aeronautics B o a r d . T h i s  evidence shows that the CAB 
set airfares for short trips between smaller cities 
which did not cover marginal cost, because it deemed 
it desirable that such towns ’’should have their fair 
share of traffic’’. To compensate for this loss it
allowed airlines to charge prices far in excess of
marginal costs on routes such as that between New-York 
and Miami, where demand conditions permit such 
prices. These discrepancies between costs and prices 
were not established by the traditional type of cost 
inquiry which is always open to doubt mainly because
- 36 -
of the difficulty of allocating joint costs, but by 
irrefutable empirical observation. Costs per 
passenger -mile of unregulated airlines flying inter - 
state and not subject to CAB regulation were compared 
to costs of air-lines flying intra - state and 
therefore subject to CAB regulation. The costs of
unregulated airlines are 32 to k 7  percent lower than 
costs incurred by inter-state airlines regulated by 
the CAB for compatible distances. .
Posner discusses further evidence. He supplies two 
case studies which are particularly suited to make his 
point. One of them concerns the introduction of cable 
television in the U.S. Private companies supplying 
cable television services are granted an exclusive 
franchise for a given area. Obviously, there is the 
possibility that subscribers to cable television may 
be charged monopolistically inflated prices. The 
traditional view of regulation would suggest that rate 
regulation would be employed by municipal authorities 
to put a curb on such prices. Instead, municipalities 
charge franchisees fees which normally take the form 
of a percentage of revenues or the provision free of 
charge of channels for educational purposes and for
the use by other public services such as 
fire-departments. Both of these fee systems have the
effect of reducing the profits of cable companies and
also raise the prices of cable television to consumers 
above what they would be under unregulated monopoly. 
Posner concludes:
"A tax is imposed on cable subscribers for 
the benefit of whoever watches the dedicated 
channels or partakes of the revenues
generated...... Taxation by regulation can
explain otherwise completely puzzling 
observations.
Posner*s second case concerns international telegraph 
services. U.S. companies providing international
telegraph services, including teletype, and
1transmission of computei*data are regulated by the
\
Federal Communications Commission. Following a 
technological innovation by AT&T which installed 
under-sea cables capable of producing telegraph 
communications at a cost considerably below that of 
the international telegraph companies using their 
traditional methods. AT&T was prevented by the FCC
from competing with the established companies 
outright. Only a few years later communication 
satellites introduced even cheaper means of sending
telegraph services. The Commission again forbade
Comsat, the satellite company, to compete. In the 
course of an ensuing enquiry it turned out that the 
telegraph companies provided those services in the 
provision of which AT&T and Comsat proposed to 
compete, at a price which was nearly 100% above cost 
(it was actually the leasing of standing lines to 
large users). Although this fact was known to the FCC 
the telegraph companies were merely required to make 
some small price reductions but it did not allow 
competition from AT & T and Comsat. Posner goes on to 
explain that this persistent, indeed dogged behaviour 
of the FCC cannot be explained either by supposing 
that the Commission acted in the public interest nor 
by the opposite contention that the FCC had been 
"captured" by the telegraph companies. Clearly, it 
cannot be in the public interest to prevent a 
cheapening of services. But also, the capture theory
does not provide an answer since both the 
international telegraph companies and AT&T and Comsat 
are client industries of the Commission. As AT&T and 
Comsat are the bigger companies one would expect their 
influence to prevail before the Commission. Posnerfs 
explanation is that the telegraph companies provide 
ordinary telegraph services at a loss. These losses 
are compensated for by monopolistic profits from 
leasing standing lines to large users. This is 
precisely that market segment in which the competition 
was proposed. The Commission is therefore seeking to 
protect a particular class of customers. These 
customers are not big business but mainly small firms 
such as travel agents, some importers, even tourists 
and their families. These groups would have been hurt 
had the AT & T and Comsat been allowed to compete in 
the large user segment of the market for this would 
have compelled the telegraph companies either to raise 
their prices charged to the other groups or even to 
abandon these services altogether.
The two case studies bear out the main reason for 
cross-subsidisation. Some industries or customer 
groups 9 can, if they are sufficiently strong and 
vociferous, successfully exert pressure to obtain 
legislation favourable to themselves. This may take 
the form of low prices for goods or services required 
by them. Once favours are granted it is extremely 
difficult to remove them.
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3.1.1 Taxation by Regulation and Price Discrimination.
Posner does not explicitly address a most important 
question which arises in this context. The cross - 
subsidisation may take place between different
products sold by the same seller or it may take the 
form of the sale of the same product by one seller to 
different buyers at different prices. Posner’s cable 
television case bears out the difference well.
When the providers of cable television are charged a 
franchise fee by a municipality this results in prices
higher than what they would be without the fee.
Posner argues that the proceeds are used to pay for
other goods and services produced by the municipality; 
these goods and services are therefore provided more 
cheaply than would be the case in the absence of
franchise fees. The cross - subsidisation takes place 
between different goods and services. On the other 
hand, when certain television channels, for instance 
those used for educational purposes, are provided free 
of charge and the remaining channels are consequently 
provided at higher prices, then the same good or
service namely provision of cable channels is provided 
at different prices. The cross - subsidisation then 
has taken the form of price discrimination.
In the case of spectacle lenses it was shown that
the same products, namely lenses of basic quality are
sold at different prices to members of the compulsory 
funds and to private patients. This is a clear - cut 
case of price discrimination and cross - subsidisation
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in the same vein as in the examples given by Posner* is 
to be suspected. It is, however, likely that this is 
not the only instance of cross - subsidisation hidden 
in the price structure of spectacles. There is 
another feature in the pricing structure which merits 
attention.
There is an enormous range of spectacle frames and 
lenses on the market. Frames range in quality and 
price from the simplest variety made of plastic and 
selling at 'DM k 0.0 to hand - made varieties made of 
solid gold costing several thousand deutsche mark with 
literally thousands of different varieties in between 
these two extremes. The variety in lenses, although 
it cannot be measured in thousands, is also 
considerable. Spectacle lenses of a particular power 
come in different qualities which are described in 
detail in chapter 5 on product differentiation later 
on in this study .i.e., they may be made of plastic 
instead of the usual mineral glass, they may be 
tinted, may change their shade in bright light, etc. 
These additional features command, of course, higher 
prices than the basic quality. Those consumers who 
are members of the compulsory sickness funds do not 
have to be content with the. simple quality of frames 
and lenses which their funds provide free of charge. 
They may choose any frame and any type of lens 
provided they are willing to pay the "private" price. ■ 
In that case they do not even lose the sum of money 
paid by their funds; the amount which the fund pays is 
deducted from the "private" price and billed by the 
optician to the fund directly. Approximately 70% of
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all buyers choose better frames or better lenses or 
both. The prices of these better quality frames and 
lenses are unregulated. It must be suspected that 
cross - subsidisation occurs between the varieties 
which command "private" prices and the basic varieties 
provided by the compulsory funds at regulated prices. 
But to show this cross - subsidisation empirically is 
not an easy task, and in an attempt to do so some 
difficult questions have to be answered. For 
instance, the cross - subsidisation between the basic 
quality of lenses sold at prices higher than those for 
the same quality sold to the compulsory sickness funds 
is obviously a case of price discrimination. But, if 
there is cross - subsidisation between the better 
quality frames and lenses and those sold at regulated 
prices, it is not obvious that this constitutes price 
discrimination, too. The accepted definition of price 
discrimination states that price discrimination is the 
sale of the same commodity at different prices by one 
seller. The different varieties of spectacles sold to 
the funds and sold privately are, however, not 
strictly the same commodity but rather different 
varieties of the same commodity. This and other 
questions which will pose themselves in the co&rse of 
this study cannot be answered without a thorough 
understanding of some new developments in the theory 
of price discrimination. A description of these 
developments will therefore be attempted in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter k
THE THEORY OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
Zt.l HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY.
Traditionally, price discrimination is defined as the 
sale of the same good to different buyers by the same 
seller at different prices. This is the definition 
provided by A.C.Pigou. His "Economics of Welfare" ^  
was the first exhaustive treatment of the subject and 
can be regarded as the standard text even today. 
Refinements were added by many welljknown scholars, but 
the basic treatment of the subject did not alter 
substantially till very recently. To name only the 
most important contributions; Joan R o b i n s o n ^  s e -t u p  
an intricate mathematical model showing precisely 
under which conditions output of the discriminating 
monopolist will remain the same or will be less or
more than that of the monopolist charging a uniform
price. Paul Samuelson^ can be said to have given the 
theory its final formulation in which it has entered 
the modern textbook, while Fritz Machlup^ added a
vivid and exhaustive categorisation of types of price 
discrimination which may be encountered in real life. 
Although there has always remained some interest in 
the theory of price discrimination because it is
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important in legal cases* most notably in connection 
with the Robinson-Patman act in the United States, 
relatively little work was done in this field 
following the seemingly exhaustive treatment in the 
late fto*s and early 5o * s. However, in the original 
formulation by Pigou and Robinson as well as in 
writings which appeared after the second world war and 
in textbook accounts of the theory more complex (and 
perhaps more meaningful) cases of price discrimination 
are alluded to. Over the last decade or so a very 
sophisticated and specialized literature dealing with 
some of these more complex aspects has developed. In 
his recently (1983) published "Economics of Price
r q
Discrimination" L. Phlips gives the first overview 
of these new developments, which, although very 
specialized and somewhat fragmentary have nevertheless 
greatly enhanced the possibilities of applying the 
theory of price discrimination in empirical 
investigations. The following short outline of the 
theory of price discrimination attempts to combine the 
traditional approach with these new ideas.
ft.2 PREREQUISITES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
Telser^ has stated very clearly which four 
conditions have to be met in a market if price 
discrimination is to be possible:
1. Some monopoly power must be present.
2. It must be possible to sort out customers
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according to the intensity of their demand.
3* Demand must not be transferable between markets 
either totally or to some degree.
ft. Demand elasticities must differ in the different 
markets.
ft.2.1 Monopoly Power.
Monopoly power must be present because under 
conditions of perfect competition price discrimination 
could not exist, even if the market could easily be 
divided into different segments. As Joan Robinson has 
pointed out:
"each section of the market demand would 
be perfectly elastic and every seller would 
prefer to sell in that section of the market 
in which he could obtain the highest price.
The attempt to do so, of course, would drive 
the price down to the competitive level, and 
there would be only one price...
Originally monopoly in the sense of one single 
seller dominating a market for a good with no close 
substitutes was deemed necessary. Gradually, however, 
it is becoming realized that a downward sloping demand 
curve is all that is needed. Oligopolists and 
monopolistic competitors can all price discriminate.^1
ft.2.2 Market Segmentation.
In order to be able to engage in price discrimination 
the firm must be able to separate its total market
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into a number of submarkets. It must be possible to 
identify separate groups of customers who can be 
treated differently in terms of price. As mentioned 
earlier it is here that F. Machlup^2 made a most 
important contribution to the theory of price 
discrimination. In a rather unorthodox manner he 
describes the economic behaviour of price 
discriminating monopolists by giving labels to typical 
business practices which are very humorous but always 
"hit the nail on the head", while at the same time 
providing a classification which seems to have 
captured all conceivable guises in which price 
discrimination may occur in practice. If different 
prices in the different submarkets are to be charged 
arbitrage must not be possible. Customers who are 
charged lower prices must not be able to resell them 
to those who are charged higher prices. Often cited 
example are service industries, i.e. the doctor's or 
lawyer’s clients cannot resell the services rendered 
to them.
ft. 2.3 Different Demand Elasticities.
It will only be profitable for the firm to engage in 
price discrimination if the demand elasticities in the 
several submarkets are indeed different (assuming 
marginal cost to be unchanged by the allocation of 
output between markets).
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a.3 TYPES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
Following A.C.Pigou it has become customary to 
distinguish between 3 types of price discrimination,
i.e. those of the first, second and third degree.
ft.3*1 First and Second Degree Price Discrimination.
The best starting point is perhaps a description of 
second degree price discrimination. In this case the 
market is divided into several blocks of consumers. 
Consumers making up any one block are willing to pay 
more or less for the good on offer than members of 
other blocks, i.e. they have different reservation 
prices.
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Fig. 1
Second Degree Price Discrimination
MC = AC
Consider Fig. 1. Line D D ? is the standard demand 
curve. Marginal revenue curve is the dotted line. 
Line MC shows the marginal cost curve which in this 
case is assumed to be constant and equal to average 
cost. In the case of a single price policy price 
would be set by a monopolist at Pm and quantity sold 
would be Qm. Under price discrimination prices charged 
would be PI for quantity Q1, P2 for quantity Q2 - Q1 
and so on. A monopolist pursuing a single pricing 
policy would sell quantity Qm at price Pm; profit 
would then be represented by the rectangle N Pm K M. 
Under a policy of second degree price discrimination 
profits will be greater by an amount which is 
represented by the shaded areas. Triangles such as P, 
Pm J1 represent consumers’ surplus which remains even 
with second degree price discrimination. From figure 
1 it can further be seen that the more perfect the
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degree of price discrimination i.e. the more the
monopolist succeeds in dividing up his market into 
more and more submarkets, the smaller becomes the area 
covered by these triangles i.e. the more consumers
surplus is taken away. The limiting case would be
that in which all consumers surplus has been taken by
the monopolist and this would coincide with perfect or 
first degree price discrimination. A further point, 
well recognized by Pigou is that under second degree 
price discrimination output approaches the competitive 
level.
This last point is important from the point of view 
of welfare theory. Under first and second degree 
price discrimination the optimal set of prices is such 
that the price for the last unit (for first degree 
discrimination) or of the last block of units (under 
second degree discrimination) sold is equal to, or 
very nearly equal to, marginal cost. As output then 
approaches the competitive level, under the criterion 
of Pareto efficiency first and second degree price 
discrimination are optimal or approach optimality 
conditions, respectively. The only difference between 
these outcomes and the competitive solution concerns 
the distribution of income. Under competitive 
conditions all consumer surplus is left with 
consumers; under a regime of price discrimination 
buyers are stripped of part or all of their consumers 
surplus which goes to the price discriminator.
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k .3*2 Third Degree Price Discrimination.
Third degree price discrimination is quite 
different. Instead of dividing consumers into groups 
which are characterized by their common range of 
reservation prices, under a regime of third degree 
price discrimination consumers are split into groups 
according to some characteristic which they have in 
common. i.e. students get cheaper theatre tickets: 
they can be readily identified, can be expected to 
have more elastic demand functions and', what is most 
important in Pigou’s view discrimination in their 
favour will not arouse public
resentment.^^Diagrammatic representation of the 
equilibrium in third degree price discrimination is 
shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2
Third Degree Price Discrimination
DM DM
0 Qi Q 0 q2 Q
DM
Q
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The above diagram is well known and a version of it
can be found in almost any textbook of economics. It 
shall therefore not be discussed here in detail. 
Prices are such that marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost (here assumed to be constant). In the case of
two products discriminatory price P1 in the submarket
having the more inelastic demand schedule will be 
higher and price P2 in the more elastic market will be 
lower than the single monopoly price. In contrast to 
the case of more perfect discrimination under the 
assumption of linear demand curves the level of output 
under third degree price discrimination and under 
monopoly with a single price policy are the same, 
however. Consider Fig. 3:
Fig. 3
Output under Third Degree Price Discrimination
with Linear Demand Functions.
> 0; MC
A commodity is sold in two different markets with 
demand curves D-^  and D2 . Aggregate demand is then 
represented by the vertical summation of D^ and D2 =
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Dt. Marginal cost is assumed constant and represented 
by the line MC. A uniform price policy would result in 
an equilibrium output Qt at price Pt, which can be
envisaged as consisting of the two market clearing 
prices P-^  and P2 f o r  demand curves and D2 . In
essence the seller in pursuing a single-price policy 
is being guided by the price elasticity of the total 
demand for his output. On this basis he has made the 
profit-maximizing decision with respect to price and 
output.
In any instance in which the total market can be
divided up into submarkets with different demand
elasticities this is not, however, a truly equilibrium 
condition, for, in the more elastic market marginal 
revenue will be greater than marginal cost whereas in 
the less elastic market it will be less. Provided he 
can do so the monopolist will react by increasing 
output in the more elastic market from BH^ to
BG^,lowering the price from to that price on
directly above G1 (not shown). In the market in which 
demand is less elastic he will reduce his output from 
BH2 to BG2 and raise his price from P2 to that price 
on D2 which is directly above Gg. By these adjustments 
marginal revenues will be equated in each market and 
will also be equal to marginal cost.
Further, B + B H2 = BC and B G^ + B G2 = BC.
Hence H 2 G2 must equal G.^. The increase in output
in the more elastic market is exactly offset by the
decrease in output in the other market and total 
output is unchanged.^  The result can be generalized
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algebraically to the case of n markets and to 
non-linear demand and supply curves. Whereas for 
linear demand curves output remains unchanged even in 
the case of n markets, it has been shown by Joan 
R o b i n s o n , g e o m e t r i c a l l y ,  and algebraically by 
Schmalensee^ that with nonlinear demand curves output 
may be larger in the case of third degree price 
discrimination than it would be under single-price 
monopoly. It could therefore be argued in defense of 
the observed price discrimination in the market for 
spectacles that this pricing policy is superior to non 
discriminatory pricing. However, the conditions 
under which this would be the case are quite precise 
and when they are fully understood it will become 
rather obvious that they are not easily met in 
practice. Consider Fig. U .
Fig. 4
Output under Third Degree Price Discrimination 
With Non-linear Demand Functions.
In Fig. l i the straight line demand functions of Fig. 3
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are shown as lines tangent to three convex demand 
functions. The effect of convexity in the more 
elastic market is to move G^ to the right. The effect 
of convexity in the less elastic market is to move G2 
to the left. Thus the effect on output in both 
markets is greater with convex demand curves than with 
linear ones. Thus, whether or not total output is 
affected will depend on the degree of convexity of 
and D2 . Only if the more elastic demand curve is 
also more convex than is the less elastic demand curve 
D2 will total output increase. An additional 
influence would be exercised by a rising or falling 
marginal cost curve, a situation which is not shown in 
the figure. A rising marginal cost curve decreases 
the magnitude of the increase in output, but cannot 
altogether prevent it. The explanation is that output 
must increase if marginal cost is to be greater. A 
downward-sloping marginal cost curve will have the 
opposite effect of increasing output. The marginal 
cost curve can be so negatively sloped that the prices 
under price discrimination are lower in both markets. 
This result is often advanced as generally applicable 
to some markets (for instance electricity). However, 
such state of affairs can only occur if the demand 
function in the more elastic market is more convex and 
if the the slope of the marginal cost function is 
sufficiently negative. A negatively sloped supply 
function, or increasing returns to scale alone are not 
sufficient to permit the conclusion that price 
discrimination results in greater output and lower 
prices than would a uniform pricing policy.
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Pigou stressed the point that first and second 
degree price discrimination are rare occurrences in 
practice. Indeed, he argued:
"...in- real life the third degree only is 
found.
Although examples of real world first and second 
degree price discrimination readily come to mind - for 
instance the doctor who charges his patients 
discriminatory fees according to their income - P i g o u  
dismisses these instances as exceptional cases. He 
points out the obstacles which prevent the necessary 
bargaining at the individual level which would have to 
take place if first, or even second degree price 
discrimination were to succeed. As main obstacles he 
cites:
1 . "the enormous expense and trouble” , ^
2 . "offending the public sense of dustice",^9
Q n
3 . and the possibility of "bribery of agents",
Pigou’s authority is such that this contention has
never really been challenged. Phlips, it is true, 
ft 1questions it, but rather feebly. It will be one of 
the main contentions of this study to show that second 
degree price discrimination does play a significant 
role in the pricing behaviour of firms and is indeed 
essential to an understanding of pricing behaviour in 
the German optical industry. This may seem a very 
strong statement, but it is hoped to show in the 
course of the discussion that this contention is
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compatible with the generally held views and that it 
is nothing but a logical extension of the accepted 
theory of price discrimination once product 
differentiation is taken into account.
4.4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION COMBINED WITH PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION.
Any attempt to generalize the theory of price 
discrimination for the single-product case to the firm 
producing differentiated or multiple products raises 
difficulties of definition. Price discrimination is 
traditionally defined in terms of the single product 
firm. '
"It is the act of selling the same 
article, produced under a single control, at 
different prices to differentQp
customers..."oc
Joan Robinson herself and subsequent writers point out 
that some degree of differentiation of products may 
exist, but to them the case of price discrimination is 
in the main restricted to products being produced at 
either identical costs or at cost differences which 
are negligible for all practical purposes.
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a.a.l Third Degree Price Discrimination and Product
Differentiation.
If the costs of differentiating one variety of a 
good from another variety of the same good are more 
significant than those negligible differences assumed 
by traditional theory, then the firm can still be 
regarded as a single product firm, provided it 
produces only one line of products. An example is a 
Volkswagen "Golf" in the standard specification and a 
"GTI" version. In other words, price discrimination 
is not necessarily confined to the simple case of the 
same good sold at different prices in separate 
markets. It is natural to extend the definition to 
cases where additional characteristics are provided at 
additional cost. Prices in excess of additional cost 
would also constitute price discrimination. In 
discussions of spatial economics, particularly "basing 
point pricing" this fact has been recognized for a 
long time. Its general applicability, however, has 
only gradually and rather recently been recognized. 
L. Phlips explicitly extends the definition of price 
discrimination as follows.
"two varieties of a commodity ... sold (by 
the same seller) to two buyers at different 
net prices, the net price being the price 
(paid by the buyer) corrected for the cost 
associated with the product
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " . ^
Oh
Similar definitions can be found in Scherer, * Ekelund 
and Hulett,®^ and Demsetz.
This extended definition may, if care is not taken, 
give rise to ambiguities. Phlips himself realizes:
"price discrimination is likely to be a 
ubiquitous phenomenon , as most firms 
probably sell several varieties in separate
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markets under monopolistic conditions.
It might* therefore, appear that any price which 
deviates from marginal cost would constitute price 
discrimination according to this definition. It is 
the very essence of the theory of monopolistic 
competition to argue that, as product differentiation 
gives every firm its own, downward-sloping demand 
curve, price must be expected to deviate from marginal 
cost.
But two different cases have to be distinguished. 
Consider, first, a particular dealer of motorcars who 
offers extensive after sales service, prompt delivery, 
better terms for trading-in used cars etc. These 
services are characteristics offered as a bundle with 
the motorcars and a particular dealer’s prices will 
reflect the costs of providing them. They have to be 
taken into account when comparing one dealer’s prices 
with discount prices quoted by another seller who only 
offers rudimentary additional services. The prices of 
the first dealer may be in excess of marginal cost but 
this would not constitute a case of price 
discrimination, as this requires that one seller sells 
different varieties in different markets at different 
net prices. Thus, the proper example of price 
discrimination would be the case in which the dealer 
referred to above offers a ’’budget” model, the price 
of which perhaps does not even include sufficient 
provision for the cost of additional services, and a 
”de luxe” model offered at a price in excess of such 
costs.
Clearly, in this latter case our definition of price 
discrimination applies. The equilibrium condition for
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a discriminating monopolist is not altered. Profit is 
maximized by setting prices in the several markets 
such that marginal cost and marginal revenue are equal 
in each market. Taking the example of the "Volkswagen 
"Golf", if demand elasticity for the "GTI" version is 
less elastic than that for the standard car, then, if 
the seller is a profit maximizer the price for the 
more sophisticated version will necessarily exceed the 
sum of the price of the standard version plus the 
additional cost of the additional characteristics. 
This can be seen from Fig. 5.
Fig. 5
Third Degree Price Discrimination with Separate 
Cost;
MC
,Pi+ss{
MC+s
MC
0 X
5a 5b
Fig. 5a shows the equilibrium price P^ charged by a
monopolist facing demand curve D1 and cost curve MC 
(again assuming AC = M C ) for the "standard" version. 
Fig. 5b exhibits a more inelastic demand curve D2
faced by the same seller for the more sophisticated
version. Cost in this case is greater by the
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additional cost for additional characteristics, shown 
by the distance s. Here equilibrium price P2 at which 
marginal cost MC+s equals marginal revenue is higher 
than price P^+s which would be the price of the
standard version plus the cost incurred by providing 
the additional characteristics. Therefore, it is
possible to say in common sense terms that the buyer 
of the improved version has been ’’discriminated 
against’’.
So far only third degree price discrimination has 
been discussed. But since it has already been shown 
that second degree price discrimination is likely to 
occur in the market for spectacles, it is now
necessary to consider second degree price 
discrimination in more detail.
4.4.2 Prices, Cost and Output with Second Degree Price
Discrimination and Product Differentiation.
4.4.2.1 General remarks.
It was mentioned earlier that Prof. Pigou in his
Q Q
classical treatment of the subject00 emphasized the 
rare occurence in practice of second and first degree 
price discrimination. Louis Phlips, however, wonders 
"whether Pigou was correct in stating that first 
degree discrimination is of academic interest only".®^ 
What can be said of first degree discrimination will 
apply a fortiori to second degree. Indeed, Prof.
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Phlips gives a hint in his preliminaries:
"second degree price discrimination 
typically arises when self-selection devices 
are used.
and goes into the matter further in his treatment of 
product selection and surplus extraction through 
second-degree price discrimination.^1 But recognition 
of the practice of second degree price discrimination 
is much older. An example is the practice of "price 
skimming" first mentioned by Joel D e a n . ^  This 
practice consists in asking a very high price at the 
introduction of a product with novelty appeal and 
thereby extracting consumer surplus from that group of 
consumers with the highest reservation prices. By 
lowering the price in a second period the group with 
the next highest reservation prices is "skimmed", then 
by lowering the price again another group is reached 
and so on. In Germany, quite an interesting 
literature on pricing new products has appeared.^ In 
The U.S. a model incorporating different consumer 
"types" was developed by F.M. Bass and found 
wide-spread interest.^
All the models mentioned here are only applicable 
under rather special circumstances and appear to be of 
relatively minor importance when compared to another 
aspect: the possibilities opened up by second-degree
price discrimination through product differentiation. 
Again, this field has been worked before,notably by 
German economists, for instance H.v.Stackelberg.^5 The 
authors who quite explicitly addressed the problem 
which is of central interest to this study, however,
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are Herbert and Marlies Jacob. They developed a model 
of second-degree price discrimination when products 
are differentiated at a cost. ^6 The following 
exposition of price differentiation with product 
differentiation follows the Jacobs* article very 
closely.
Before the model of second degree price 
discrimination with product differentiation can be 
described it is important to be quite clear about the 
essential difference between second and third degree 
price-discrimination. With third degree price 
discrimination buyers are split into two or n 
subclasses which are distinguished from each other by 
some attribute on the buyer’s side which is outside 
the influence of the monopolist.
To give an example: The market for theater tickets
can be divided up into 3 separate markets for, say, 
students, old-age pensioners and the ordinary public. 
Each group will contain a mixture of all sorts of 
different reservation prices. When these are ordered 
hierarchically, three different demand ’’curves" will 
have established themselves. As can be expected in 
the example given, these curves will exhibit different 
slopes and setting a different price in each market 
will maximize profits. In this case some buyers will 
be excluded from buying although their reservation 
prices are actually charged in adjacent markets. This 
exclusion is a result brought about by dividing 
markets not according to relative height of 
reservation prices but according to some arbitrary
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characteristic, which has, however, to be used because 
dividing markets according to reservation prices is 
not possible.
With second degree discrimination the situation is 
quite different. Here, the monopolist perceives all 
buyers as being ranked in hierarchical order of their 
reservation prices.
Fig. 6
Market Division with Non-Linear Demand Curve and 
Second Degree Price Discrimination.
P
q2 Q0
Let the assumption be made that a firm selling a 
single product faces these reservation prices ordered 
hierarchically. Let it further be assumed that buyers 
are divided into subgroups according to their 
reservation prices in such way that if there are two 
groups all members of the first group will have 
reservation prices higher than those of the second
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group. If there are n groups the first group will 
have higher reservation prices than the second group, 
the second higher ones than the third and so on to the 
n-th group. Jacob and Jacob now ask what will be the 
optimal set of cost, output and prices in such a 
situation. They answer the question in steps. First, 
they derive a model under extremely restrictive 
assumptions. These assumptions are successively 
relaxed to make the model more realistic, but also, of 
course, more complicated. A model is finally arrived 
at, which, it will be shown can usefully be applied to 
the market for spectacles in Germany.
l i . 11.2.2 A simple model of second degree price 
discrimination
with product differentiation.
The demand curve is defined as:
P = f(Q); 
with the inverse function
Q = s(P)
The assumptions under which the first model is 
arrived at are:
Markets shall be separated such that at price P^ 
quantity will be taken, at price P2 quantity taken 
will be ^2"^! an<a at Price pn <3uantity Qn-(Qn-1) (See: 
fig. 6 ). The demand curve remains the same whether
- 6ft -
one price, two prices or n prices will be set. The 
marginal cost curve will be assumed to be constant. Then,
TC = C . Qn (1)
where, C = cost per unit, and TC = total cost.
Price differentiation is for the moment assumed to be costless.
Under these assumptions the following profit function can be 
defined:
n= Pj.Qj +.P-2^Q2“Qi? + P3^ 3"Q2^  + •“ “ °*Qn ^
a s  Q  d e p e n d s  o n  P, i . e .  Q  = g(P), t h e n ,
n = P r g(P,) + P2 [g(P2) - gtPj) ] + ... + pn [g(Pn) - g(pn_|) ^ ~ CQn (3)
A system of equations is obtained which defines the 
optimal set of prices P1 - Pn .
■^-■Pj.gHp,) - P2.g'(P2) = o
P2.g’(P2) + g(P2) - gCP,) - P3.g'(P2) = o
-Y-n = P .g'(P )■.+ g(Pn) - g(Pn_l) - c-8'(pn) = 0 <4)
n v
solving for P^ to Pn :
l l . k . 2 . 3  Second degree price discrimination 
with linear demand functions.
In general form 
the model derived so far can be written as:
p4 .. - scp,) + P  ) (6)
g'(P.) 1+1
where, i = l, 2 , 3 ,... ...  n
The function g(P^) is completely general.
Normally,however, in discussions of price
discrimination linear demand functions are used.
Algebraically they take the form:
P = a - bX (7)
with the inverse function:
X = a - P (8)
In equation (5) let P^ be the artificial price at 
quantity 0 and Pn the price at that quantity where 
price = cost. Equation (4) can then be rewritten:
Substituting (7):
P , = na + C
2 '
n+ 1
(n- 1 )a + 2C 
n+ 1
a + nC 
n+ 1
(1 0)
(11)
(1 2 )
These equations have some interesting properties 
which can be depicted geometrically as in Figure 7.
Fig. 7
Second Degree Price Discrimination Compared to 
single Monopoly Pricing.
Fig. 7 is drawn assuming: a = 17. c = 2, n = 4. where
07line CC = LRMC when MC is assumed to be constant7'and 
line aN = demand curve. Then according to equations 
(9) to' (12" *
= 4 ’ 1 7 + 2 = 14
ii U)
 
1
5
* 17 + 4 = 1 1
n IN,
 
1
5
* 17 + 6 = 8
5
P . = 17 + 8 = 5
4  5
From the equations and also from the figure (As(P2 “ pi ) 
= p2~^3 = P3 ~ ^  can be seen that for
profit-maximization distance a-C on the y-axis must be 
divided up into n+1 equal parts; also, assuming linear 
demand functions profits are maximised when quantities 
sold at these optimal prices are equalized:
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— ^ 2 _<^ 1 ~ ^3 "^2 — ^3
Total quantity sold becomes larger, though at a 
diminishing rate the greater is n. At the limit where 
n approaches infinity Pn becomes equal to C and output 
Qc equals output under perfect competition, a result 
which plays an important role in welfare economics. 
Profit becomes at the limit equal to the area of 
triangle a Pc C. As this triangle represents consumer 
surplus in the case of perfect competition it can be 
seen that second degree price discrimination carried 
to its limit, namely first degree price 
discrimination, captures total consumers surplus, but 
also results in the same quantity of output as would 
be the result under perfect competition.
4.4.2.4 A Numerical Example.
Price Pm set by a non-discriminating monopolist is 
determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue 
curve and the (marginal) cost curve. Jacob and Jacob 
compare quantities sold and profit realized by the 
simple monopolist to quantities sold and profits 
realized by the price discriminating monopolist. The
■ m
simple monopolist achieves a profit which is given by 
the formula:
J[ —  ^a ~ C ) 2 
4b
The discriminating monopolist who is able divide his 
market into 2 segments achieves profits of:
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when he is in a position to achieve a three-fold 
splitting of his markets, then:
H = (a - C)2 
8b
Accordingly, profit with two prices = 133 1/3 % of
profit achieved with a single monopoly price, with 3 
prices it is 150 % of the single monopoly profit.
Therefore the discriminating monopolist achieves 
profits 33% higher^ than that realized under
non-discriminating monopoly. When n=3 the increase is 
50% in both quantity and profit.
Price discrimination of the second degree appears, 
therefore, to be an extremely profitable strategy; it 
must be remembered, however, that the assumptions of 
the model are highly simplified. As already 
mentioned, Jacob and Jacob go on to modify their
assumptions step by step and these modifications which 
introduce increasingly realistic assumptions will be 
discussed in the following sections. ?
4.4.3 The Incorporation of Separate Costs into the 
Model.
If a seller offers several varieties of the same good 
in the market, then he may combine price
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discrimination and product differentiation. This 
calls for some additions and changes in the 
assumptions:
1. When several varieties of a commodity are 
produced, then it can no longer be assumed that 
these different varieties have the same costs: 
differential costs must be expected. In other 
words, additional characteristics imply 
additional separate costs.
2. When a change in a commodity is brought about by 
product differentiation, i.e. when additional 
characteristics are added to a basic commodity, 
then it is very likely that the reservation 
prices are affected, i.e. the reservation 
prices become higher and the curve P = f(Q) will 
change.
3. When additional characteristics are added to a 
commodity then the assumption that the demand 
curve does not shift its position is no longer 
realistic.
4.4.3*1 The general case. 0
A model will now be analysed which takes account of 
the first change in the basic assumptions. It is now 
assumed that different varieties of a commodity imply 
different costs.
As in the previous model a fixed demand curve is 
assumed. Markets are divided among groups of
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consumers as in Figure 6 , page 63 At Price 
quantity is taken, at price P2 quantity Q2 - is 
taken, etc. • Average costs are assumed to be
constant. Average costs for variety A = C + for
variety B = C + s 2 for variety C = C + S3 etc. s^, 
s2 , s3 ... may be positiv, negative or zero. Average 
costs may now be higher, smaller or equal to the
average costs of the single undifferentiated product. 
There is no cost inderdependence. Given these 
assumption the profit function of the firm becomes:
n = P j Q ,  + p2 ( q 2 -  Q | ) + p3( q 3 -  q 2 > .  ( c  + S ] )  Q | . . .  ( c  + S2)(p2 .
- ... (C + 3n)(Qn -
by rearranging:
n - (P, - s , )q , + (P2 - 8 2)<q 2 - Q,) + ... + (Pn - sn )(Qn - Qn_ j)
or:
n = P .Q + p (Q - a,) + ... + P (Q - Q .) - C.Q 
a 1 b 2 1 n hr n - I n
This is the same equation formally as the profit
function in the preceding section. Profitmaxizing
prices are therefore derived in the manner already 
described. When the original expressions (pi ~ sl^
(P2 - s2 ) etc. are substituted for P& , Pb , . . . Pn then 
the following simultaneous equations are obtained:
l l . U . 3 • 2 Price and product differentiation 
with linear demand functions.
As in the preceding section a linear demand function 
is assumed of the form:
P = a - bQ
Following the argument in the preceding section, therefore
and,
P1 = a+c + s1 (18)
P2 = P1+C (19)
Px = 2a + C + 2 s ± (20)
P2 = a + 2C + (21)
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4.3.3 A numerical example.
The situation is shown geometrically in Fig.8 .
Fig. 8
Second Degree Price Discrimination with Product 
Differentiation at a Cost.
As can be seen from Fig.8 monopoly profit without
price discrimination will be the area P„, P_ E C.m m
i
Monopoly profits under a regime of pricediscrimination 
are shown by the shaded areas. It is interesting to 
note the large change in profits associated with a 
comparatively small change in separate costs 
incurred. An everyday example of this effect are 
shirts which command a large increase in price if a 
small label of a well-known designer is added; the 
cost of which is almost negligible. Jacob and Jacob 
give a numerical example.
Let a = 20, c = 10, b = 1, = +1, s2 = +14.
When there is no differentiation.
Monopoly price, Pm = 150
Monopoly quantity, = 5 0
Monopoly profit II = 50(150-100) = 2500.
With differentiation, from ( 20 ) and ( 21 )
P ± = 166 2/3 + 9 = 175 2/3
P 2 = 133 1/3 + 5 = 138 1/3
= 24 1/3
Q2 = 37 1/3
and, profit will be
n j +n 2 = 3 7  l/3(138 1/3 - 101) + 24 l/3( 175 2/3 - 114) = 2894 1/3
Hence, through price differentiation combined with 
product differentiation at a cost the monopolist has
increased quantity sold to 61 2/3 i.e. increased it by
24% and increased profits by approximately 16%.
Although the two newly introduced varieties caused 
higher costs compared to the -original quality 
produced, the strategy paid its way by increasing both 
output and- profit substantially though not as much as 
when no additional costs had to be incurred.
4.4.4 The Model with Demand Changes taken into 
Account.
So far the impact of product-differentiation and 
price discrimination on output and profit have been 
considered under the assumption that the introduction 
of varieties with additional characteristics would not 
change the reservation prices of consumers. A
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moment’s reflection shows that this is a very 
unrealistic assumption. When, for instance, more 
horsepower is added to a car, at least some buyers 
will be prepared to pay a higher price for this than 
for the standard version. The situation is
illustrated in figure 9.
Fig. 9
Second Degree Price Discrimination with Product 
Differentiation: Demand Changes taken into 
account.
MC + s
MC
In figure 9. for expository purposes,the situation 
shown is that faced by a simple monopolist. With the 
introduction of additional characteristics at 
additional cost, cost rises from MC to (MC+s). This
was the assumption made in the preceding section. 
Monopoly price is then Pm provided there is no change 
in buyers* reservation prices. Now assume such a 
change does occur. The original demand curve D^ D is 
no longer applicable; it has changed to D^ * D. It is
important to note that the change considered here
implies both an increase in the intercept a, and a
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change in the slope b. Both changes are a consequence 
of the assumption that the reservation prices of 
consumers increase. But it is not assumed that the 
total quantity demanded increases, too. This may seem 
a rather severe restriction on assumptions. However, 
it will be shown later that this assumption is not 
unrealistic in the case of spectacles, because here 
regulation will cause the quantity demanded to change 
very little. In the situation depicted in figure 9. 
quantity Q*m and Price P ?m will both increase implying 
increased profits. If the monopolist can price 
discriminate further by introducing 2 to n varieties 
then, with the addition of every new variety, profits 
can be increased.
l l . l l . U . l  The general case.
From figure 9 it can be seen that not only profits 
but also quantities sold are increased. This increase 
in quantity shall be denoted by d. Then,
d - Q'm ~ «m < 22 >
d can be visualized as the additional quantity which 
the entrepreneur thinks he can sell because of the
introduction of an improved product. Later it will be
shown that this concept opens up interesting
possibilities of empirical verification.
Returning now to the case of n varieties of a
product these changes in quantity sold will be denoted
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by:
■ dl» d2 ’ d3...... dn
and n separate costs by
S1’ s2 ’ s3’ ‘ ‘ * sn
Applying the same reasoning as in the preceding 
section, i.e. formulating the profit function and 
optimizing it, the optimal set of n prices will again
be obtained:
p i = -  *(p.>'- d . + P,.
g'(p,>
P2 =
g(p,> - g(p2) - d2 +
z
g'(p2)
p = 8(Pn-l} - *(Pn) - dnn
g'(pn)
Generally, for the ith price:
P. = 1
g(p(i_,) - g<pi) - d.
J.
g'tPi)
4.U , a.2 The model with linear demand
Again, one can assume linear demand :
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'2
sn (23)
' . ,' + (s . - s . ,) (24)
l+l l l-l
a = P -bQ and its inverse. 
Then for the two-goods case
_ 2a + C 2s, - s_ 2bd, + bd_
t t — + 1 Z + I Z
P2 = a + 2 C + S1 + S2 + bd| + bd2
The second and third terms of these equations show 
respectively;
1. The influence of separate costs of additional 
characteristics on price and thereby profits.
2. The influence of the change of demand induced by 
the change in quantities sold on the market when 
additional characteristics are added to 
products. This can be considered as the change 
in the quality of the industry’s output.
As before, a very simple numerical example shall be 
calculated to illustrate the point. Assume the 
introduction of two new varieties to replace a 
formerly undifferentiated product. A linear demand 
function for the undifferentiated product is assumed:
P = 90 - 1 
marginal cost = average cost = 18 
increases in quantity: d^ = U , d p  = 10
increases in separate cost s^ = 2, s2 = 1 2 .
If total demand is assumed unchanged, then only the 
first two terms in the equation go into the estimation
of the optimal prices.
P1 = 180 + 18 + a - 12 = 63 1/3 
P2 = 90 36 + 2 + 12 = a6 2/3
With changes in demand taken account of from ( 25 )
and ( 26 ):
P '  ± = 180 + 18 + a - 12 + 8 -+ 10 = 69 1/3
P '2 = 90 + 36 + 2 + 12 + a + 10 = 51 1/3
The result is shown graphically in figure 10.
Fig. 10
Single Monopoly Pricing: Effect of Demand Changes
D M
MC
0  Q X
When changes in the reservation prices are taken into 
account, profits at prices P* P ’2 are equal to the 
rectangles bounded by the dotted lines. These can be 
compared to the smaller profits achieved under the 
assumption that no change in demand took place shown
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in the figure by the rectangles bounded by full 
lines. The result can be verified algebraically by 
multiplying the prices P1 , P2 , p 'i» p *2 ^  quantities
Q^ ’ ^ 2 ’ ^  * 1 * ^  * 2 *
The incentive to price discriminate is therefore 
greater when the assumption of an increase in 
reservation prices as a consequence of product 
differentiation at a cost is added.
a.a.5 Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation 
when
Changes in Quantity Demanded are taken into Account.
What has been said so far is valid under the 
assumption that the number of buyers demanding the 
product under observation does not change when 
qualities are varied. This assumption, again, is 
unduly restrictive, although it will be seen later on 
that in a regulated market like that for spectacles, 
this seemingly artificial condition may well come very 
close to reality. It is now proposed to consider the 
effect of dropping this assumption.
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Fig. 11
Single Monopoly Pricing: Effect of Changes in
Quantities Demanded Taken into Account.
D M
M O s
MC
In Fig. 11 the situation is shown for a simple
monopolist. It is assumed that he starts off by 
producing a single homogeneous good at constant cost 
MC. His optimal price will be at which quantity
is produced. Let us assume that he tries to increase 
his profits by introducing a superior quality of the 
product which entails additional cost s^ which is also 
constant. An increase in reservation prices will 
cause the demand curve to cut the vertical axis at a2 
instead of a^, • an effect that has already been
described. But, additionally, there is reason to
expect that more buyers will now demand the product as
they are lured away from competing products because of 
the superior quality of the newly introduced variety 
of the good under observation. Therefore quantity Q + 
v can be sold where v denotes the increase in quantity 
caused by additional buyers demanding the new
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variety. The shift in reservation prices and the 
increase in quantity demanded will have the combined 
effect of shifting the demand curve to the right as 
shown. The profit function in its general form has 
now to be changed:
H = (P-s) [g(p)'+ v (s,p)] - c[g(p) + v(s.p)]
In this equation s stands for the additional cost 
caused by the introduction of a new variety. s may be 
positive or negative, as it is quitje conceivable that 
the introduction of an inferior quality implying less 
additional cost may serve to increase profits. 
(p-s)g(p) measures the change in price under the 
assumption of no change in reservation prices when a 
new variety is introduced, and v(s,p) measures the 
change in quantity, which is due to the combined 
effect of a change in reservation prices and a change 
in the number of buyers. It should be noted that a 
change in v caused by a change in reservation prices 
cannot be distinguished from a change in v due to an 
increase in the number of buyers demanding the good 
after quality changes.
The explanatory variables in the equation are s, v 
and P. Prices and quantities are the dependent 
variables and have to be optimized. Profit-maximizing 
prices and quantities can then be calculated if 
function g(P) is estimated and if v, s and P f are 
known.
Because of the extreme complexity of the resulting 
equations, only the simplest case, namely the
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two-goods case will be considered. If two varieties 
are introduced instead of a single product, let
changes in quantity sold be denoted by and v2 , and
changes in cost by s^ and s2 . and v2 depend on
prices and P 2 , on separate costs s-^  and s2 and on
the prices of competing products which will be denoted 
by P*^ and P f2 » as the latter will determine the
increase in the number of buyers which is induced by
product-differentiation. Hence:
vrVpi’ p2’ V V PV (27)
v2=v2(p |, P2 , a,. s2 , P'2>. (28)
For two varieties, then, the profit function should 
be written:
n = g(P,, P2 , s,, s2 ,) = (P ,-s,) [g(P j) + V ^ P,, P2, S], s2 ,P' j) ]
+ (P2-82) [g(P2) - g(P,) + V2(P,, P2, s ,, s2> P'2) ] - C.Q
It would be quite futile to hope that with the help 
of such an equation profit maximizing prices and 
quantities could be calculated in real life 
situations. If this is true of only two varieties
what point is there in extending the equation to more 
than two varieties. A very similar formula is often 
described in textbooks of managerial economics.100 A 
mathematical approach has been suggested by Urban.101 
His treatment, however, concerns multiple products 
produced in variable proportions. The complexity 
usually leads to the abandonment of any attempt to 
calculate profit-maximizing prices for multiple
products in a formal way. Textbooks of managerial
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economics usually end their chapter on multiple 
product pricing by merely drawing attention to the 
practical difficulties of finding the optimal 
structure of prices. No link is established with the 
theory of price discrimination and the possibility of 
product differentiation is not explicitly taken into 
account.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A DYNAMIC CONTEXT.
So far the argument has been conducted under the 
assumption that the discriminating monopolist is free 
to set his prices and his output at will. In reality, 
of course, such conditions will probably never be 
found. They are just a conceptual limit used in
describing the structure of a market in which
monopolistic elements dominate, just as the case of
perfect competition is the conceptual limit of a 
market structure in which competitive elements are 
preponderant. Fortunately, recognition of competitive 
elements does not invalidate the argument conducted so 
far but can easily be incorporated into the model. It 
is true that in a competitive environment a situation 
as described in Jacob's model cannot be sustained.
But looked at in a dynamic context it becomes obvious 
that there is a tendency towards price and output
solutions suggested by the model. An analogy can be 
drawn with the role which Schumpeter assigns to
monopoly in the process of economic development. He
describes how the innovative entrepreneur attempts to
make what in a static sense may be called monopoly 
profits by introducing new products or varieties.
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102With time these profits are eroded by imitators.
But the innovation and its beneficial effects 
persist. Lipsey gives an example of the development 
in the market for ball-point pens which describes the 
process very w e l l . T h u s ,  in a static sense monopoly 
simply enables the entrepreneur to extract monoply 
profits from consumers. In a dynamic context profits 
are an incentive to innovation. Similarly, in a
static context price discrimination is a means to 
increase profits. In a dynamic context it is an
incentive to innovative product differentiation.
Concerning the market for spectacles it is quite
normal, therefore, to expect a certain degree of 
product differentiation which is due to the normal 
incentives exerted by the profit opportunities which
arise from such a strategy. But for spectacles more 
can be said. Posner’s model of taxation by regulation 
predicts that the regulatory authorities set the 
prices for certain products or varieties of products 
below marginal cost. It follows that there is an 
absolute necessity to make up for the consequential 
losses. To achieve this end the regulator permits or 
even assists in setting prices for unregulated 
products or varieties of the same product above cost 
in order to allow compensation for the loss incurred 
in the regulated section of the market. The model of 
Jacob and Jacob demonstrates how price discrimination 
of second degree is a realistic strategy if product 
differentiation at a cost is used for its 
implementation.
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The model not only emphasizes the presence of 
product differentiation strongly; even more: product
differentiation is a necessary assumption underlying 
the more sophisticated versions of the model. It 
should therefore be expected that a high degree of 
product differentiation exists in the market for 
spectacles.
But there are two further important reasons for this 
expectation
1. the normal incentive exerted by profit 
opportunities afforded by price discrimination.
2. the necessity to make profits from the sale of 
differentiated varieties of a product in order 
to pay for losses incurred by having to sell 
certain varieties at a loss because their prices 
are set by regulatory authorities below marginal 
cost.
The conditions for profit maximization underlying 
the model are, however, essentially static. The 
degree of product differentiation is assumed to be 
given. Looked at in a dynamic context an analogy can 
be drawn to the role which Schumpeter assigns to 
monopoly in respect to product innovation. In a $  
static sense monopoly simply enables the entrepreneur 
to extract monopoly profits from consumers. In a 
dynamic context monopoly profits are an incentive for 
innovation. In a static context second degree price 
discrimination is a means to make profits. In a 
dynamic context it is an incentive for innovative
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differentiation of products.
The model does not merely emphasise the role of 
product differentiation; for the more sophisticated 
versions it is a necessary assumption. It must, 
therefore, be shown that product differentiation is an 
integral feature of the market for spectacles and this 
is the next task to be addressed.
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Chapter 5
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION.
5.1 THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION.
Product differentiation can be defined as:
"the extent to which basically similar 
products vary in quality or other 
attributes".1
The idea goes back to Chamberlin’s Theory of 
Monopolistic C o m p e t i t i o n 1 0 ^  where the concept was used 
in order to define an industry which was envisaged as 
a group of firms producing closely substitutable 
products.
But the concept has also proved useful in studies 
concerning consumer choice. Recent work on the 
subject has been associated mainly with the names of 
Lancaster,10^ Griliches10 ,^ Spence10® and
Schmalensee.109 Lancaster and Spence provided insights 
into the theoretical aspects of consumer choice, 
Griliches opened up very useful avenues for empirical 
investigation, while Schmalensee’s account of the 
ready- to-eat-breakfast-cereals industry, was the 
forerunner of a multitude of empirical applications.
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A contribution which has not been widely recognized so 
far but is of vital importance to this study was made 
by Louis Phlips who suggested the concept of vertical 
and horizontal product discrimination following work 
done by Pilati.110
Lancaster was dissatisfied with the traditional 
approach to consumer theory which assumes that people 
evaluate the utility of, say, apples and pears and 
then decide how much they want to buy of each. He 
suggested that commodities are not bought for the sake 
of the commodities themselves but rather for the 
characteristics that they convey. In his view each 
good provides an array of characteristics and a good 
is best viewed as the bundle of attributes contained 
within it. An apple conveys to the person who eats it
a certain quantity of nutrition as well as a certain
amount of taste, smell amd texture. Lancaster and 
others used this approach to consumer theory in order 
to substitute for commodity space, where each 
dimension corresponds to a specific good, 
characteristics space in which each dimension
represents a specific characteristic such as
nutrition, taste, exercise, intellectual diversion,
social standing and so forth. Viewing commodities as 
bundles of such fundamental characteristics opens up 
very interesting applications in the pure theory of 
consumer choice, but empirical application encounters 
the difficulty of putting a quantitative measure to an 
esoteric concept such as intellectual diversion or 
taste.
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Griliches prepared the way for empirical
application. His original study was intended to come
to grips with the problem of quality change when
111constructing price indices. . He rediscovered an 
important idea first put forward in 1939 by Court? an 
engineer in General Motors, who deflated increases in 
car prices to take into account changes in their 
"quality content". A motor-car is viewed as a basic 
commodity providing transportation bundled with 
additional qualities such as length of car, more or 
less horse-power, interior fittings, weight etc. He 
argued that changes in these quality characteristics 
were at least partially responsible for changes in 
prices and when a price index was constructed such 
quality changes had to be taken into account.
The two approaches are not incompatible. Whereas it 
is intellectually more appealing to regard Lancastrian 
characteristics such as social standing as ultimate 
objectives of consumption, it is the physical 
characteristics which give rise to them. They can 
therefore be regarded as proxies and in empirical 
observation these proxies are in some way ascertained 
and can then be interpreted as substitutes for the 
more fundamental kind of characteristics which 
Lancaster had in mind.
A good example of this approach is a study by King
11?of the demand for housing characteristics. King
estimated prices of housing characteristics such as 
number of rooms, floor space, insulation, but also 
quality measures, such as neighbourhood, fire services
and garbage collection. He then condensed these 
characteristics to l l essentials; basic structure, 
quality, space and site and estimated by multiple 
regression their impact on house prices.
In like manner spectacles can be regarded as bundles 
of physical characteristics which find their 
expression in the multitude of different materials 
frames and lenses are made of. These physical 
characteristics are ultimately desired for the 
intangible qualities, i.e. social standing, comfort, 
safety etc. which they convey to the consumer.
5.1.1 Vertical and Horizontal Product Differentiation.
A most important contribution which has hitherto not 
yet found wide-spread recognition was made by Louis 
Phlips. According to Phlips there are two types of 
product differentiation, vertical and horizontal 
differentiation.
5.1.1.1 Vertical Differentiation.
Vertical differentiation is present when different 
varieties of a commodity are created by an increase or 
decrease in the absolute amount of the characteristics 
which make up a good in the Lancastrian sense. One 
can say that there is an increase or decrease in 
"quality".
An example is the difference between a Mercedes 19o
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and a Mercedes 300. According to theorists like 
Schmalensee and Pilati the introduction of
differentiated products serves to augment a firm's
market share. Thus Mercedes probably introduced the 
model 190 because it felt that the time had come for a 
small car at a prestigious price. The success proved 
the marketing managers right. But apart from trying 
to cover new market segments firms often try to 
enlarge their market share by introducing intermediate 
models in that range in which they are strong. Thus 
Volkswagen in 1983 introduced the "Santana" which is 
located between its "Passat" and the Audi 100. 
Examples are not confined to the market for
automobiles. Almost any product one can think of,
from groceries to household appliances, garments, 
jewelery or houses, almost any conceivable good is 
provided in ranges of vertically differentiated 
varieties.
5.1.1.2 Horizontal differentiation.
Horizontal differentiation can be said to exist when 
additional characteristics are added to a basic 
commodity. Phlips cites as one possibility the case 
where commodities are adapted to special usages. Thus 
a limousine is transformed into a shooting-break or a 
coupe. However, in his view the main vehicle used to 
achieve horizontal differentiation is the offering of 
a series of options. The customer is then asked to 
select that combination which best suits his tastes.
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In this way customers are seduced into revealing their 
reservation prices and the door is opened wide to the 
exercise of second degree price discrimination. As 
the number of options increases, it is even possible 
to approach perfect discrimination. As Phlips 
observed:
"One has the impression that extra options 
are overpriced, to extract the highest 
possible price from those who want fancy 
tyres or extra horse-power.” ° ■
Fig. 1
Vertical and Horizontal Product Differentiation 
according to Pilati.
R 3011.141
341.175 451.175
R70 (3.1171
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R15I1.4I _
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R4 (3.01
147.500 177.500
144.000 745.500
R4 (3 .1 0 1
107.075 140.100
100.000 700.000 300.000 400.000 BF
Fig.1 is taken from Pilati, page 66. It represents in 
a diagrammatic form the choice of Renault cars offered 
to the Belgian public on the 9th of October 1978. The 
vertical dimension represents vertical
differentiation, each line representing a specific 
model, i.e. Ril, R5> R6 etc. The price of the basic 
version is given below the beginning of each line. 
The length of the line represents the price range
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within which a model including all its varieties and 
combinations is available. There are three features 
to the diagram which warrant comment. First, it is 
interesting to note that no segment of the market is 
left out. Renault cars are supplied from a price of 
BF 109,875 to BF 458,125 (approx. t 15300 to L75300). 
But, secondly, price ranges overlap. Thus one could 
buy at BF 1,475»300 particular varieties of the 3 
models R4, R5. and R6. At BF 313 251 particular
varieties of 4 different models could be purchased, 
namely of the R17, Rl6, R18 and R2o. Phlips concludes 
that this fact "constitutes a clearcut case of price 
discrimination". 11*t Thirdly, the lengths of the 
different lines correspond to different degrees of 
horizontal differentiation. Apparently the more 
successful models, notably the R5» R16 and R18 tend to
be offered with a wider range of options than others. 
The same applies to the high end of the market, i.e. 
the R2o and R3o.
5.1.2 Horizontal Product Differentiation in 
Spectacles.
This device can usefully be applied to spectacles 
which are even more differentiated than cars. A pair 
of spectacles can only have one prescription, the one 
that corrects the patient’s vision optimally. As the 
dioptric power of a prescription is increased there is 
more of the characteristic correction of faulty vision 
being supplied. This is the reason for regarding
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spectacles of different prescription as vertically 
differentiated. On the other hand a particular 
prescription can be made up in a host of physically 
different varieties. Thus lenses may be made of 
plastic or silicate glass, may be tinted, phototropic 
etc., and frames may come in different materials, 
i.e. plastic, metal, may be differently coloured, 
designed by a famous "couturier", and so on. Such 
attributes add characteristics to the basic 
commodity. Such addition of characteristics 
constitutes horizontal differentiation according to 
Phlips and Pilati.
5. 1.2.1 Horizontal differentiation in spectacle 
lenses.
Lenses are differentiated physically by the different 
raw-materials they are made of and by what may be 
called various "fringe treatments" such as coatings 
applied to the lens which add a colour, enhance 
clarity, make the lens shatterproof etc. Lenses are 
made either of mineral glass or plastic. The staple 
product are lenses made of white ophthalmic crown 
o mineral glass. This type of lenses therefore 
constitutes the "basic quality". This basic quality 
can, however, be differentiated in a large number of 
ways.
One way of differentiating lenses is the usage of 
tinted glass. Tints are defined by their colour, 
i.e. grey or brown and by the percentage of light 
absorption. The absorption may be slight(12 -25%)
- 96 -
medium (< 5o%) or large >5o%).
Whereas formerly tinted glass with high and medium 
percentage of light absorption was quite common, 
nowadays only the slight shades are used-. Higher 
shades are obtained by the aesthetically superior
method of coating white glass with a colour surface 
and will be described together with other "fringe 
treatments.”
The shades are one of the main methods of 
differentiation and the process of differentiation in 
this respect has a long and interesting history. In 
the 192o*s the firm of Zeiss, Jena, obtained a patent 
on a tinted glass which absorbs infra-red light and
brought it onto the market under the trade-name of 
"Uropal." Great advantages were ascribed to it. It 
cut down glare, made for increased visual acuity and 
protected the eyes from harmful invisible radiation. 
Although no objective proof of these claims could be 
offered except that it would protect people exposed to 
excessive infra-red radiation such as is found in the 
tropics or in glass-works, the glass was a great 
success. Rival firms brought lenses on to the market 
which exhibited a slight pink tint. These lenses did 
not even absorb infra-red radiation, but the 
protective qualities came to be ascribed to them. As 
the pink variety was aesthetically much more pleasing 
than the greenish Zeiss lens it made eventually such
inroads on their sale that Zeiss was forced to
introduce a slight pink tint under the name rose which 
now accounts for over 80 percent of its sale of
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slightly shaded lenses. Thus one observes the 
astonishing result that a product the "healthiness" of 
which was never properly established was supersededby 
an imitation which did not eve possess the properties 
which gave rise to the original claim. The effect can 
be likened to the placebo effect of drugs. Whatever the 
medical pros and cons, to the economist this is an 
example of an additional characteristic. A relatively 
new development is photochromic glass which opened up 
a whole new range of possibilities for differentiating 
a particular . lens power. Photochromic glass 
"automatically" tints in sunlight and clears in the 
shade. The first patent was taken out in 1964 by 
Corning Glass Works for borosilicate glass. The 
British firm of Chance-Pilkington holds a patent for 
another variant, aluminophosphate glass. These two 
types of glass have different properties. The 
borosilicate glass changes colour more rapidly, 
whereas the aluminophosphate variety has a slower 
reaction time but compensates for this by obtaining a 
more aesthetically pleasing colour. It is also less 
temperature dependent] a disadvantage of the 
photochromic effect is that it is decreased in high 
temperatures. Additional types of photochromic glass 
have been introduced by the three main competitors in 
the field, i.e. Corning Glass Works of the U.S., 
Chance-Pilkington of Great Britain and Schott of 
Germany. Thus there exist nearly twenty different 
varieties of photochromic glass on the market today. A 
further type of differentiation is related to the 
refractive index of the glass or plastic. For 
prescription purposes one of the most important
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properties of the raw material of which a lens is made 
is its refractive index, which for the basic opthalmic 
crown glass is 1.523* The refractive index determines 
the relative thickness which a lens will take for a 
particular prescription. The higher the refractive 
index the thinner the lens. It is possible to make 
glass of higher index than 1.523. but unfortunately 
such glass has an undesirable side-effect: vision
becomes slightly blurred towards the edges of the 
lens, mainly because of colour aberrations. The 
cosmetic effect is, however, such that, for 
high-powered prescriptions, high-index glass is 
preferred. High refractive index glass is on offer 
for very strong lenses (above lo diopters) by all lens 
suppliers.
In 1983 the German firm of Carl Zeiss introduced a 
lens which combines a higher index with only slight 
disadvantages of the kind described. This lens is 
offered as an alternative to the normal ophthalmic 
crown glass in medium power ranges. Zeiss* 
competitor, Rodenstock, is offering at the same price 
a variety which cuts out harmful radiation from TV 
and, now a growing part of the market, computer 
screens.
Until about the end of the second world-war glass 
was the only material used to make spectacle lenses. 
The first firm to make ophthalmic lenses of plastic 
material was Combined Optical Industries of Slough, 
England. They used Polymethyl Methacrylate, and 
marketed a range of lenses under the trade name Igard.
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Polymethyl methacrylate or PMM, as it is usually 
referred to in the trade, is rather soft and hence 
liable to abrasion. These lenses were not 
particularly successful. They contained a negative 
new characteristic, namely softness.
The situation, however, has been changed, to an 
extent at least, when an improved version came on to 
the market. It was a product of the war effort. When 
an American company, the Columbia Southern Chemical 
Co., experimented with allyl diglycol carbonate to 
produce plastic windshields for aircraft, one of the 
experiments. Charge Number 39. proved to be a 
material well suited not only for windshields but also 
for spectacle lenses. CR 39 was registered as its 
trade name and it has become known by this name in the 
optical industry. The technique implied in making 
ophthalmic lenses from CR 39 was developed by Dr. 
Graham of Amorlite Co. in California. In Europe his 
method was improved upon by Essilor of France who 
began selling a series of plastic lenses under the 
trade name of Orma 1000 in 1956. In Germany plastic
lenses never accounted for more than 8% of the market 
till 1978 when a method was invented to coat plastic
lenses with an antireflex coating which made these
lenses both scratch- resistant and better-looking.
Anti-reflex coating is a so - called "fringe" 
treatment of lenses which has become one of the main 
vehicles of enhancing spectacle lenses and therefore 
an important new method of differentiation. Mineral
glass and to a lesser extent also plastic can be
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coated in high vacuum with extremely thin 
(approximately. 5mikron) layers of metal-compounds. 
These layers essentially serve two purposes:
- They reduce reflection,
they colour the lens.
No lens is completely transparent; it reflects some of 
the light incident upon it, which may be diverted into 
the eye, causing discomfort such as glare etc. These 
reflections also conceal the wearer's eyes thus 
creating an unsightly and isolating effect. 
Anti-reflex coatings reduce reflection up to 12-fold. 
In 1983 53% of all spectacle lenses supplied in
Germany were anti-reflex coated. Anti-reflex coating 
of spectacle lenses was developed by Carl Zeiss in 
1959. It took competitors several years to master the 
technique. Zeiss improved their method steadily and 
are regarded to this day as leading in quality as well 
as having pioneered most of the advances in this 
field, i.e. antireflex-coatings of different degrees 
of efficacy. Apart from becoming more and more 
scratch-resistant, coatings nowadays come in 
"ordinary" (4-fold decrease of reflection) "medium 
(6-fold decrease of reflection) and "super" (12-fold 
decrease of reflection) quality.
With any anti-reflex coating there remains a 
residual "colour tinge" the "blueness" perceived in 
coated lenses, for instance camera lenses. A change 
in the residual tint gave rise to another 
differentiation introduced by Zeiss in 1984; the
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"golden" anti-reflex coating.
The other application of ultra-thin metal layers on 
spectacle lenses pioneered by Zeiss is
colour-coating. The Zeiss specific variety known as 
Umbra is still marginally superior to its nearest 
competitor's. Nevertheless, all lens suppliers 
produce competitive qualities of colour coating 
today.
A very popular combination is slight tints with 
anti-reflex coating. This offers the ultimate in 
efficient function and aesthetic appearance. The tint 
may be a slight pink but this is hardly noticeable and 
takes the "bespectacled" look away from spectacle 
lenses. It may be a slight brown, grey or violet 
giving the sophisticated effect of eye shades. For 
technical reasons variations of colour are somewhat 
restricted with mineral glass but any colour can be 
obtained in plastic lenses by controlled dipping into 
the desired colour mix. Special effects are arrived 
at by making colours by graduating the colours from 
the upper to the lower half of the lens. The latest 
craze is lenses which show different colours in their 
upper and lower half.
Another major feature of differentiation is the size 
of lens. In the late sixties it became fashionable to 
wear out-size lenses. The industry at first had to 
make such lenses to order at immense cost. But it 
responded to the new fashion by mass-producing outsize 
lenses as soon as they caught on. Prices, however, 
have not come down very much from their original
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level,and lens size therefore constitutes another
significant method of differentiation.
The list of differentiation techniques would be 
incomplete without mentioning the little monograms 
that can be engraved on lenses and the fancy bevels 
which add more exotic feature.
This short account paints a vivid picture of the 
many physical characteristics which can be added to 
the basic variety of a prescription lens. No mention 
has been made so far of those more fundamental
characteristics which Lancaster clearly had in mind. 
The categorisation of such characteristics is
necessarily a highly subjective matter, but the 
establishment of appropriate categories may not be an 
unsurmountable task. The following categories suggest 
themselves: comfort, aesthetic appeal, novelty appeal, 
safety, "healthiness". But these ultimate
characteristics have to be derived from the physical 
characteristics. King, in his housing study has shown 
how this can be done. He derived four ultimate,
Lancastrian characteristics such as convenience, 
standing, comfort etc. from twenty-four physical 
characteristics such as location, quality of garbage 
collection, size of garden etc. With spectacles, 
however, a particular difficulty has to be faced: one 
physical characteristic may give rise to several of 
the Lancastrian characteristics. It would therefore 
be necessary to assign absolute values to these 
intangibles. There is a major, question as to whether 
the positive possibilities outweigh the uncertainties
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necessarily attached to such efforts. It is proposed 
here to discard this possibility in favour of using 
the observable and often measurable physical 
characteristics outlined in this section.
5.1.2.2 Horizontal differentiation in spectacle 
frames.
The basic function of a frame is to hold the lenses 
in the correct position, firmly and comfortably in 
front of the fullfilmonifr.’ c eyes. But the fullfilment 
of this very basic function still allows considerable 
scope for product differentiation. Frames may be made 
either of metal or plastic. They may be physically 
differentiated also by their colour, weight, shape 
etc.; by being designed for special purposes e.g.
sports frames, children’s frames, safety frames, 
folding spectacles, lorgnettes, make-up spectacles to 
name the varieties most commonly met, while a further, 
perhaps the most important feature differentiating 
frames, however, is the attachment of a trade-mark or 
designer’s name to it.
Plastic is a generic name covering a variety of 
perhaps thousands of chemical compounds, only about 
half a dozen of which are used in frame-making.
Different technologies have to be used with different
plastics giving rise to differences in various
technical properties and the aesthetic appearance of 
frames depending on what kind of plastic has been used 
in their manufacture.
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Until about i960 the predominant plastic materials 
used in frame-making were cellulose acetate and
cellulose nitrate. These materials came in sheets up 
to 6mm thick in a limited range of mostly 
semi-transparent colours and colour patterns. To make 
frames from these sheets, they were first cut into 
slabs of appropriate size and frames were made by 
cutting, milling the final shape and polishing the 
final product more or less by hand.
Increasingly refined methods of cutting and milling 
were introduced so that the original flat appearance 
of frames has now given way to a three-dimensional
effect somewhat on the lines of artistic ivory 
cutting. Innovations were made not only in the actual 
processes of cutting and milling but also in the 
process of manufacturing the raw-material. The
original process of producing patterns of various 
colours was one of stacking sheets of different 
colours in a criss-cross fashion, bonding them 
together and then cutting them again vertically. Thus 
imitations of genuine tortoise-shell were eventually 
produced, but variations in colours and patterns were 
introduced gradually. An important innovation was the 
extrusion of acetate sheets giving rise to an almost
infinite variety of different colours and patterns.
These innovations were made not by frame makers but 
by the producers of acetate, most notably by Dynamit 
Nobel of Troisdorf, Germany, who were the first 
company to make extruded material. Others soon 
followed with their own methods and in this process of
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innovation many smaller* makers ‘either ceased • to 
produce or merged with others. Today there are only 
six makers of acetate sheet in Europe:
1. Dynamit Nobel of Troisdorf, Germany.
2. Mazzucchelli Celluloid of Castiglione, Italy, 
who took over the huge celluloid plant owned by 
Rhone Poulenc in France and today are the 
largest producer in the world.
3. LA.ES. of Figliaro, Italy.
H .  Optinova of Venegano, Italy.
5. Courtaulds, Ltd. of Derby, England.
6. Bayer A.G of Leverkusen, Germany, who
manufacture sheets of cellulose proprionate 
rather than of cellulose acetate.
About H o % of spectacle frames are made from metal.
Metal frames should be corrosion resistant,, light,
strong and adjustable to the individual wearer's 
head. One of the most important properties is
corrosion resistance which was traditionally achieved 
by making metal frames of ’’Gold Filled” also known as 
Double. Double consists of a base of metal such as 
bronze or nickel onto which a layer of gold alloy is 
bonded by heat and pressure so that the materials 
become physically inseparable. There are different 
varieties of Double according to thickness and
fineness of the gold layer giving rise to 
differentiation in the final product.
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With the high price of gold in recent .years a spurt 
of innovation in the manufacture of metal frames set 
in giving rise to almost endless opportunities for 
differentiation. Frames are now made from pure nickel 
or various nickel alloys and are corrosion-protected 
by chromium plating. Chromium plating can be of a 
silverish colour or grey and even black (when combined 
with chromium oxide). When plating is used the 
designer has much more freedom to produce shapes and 
forms which might be difficult or even impossible to 
produce in Gold Filled with the necessity to preserve 
the gold skin intact. Thus an array of new models 
emerged made of metal which appealed to the younger 
and more fashion-conscious consumer who had hitherto 
scorned metal frames because of their ’’stodgy” image.
Galvanic plating has in turn been superseded in 
recent years as metal frames were coated with a thin 
layer of coloured plastic material. In this way metal 
frames can be produced in all colours of the rainbow. 
If the plastic used is transparent it can be dyed 
afterwards in two or more different colours on 
different sections of the frame.
In the account of frame making mention has so far 
been made only of the ’’giants” in the trade,
Rodenstock and Zeiss of Germany, Anger of Austria and 
Essilor of France. As far as frames are concerned 
these companies do exert great influence and their 
market share is considerable although no exact
quantitative estimate can be made due to lack of
data. The author’s informed guess would put it at
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less than 2o%.
Judging from their sheer numbers independent 
suppliers must have the greater share of the market. 
There are 3 large suppliers besides those already 
mentioned, Metzler, Menrad and Silhouette and 
approximately another 125 smaller independent 
suppliers, mostly wholesalers, but also manufacturers 
who deal exclusively or partly in spectacle frames.
Wholesalers buy their frames mainly . from 
manufacturers in Italy and France, and recently also 
from the far East. Italy and France have a very lively 
and innovative frame-making industry consisting mainly 
of smaller firms which tend to cluster in certain 
regions. In France they are located in the Jura, with 
Oyonnax and Morez as the frame making cities, and in 
Paris. In Italy the industry is concentrated in and
around the Valle di Cadore in the Italian Alps and
around Milan. These firms tend to be very innovative
producing thousands of new models of plastic as well 
as metal frames per year.
Often new methods of production and new fashions are 
not introduced by big firms like Rodenstock or Zeiss 
but by these smaller companies usually run by 
owner-entrepreneurs. Thus, coating of metal frames by 
means of coloured plastic originally came from the 
small firm of DESIL in the Valle di Cadore. The
fashion of making frames in the style of the thirties 
also originated in Italy.
The latest fashion impetus came from an outsider, a
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Swedish company, Polaris, who brought an eight-hole 
rimless frame onto the market with facetted and tinted 
plastic lenses. Lens shape, facetting and lens colour 
(often two-tone) are part of the style and can be 
widely varied so that the customer may style his 
individual eyewear. Within a few months several dozen 
competitors brought similar frames onto the market and 
the fashion has now passed its peak.
An interesting new development is the appearance on 
the market of many collections of frames sold under a 
specific name which may be that of a haute couture 
house, a film star or a sports celebrity. The method 
was introduced by the innovative Wilhelm Anger, 
inventor of the Optyl frame, who secured the famous 
name of Dior for his collection. Dior frames exhibit 
the DIOR logo rather conspicuously on the templates 
thus adding ’’Leibenstein” snob appeal much as a 
’’Hermes” or ’’Dior” sign on a silk scarf or the famous 
crocodile on sports shirts. It is widely believed in 
the trade that Christian Dior had no part in the 
design of his spectacle collection which is perhaps
just as well as a line actually designed by the famous
I
couturier Pucci was rather a fiasco. Very successful 
lines besides Dior were a sunglass range by ’’Porsche 
design” and ’’Nina Ricci” . The latest addition to the 
field is ’’Cartier” who were the first to ’’launch” 
their appearance in the optical field by inviting 
fashion reporters to Tunis where they met pop star and 
now spectacle promoter Elton John, sporting his new 
’’Cartier” glasses. ’’Cartier” frames retail for 
approximately L15o.o and are produced and sold by
Essilor, the leading French Optical company. A 
no-name frame of similar quality would retail at less 
than half that price. These successes have produced 
their crop of imitators and a list of "haute couture” 
and similar collections together with the companies 
manufacturing them is given in TABLE 2.
TABLE 1.
Frame Collections sold Under Name of Fashion House.
Name Manufacturer or 
Distributor
City and Country
Alfa Romeo Liven Intern. Milan, Italy
Balenciaga S.A.M.P. Annecy, France
Cartier Essilor Creteil, France
Charles Jourdan Hennert Bois-le-Roi, France
Christian Dior Optyl Munich, W.Germany
Dunhill Optyl Munich, W.Germany
Emilio Pucci Grasset Oyonnax, France
Givenchy Vertex Optical Driffield, England
Gloria Vanderbilt Zyloware Long Island, USA
Gucci Modissa Porto Mantovano, Italy
Guy Laroche Grasset Oyonnax, France
Jacques Fath Serrano Boissise-le-Roi,France
Jean Patou Societe Gome Bois-Colombes, France
Lanvin BK Optic Paris, France
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Maggy Rouff 
Nina Ricci 
Paolo Rossi 
Pierre Cardin 
Rochas
Sophia Loren 
Ted Lapidus 
Yves Chantal 
Yves St. Laurent
Opt-Art 
S.A.M.P.
Fedon Occhiali 
Styloptic 
S. A.M. P.
Zylowware 
L ’amy Jeune Fils 
Marwitz & Hauser 
Plastinax
Paris, France 
Annecy, France 
Cadore, Italy 
Paris, France 
Annecy, France 
Long Island, USA 
Morez, France 
Stuttgart, W.Germany 
Oyonnax, France
5.1*3 Vertical Product Differentiation in Spectacles.
Spectacles are differentiated vertically in three 
ways:
1. According to dioptric power
2. According to whether a new frame is included or
whether lenses are dispensed into a frame 
supplied by the customer.
3. According to whether the prescription dispensed
is single or multi focus.
5.1.3.1 Product differentiation between lenses of 
different power.
There is an enormous range of values which an optical 
prescription may take. Firstly, a person requiring 
visual correction .may be either short-sighted, or 
long-sighted. Lenses correcting short-sightedness are 
concave and designated by a minus sign. Hyperopic
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lenses are convex and designated by a plus sign. The 
power of spectacle lenses, whether plus or minus, is 
specified in diopters, which are the units of 
measurement. One diopter is defined as the power of a 
lens of focal length 1 meter. Spectacles are normally 
dispensed in 1/4. diopter intervals from zero power to 
approximately. +/- 20 dpts. This adds up to 20 x & x 
2 = 160 possible lens powers. For pricing purposes 
this number is reduced considerably. First of all 
plus and minus lenses are sold at the same prices thus 
reducing the number of possibilities by half. 
Furthermore, spectacle lenses are divided up into 
ranges of equal prices. Thus, lenses from power 0 to 
power 1.75 constitute the first range, those of 2 to 
3.75 the second and so on. The first range is denoted 
by the abbreviation -+--2 , the second by +-4 and so on. 
Table 1 shows price ranges and corresponding prices 
for spherical lenses of basic quality.11^
TABLE 2.
Price Ranges of Spherical Lenses.
RANGE (DPTS.) ABBREVIATION. PRICE.(DM)
0 < 2 + -2 1 1 . H 5
2.25 <4 + -ZT 1 2 . 40
4 . 24 <6 + -6 1 5 . 60
lo.25 <13 + -13 2 7 . H 5
13-25 <16 + -16 38 . 50
16.25 <20 + -20 55. 10
Source: Recommended Retail Price List
Rodenstock Lens Manufacturers, Mu nich, 1984
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The matter becomes, unfortunately, more complicated 
because of the necessity to correct for astigmatism. 
This condition is present when an eye has different 
refractive errors in different meridians. Astigmatism 
occurs very frequently. It may normally take values 
between + 0.25 and + 6.0 dpts, It is also corrected
for in steps of 1/4 dpts. Astigmatism usually occurs 
together with the condition of short or 
longsightedness. This kind of refractive error is 
then denoted by two numbers, the first for the 
spherical and the second for the astigmatic 
component. If the astigmatism lies between 0.25 and 2 
dpts, then the abbreviation for the resulting lens 
power is +-2/ 2 , +-4/2 etc. where the first number
denotes the strength of the spherical and the second 
number that of the astigmatic component. If the 
astigmatic component lies between 2.25 and 4 dpts the 
abbreviation is: +-2/4, +-4/4, +-6/4 etc. and for
lenses with a toric component between 4,25 and 6 dpts 
the abbreviation is: +-2/ 6 , +-4/6, +-6/6 etc. and
there is a fourth range for cylindrical power > 6
dpts. Following this categorisation price ranges of 
spherical and toric lenses are 4 x 8 = 3 2  in number. 
Price ranges for astigmatic lenses are shown in table 2.
- 1 1 3 -
Price Range for Astigmatic Lenses
RANGE (DPTS) ABBREVIATION PRICE (DM)
0 <  2 2/2 17 - 85
2 < 4  4/2 19.85
4 < 6 6/2 26.0
6 < 8 8/2 33. 15
8 < 10 10/2 42.20
10 < 13 13/2 5 2 . 65
13 < 16 16/2 6 3 . 80
16 < 20 20/2 73-85
Source:Recommended Retail Price List of 
Rodenstock Lens Manufacturers, Munich, 1984.
This number is doubled again because pairs of human 
eyes do not necessarily fall into only one of those 
categories. A person may require - 2.0 dpts. in his 
right eye and - 2.5 in his left. Price for his two 
lenses will then not be 2 x 11.45 = 22.90 but 11.45 + 
12.40 = 2 3 .8 5 . Alternatively it may consist of values
- 4.0 for the one eye and - 6.25 spheric combined with 
+ 1.5 toric. Price will then be category +-4 = 12.40
+ category +- 8/2 = 22.10 = 34.50. Fortunately,
differences of more than 2 diopters are extremely 
rare, so that in practice the number of prices for a 
pair of lenses is dust more than doubled to 
approximately 7 0 .
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5.1.3.2 Further instances of vertical product 
differentiation in spectacle lenses.
A form of vertical product differentiation arises out 
of whether a new frame is provided or not. This may 
at first sight seem surprising. But if it is accepted 
that a pair of spectacles without a frame is a 
non-entity, only the combination of frame and lenses 
allows a prescription to fulfill its purpose, the 
inclusion of a new frame does not add any additional 
characteristic to any pair of spectacles being 
supplied. It does, however increase '’quality” as, 
presumably, a new frame is preferred to having to make 
do with the old one and that, according to the 
definition offered above, is a sign of vertical 
differentiation.
5. 1.3.3 Vertical differentiation according to whether 
lenses supplied are single- or multi-focus.
A third way in which spectacles are differentiated 
vertically is by being single - or multi - focal. 
This contention, again, may seem surprising. Around 
the age of 45 the human species exhibits the first 
signs of ''presbyopia1', which is caused by the flexible 
lens within the human eye losing its flexibility and 
thereby causing the eye no longer to be able to focus
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close up. Reading matter becomes blurred and reading 
is rendered increasingly difficult. This fault is 
compensated for by wearing a pair of convex lenses, 
the well known ’’reading glasses”. For a person who 
also requires a pair of glasses for distance the 
convex power has to be added onto the power he needs 
for distance. With these glasses, however, he can 
only see close up. He therefore needs two different 
pairs, one for distance and another one for reading. 
In order to save him the trouble of having to exchange 
two different pairs of glasses, perhaps hundreds of 
times per day, both prescriptions are incorporated 
into one lens, the bifocal lens.
It is also possible to incorporate a third focal 
power into one lens which will then enable the
presbyopic individual not only to see clearly at a
distance and close up but also at an intermediate 
range. This third distance may be incorporated into 
the lens in such a way that the focal power of the 
lens increases continuously from its distance value to 
the reading value. Such a lens is termed varifocal.
All lenses with more focal power than one are for
this study considered under the heading of
multi-focal. This type of lens constitutes a
vertically differentiated commodity from single-focus 
lenses, because, provision of more than one focal 
power is possible by providing either two pairs of 
different power or one pair of multi-focals. The
alternative multi-focals does not add a new
characteristic, it adds "quality” through the
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convenience of not having to change glasses when one 
wants to see clearly at near.
5.1.4 Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Combined.
It is now possible to arrange different varieties of 
spectacles according to vertical and horizontal 
product differentiation in a two-dimensional graph as 
suggested by Pilati. On the vertical axis lenspowers 
are shown and on the horizontal axis all the different 
varieties in which each lens power may be supplied. A 
difficulty is posed by the fact that spectacles are 
differentiated vertically not only according to lens 
power but also according to whether they are supplied 
including a new frame or not and according to whether 
they are single or multi-focal. This difficulty can 
be surmounted by drawing four different graphs for
1. Single focus spectacles without frames;
2. Single focus spectacles including frames;
3. Multi-focus spectacles without frames;
4. Multi-focus spectacles including frames.
Fig. 2 shows as an example single-focus spectacles 
supplied without frames.
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I ly. l
Vertical and HorizontEl Product Diffsrsntiation in 
Spectacles.
+ 20  11 2 0 .3 0 ___________________   DM 204.10 {
+ 1g ! 101.60_______________________  DM 182.46 (
+ 12 | 83«3°  DM 171.70 {
1 1 ■ ■ -------------
.51.40 DM 136.00.
.37.30
1
DM161.50 .
+ ^  | 30.00 ________________________________ DM 170,90 >
+  2 , 26»50____________________  DM168,20
Source: Recommended Retail Price List of Rodenstock Lens
Manufacturers, Munich, 198*1-.
Dividing up spectacle prices into *1 categories and 
depicting them in U 2-dimensional graphs is somewhat 
awkward and it will later be shown how in a 
3-dimensional representation all spectacle prices can 
b© incorporated into only one graph.
In the first section of this study it was shown that 
neither traditional price theory nor most versions of 
the theory of regulation provide* a satisfactory 
explanation of the rigid pricing structure observed in 
the market for spectacles. It was further shown that 
Posner’s theory of taxation by regulation opens up 
avenues worthy of further exploration. This theory in 
turn leads one to suspect the presence of 
cross-subsidisation. Such cross-subsidisation might 
be achieved by means of price discrimination. A 
discussion of modern developments in the theory of
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price discrimination led to the conclusion that, in 
contrast to a widely held opinion, not only third but 
also second degree price discrimination might afford a 
viable strategy to achieve this end. But such a 
strategy is only possible if the product, namely 
spectacles, can be split up into a great number of 
highly differentiated varieties, albeit at a cost. 
Next, some theoretical and empirical aspects of 
product differentiation were addressed. The 
theoretical discussion concerning product
differentiation highlighted a feature which will be of 
great importance in later parts of this study. It is j 
the possibility to differentiate products vertically J 
as well as horizontally. In the empirical part of the 
survey it was established that a high degree of 
vertical as well as horizontal product differentiation 
does in fact exist.
All the prerequisites for an empirical estimation of 
price discrimination in the market for spectacles have 
now been assembled. Next, empirical research which 
has been done in the field will be introduced and it 
will be discussed whether the methods used there can 
be usefully applied to the market of spectacles. It 
will be shown that the "hedonic" method using the 
Lancastrian characteristics framework can be used to 
demonstrate the existence of price discrimination in 
the market for spectacles. A critical discussion of 
the hedonic method and of its application , however, 
will reveal severe methodological shortcomings of the 
method. While it is very useful in estimating demand 
relationships, cost estimation by this method poses
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considerable problems. Alternative methods of cost 
estimation therefore are explored and will be used to 
test for the existence of price discrimination as 
predicted by Posner’s theory of taxation by
regulation. The next section will address the 
threefold task outlined above and,
- Describe the hedonic method.
Apply the method to the case of spectacles.
- Explore the theoretical soundness of the hedonic 
method.
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Chapter 6
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND HEDONIC DEMAND AND COST
FUNCTIONS.
6.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY.
The Lancastrian characteristics framework has been 
used extensively in so-called "hedonic” demand 
studies, when differentiated products had to be 
analysed. The method had been pioneered by Couts in 
1939. but fell into oblivion until it was rediscovered 
by Griliches in 1961. Products are viewed as
bundles of characteristics. They are differentiated 
in so far as they contain different "amounts" of the 
characteristics making up the product. Some 
characteristics may be absent in particular
differentiated products or "models”. Thus a motor-car 
is characterized by its brake-horsepower, passenger 
area, length, fuel consumption, type of gear change, 
quality of interior fittings etc. It is argued that 
the price of a particular model of car is a function 
of the characteristics embodied therein.
P = f(BHP; PA; F; L; BR; G) 
where P = price, BHP = brakehorsepower, PA
= passenger area, F = fuel consumption BR = power-assisted
brakes, G = 5-sea**s (or not).
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If a suitable . data set is obtainable, then, by 
multiple regression of the dependent variable price, 
on the "explanatory” variables, brakehorsepower, 
passenger area etc. a regression equation can be 
obtained as follows:
= a + b1 BHP^ + bg PA.^  + b^ F.^  + b^ . + b^ BR^ + bg
where a = intercept, b^ to bn are coefficients of the 
independent variables BHP to G and u^ = disturbance term
The coefficients of the independent variables can be 
taken as the implicit prices of these 
characteristics. Thus, in a study by Cowling and 
Cubbins.11^ the following results were obtained:
Explanatory Coefficient
variable
2.3554 
0.00075643 
0.00002242 
-.0037334 
0.0019591 
O.10640
o .058276
The price of a car is then made up of $2355*4 +
$0.75643 times bhp + $0 .o2242 times passenger area in 
cubic inches - $37,334 times fuel consumption per loo 
miles etc.
The method was used originally by Griliches to 
improve consumer price indices by taking into account 
quality changes, which could now be measured. As 
mentioned above, in the U.K., Cowling and Cubbin used 
hedonic demand functions in 1971 to describe the
Constant
BHP
PA
F
L
BR
G
British car market. Ohta was another author to use
the approach in a study of the U.S. electrical
1 1 Agenerator manufacturing industry, and, together
with Griliches, he describes interesting aspects
of used-car prices where demand influences are not 
distorted by monopolistic elements. It has already 
been shown in the section on product discrimination 
that the hedonic approach found intensive applications 
in studies of housing demand by King,1^°Straszheim121 
and McLennan, ^  to name only a few. Thus King 
estimated prices of such characteristics as double 
glazing which corresponded very accurately to the 
actual cost of such characteristics. On the whole, 
housing studies, however, estimate prices of 
intangibles such as quality of location, distance from 
work, influence of racial preponderance etc. which 
are not amenable to direct verification.
Rosen, in 197412^ studied the problem more 
formally. He formulated a theory of hedonic prices 
where in multi-dimensional characteristics space an 
equilibrium set of implicit prices guides both 
consumers* and producers* decisions. His theory 
presupposes a competitive framework in which these 
implicit prices reflect both the marginal cost of 
supplying a unit of characteristic and the marginal 
valuation consumers place on them. However, if there 
are monopolistic elements present in the market, then 
each firm has its own downward-sloping demand curve 
and the price may diverge from the marginal cost. It 
must then reflect the consumers* marginal evaluation 
rather than the marginal cost of production..
- 123 -
i p/i ■
Triplett spells out this point very succinctly. He 
considers this a severe draw-back of the hedonic 
method.
6.2 APPLICATION OF THE HEDONIC METHOD AS A TEST FOR 
.PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
However, this divergence also opens up possibilities 
of * testing for price discrimination and cross 
subsidisation in markets where product differentiation 
is present. This idea was behind early attempts to 
establish the existence of price-discrimination, for 
instance by B r y a n , S h n e o r s o n , a n d  Heaver12^ who 
attempted to prove the presence of
price-discrimination in the common rates charged by 
shipping companies who are organized in so-called 
"conferences”.
A similar approach was taken in studies concerning 
the U.S. trucking industry, for instance by Spady and 
Friedlaender12®, who estimated a hedonic cost function 
and Ferguson et al. who did the same for the railway 
industry.^2^
A good example of this approach is to be found in a 
study by Deakin1^0 who was one of the first proponents 
of this application. He regressed freight rates for 
different types of cargo quoted by maritime 
conferences on selected characteristics of the 
transported goods which he considered might have an 
influence on the conference rate. He distinguished
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between demand and cost characteristics.
Demand characteristics were such attributes as might 
conceivably have a (positive or negative) correlation 
with demand elasticity. Such a characteristic might 
be value per ton, implying that a high per unit value 
would go hand in hand with a low elasticity of demand, 
just as in the case of Marshall’s derived demand, 
enabling the conference to charge a higher price. A 
negative influence would be exercised by a 
characteristic such as strong competition for 
freighting of the good in question from charter 
carriers, a characteristic taken account of as 
"charter potential/*
Cost influences would find expression in 
characteristics such as ease of loading, need for 
refrigeration, need for careful handling, dangerous 
cargo, etc.
Regression of prices on characteristics did indeed 
reveal that about 66% of differences in freight rates 
could be explained by demand influences, whereas cost 
influences had only a minor explanatory power. From 
this evidence Deakin concluded that, rates being 
mainly influenced by demand factors, particularly by 
per unit value, freight rates were discriminatory.1^2 
Of all the studies mentioned it can be said that they 
report one interesting aspect unanimously: demand
related factors are the principal determinants of 
price and cost factors play only a minor role. The 
authors stop at this point of their research and offer 
no further substantiation of their claims.
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It would be desirable, however, to come to a 
quantitative estimate of the price-discrimination 
effect. What are costs of individual differentiated 
commodities and how do they compare to prices actually 
charged? Or, to put it in another way, what would 
prices be if they were truly cost related?
Zerby and Conlon1^  in a study of conference liner 
rates in the Australian outbound trade published in 
1983 attempt to answer this question by constructing a 
table of implicit freight rates derived from the kind 
of regression analysis mentioned above, the 
implication being that such prices would come about 
under competitive conditions. By calculating implicit 
prices and comparing them with the prices actuallly 
charged they attempt to show in numerical terms the 
extent of price-discrimination present.
Zerby and Conlon used data relating to 1972-73 
exports of Australian goods shipped to Europe, Japan 
and the Arabian Gulf region respectively as classified 
by the Australian Export Commodity Classification. 
They explain differential prices of differentiated 
"commodities” , i.e. per ton-rates charged for the 
transportation of particular differentiated goods,
i.e. grain, machinery, meat etc. by two types of 
explanatory variables. The first type are cost 
variables, i.e. ease of loading, port efficiency and 
the second type are demand variables i.e. value of 
freighted goods, charter potential etc. In their 
study they isolate the following cost related factors 
which might conceivably influence prices actually
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charged:
index for ease of loading (IEL) 
index for port efficiency (IPE) 
dummy variable for special handling (SH) 
dummy variable for hazardous cargo (HC) 
dummy variable for refrigerated cargo (RC)
Demand related factors are:
value of the freighted good (VFG) 
index of shippers bargaining advantage (ISBA) 
index of volume and availability (IVA) 
index of charter potential (ICB)
Abbreviations are given in the brackets. Thus, the n 
x 'I vector of observed prices, P, is explained by the 
n x -■ matrix of cost variables and the n x k vector of 
demand variables. Multiple regression will yield an
ordinary least squares estimate of the coefficients of
vector b and g and the intercept a in the equation:
P = a + b'x + gN + u. ( 1 )
which Zerby and Conlon have written down in matrix 
notation. In the notation so far used in this study 
the equation would be written:
P = a + bjIEL + b2IPE + t>3SH + t>4HC + b5RC. + gjVFG + g2ISBA
+ g3IVA + g^ICB + u ( 2 )
where P = price, IEL, IPE, SH, HC, RC are the cost 
variables and VFG, ISBA, IVA and ICB are the demand 
variables and u = disturbance term.
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Zerby and Conlon now go on to calculate the marginal 
costs of transportation of the various goods. This is 
done in two steps. They argue that the revenue 
contribution from the demand related variables, i.e. 
the g*s in equation ( 2 ) should be left out. The
first step consists in calculating the "separate1* cost 
SC  ^ of each individual rate from the coefficients b^ 
and adding the constant term a.
Note that value of the intercept, a, is considered a 
cost-related factor and that only the cost variables 
with the magnitude estimated by the coefficients b^ 
have gone into the calculation. That part of revenue 
which is due to the demand variables g^ thus is not 
accounted for. These are included later.
Next, total revenue is divided into three parts: 
that part due to the intercept, that part due to the 
cost variables and that due to the demand variables. 
The result is shown in table 1:
( 3 )
TABLE 1.
Revenue Contributions of Cost and 
Demand Variables. (Millions of $A)
Actual revenue 
Revenue contribution 
of hedonic cost 
variables
Revenue contribution 
of intercept 
Revenue contribution 
of hedonic demand 
variables
$1 1 0.47
$42.113
$48.751
$2.915
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Now a ’’scale factor” is calculated such that the 
missing part - revenue due to the demand related 
variables - is added onto the cost-based price. This 
is done by dividing total revenue by the sum of the 
revenue contributions of the intercept and the 
cost-related variables. This can be expressed in a formula:
I  p± Qi
II bixid Q i * a I  Q i
coefficients derived from the multiple
The scale factor works out at:
k 2 = 1 . 2 16
The second step in Zerby and Conlon's calculations 
is now performed. ’’Separate cost” of transportation 
of each transported good estimated according to 
formula (2) is multiplied by k2 in order to arrive at 
the ”implicit” prices i.e. the rates at which goods 
are transported. According to Zerby and Conlon these 
implicit rates are those which would come about under 
pure competition. They calculate these "implicit” 
prices according to the formula:
Pi = K2 (a + biX id} 1 ( 4 )
Table 2 shows implicit rates ( column 2 ) for
shipment to Europe of selected goods derived by Zerby 
and Conlon displayed alongside actual rates ( column 1).
where b and a = 
regression.
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There is a further column showing implicit rates as 
percentage of actual rates ( column 3 ) and a column 
showing implicit rates as percentage of lcngrun 
average cost derived by a non-hedonic estimate in an 
earlier article by the authors ( column 4
TABLE 2.
Actual and Implicit Rates Compared.
(1)
Actual
Rates
(2)
Implicit
Rates
(3)
^Implicit
/Actual
Rates
(4)
^Implicit
/LRAC
Machinery 156.48 114.14 72.9 39. 0
Meat products 102.73 90.38 88. 0 59.4
Dairy products 86. 05 77.24 89. 8 70.9
Fresh fruit 69.26 71.59 103. 4 88. 1
Wool 68.00 77.22 113.6 89.7
Other crude mat. 57-33 62. 81 109.6 106.4
Other food prod. 46.27 60.97 131. 8 131.8
Nuts and seeds 26. 21 41. 49 158.3 232.7
Dried fruits 21.31 37.24 174. 8 286. 3
Minerals, ores 18.09 23. 56 130.2 337.2
Grain 11.96 45. 84 383.3 510.0
Source: Zerby and Conlon,MJoint costs and
Intra-Tariff cross Subsidies,” Journal of Industrial
Economics. 1983^
The table shows some interesting features. Some rates, 
those for machinery, meat and dairy products are 
well above cost. For others, fresh fruit, wool, crude 
materials, costs and rates approximately coincide. 
But there are some rates which are well below costs,
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for instance dried fruit which is being transported at 
a rate approximately il5K below cost and, most notably, 
grain, the rate pf which covers only about 30% of its 
cost.
Another interesting feature is the discrepancy 
between LRAC estimated conventionally and the cost 
estimated with a hedonic specification. Zerby and 
Conlon estimated in a separate study1^  l r a c  to A$
61.0 per tonne. Comparison of columns (3) and (4) 
shows that recognition of differential costs by a 
hedonic specification indicates a discrepancy between 
actual and implicit rates that is much smaller than 
would appear from the much cruder, conventional cost 
estimate.
6.3 AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE 
METHOD IN THE MARKET FOR SPECTACLES.
Next, the method proposed by Zerby and Conlon will 
be used to estimate the implicit prices of spectacles 
and to compare them with the prices actually charged. 
It is to be noted here that later on in this study 
reservations will be made concerning the method used 
by Zerby and Conlon and improvements will be 
suggested. Nevertheless it is an accepted method and 
it was felt that the exercise of estimating cost based 
prices by this method would help to clarify the 
improved method ultimately to be used in this study.
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In order to undertake the task a random sample of
450 sales records was obtained from one of the 
writers* 5 optical practices in West-Germany. 
Randomness of the sample has been ensured as far as 
practically possible by obtaining a complete set of
records for a specified time period ( 6 weeks).
Each record contains the following information:
An identification number. This allows a check
against the original record if a value in the 
dataset as shown on a computer printout appears 
to be very improbable.
Dioptric power of lens. (Technical terms such as 
this one and also the following have already been 
explained).
- Whether the lens is toric.
Whether the lens is multifocal.
Price of the pair of lenses.
- Price of the spectacle frame (if applicable).
- Raw material price of the lenses.
Raw material price of the frame (if applicable).
The cost and demand variables now have to be 
selected. In the case of spectacles such variables 
come to mind easily. In freight rates it is unit 
value which has great influence on demand. With 
spectacles a similar influence can be attributed to 
the value of raw material. Likely cost influences
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are:
1. whether the prescription is toric. This
characteristic influences costs at the workshop 
level.
2. When spectacles are supplied including frames
this entails additional costs for display and 
the costs of the time spent in serving the 
customer.
3. A further cost factor would be the sight-test 
because this involves additional labour-time and 
cost of equipment and room costs.
The information contained in the records is set up
in 7 columns. The prices of spectacles can be read
directly from the records, as can raw material
prices. The other variables have to be represented by 
dummy variables ( 1= yes, 0 = no ). The variables are 
shown in the following list. (names given in brackets)
1) Dummy variable for lens being toric. (TORDUM).
2) Dummy variable for lens being multifocal. (MULTDUM).
3) Dummy variable for frame included in the pair of
spectacles sold (FRIDUM).
4) Raw material price of frames and lenses. (RAWCOST).
5) Total price of pair of spectacles as charged to the 
customer. (RETPRICE).
PRICE was taken as the dependent variable and
regressed against the 4 "explanatory" variables
RAWCOST, TORDUM, MULTDUM, FRIDUM.
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P = a + b1RAWCOST + B'2TORDUM + B^MULTDUM + B^FRIDUM + u
The result of the regression is shown below.
TABLE 3- 
Regression Results.
VARIABLE REGR. COEFFICIENT t-VALUE
RAWCOST 2.42 119.39
TORDUM 3.9 5 1.76
MULTDUM ■ 23.67 6.55
FRIDUM 23.40 8 .73
CONSTANT 24.8 1
ADJUSTED R2 = .9839-
& 2 is *9839- This implies that the correlation 
between the explanatory and dependent variables is 
nearly perfect. Such a result is very rare in
empirical studies and might lead one to suspect multi 
collinearity. However, the partial correlation 
coefficients, i.e. the measure of correlation between 
each explanatory variable taken separately and the 
independent variable suggest that this is not the 
case. The T-ratio of RAWCOST is significant at the
99.9% level. The T-ratios of MULTDUM and FRIDUM at
the 99% level of confidence whereas TORIC is
significant at the 90% level.
The individual prices of pairs of spectacles can now 
be calculated in the following manner: Take common
cost which is given by the value of the intercept, 
multiply the raw material price by 2.112 and add it to
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the value of the intercept. Then add DM 3*95 if the 
lenses are toric; DM 23.67 if the lenses are 
multifocal and DM 23.& i^ frames have been supplied 
together with the lenses.
The influence of each variable can be shown by
calculating the price of three pairs of spectacles;
one at the low end of the price scale, one at the mean
of the sample and one at the high end of the price
scale using the coefficients derived from the hedonic 
regression.
TABLE U.
Co nt r i b u t i o n  to Price of the Hedonic Demand 
and Supply Variables.
DM % DM % DM %
INTER
CEPT 24 .8 1 19.6 24 .8 1 10.0 24 .8 1 4 . 7
actual
RAWCOST (30.53) (74.03) (202.00)
2.42 x 
RAWCOST 73.88 58.6 179. 15 7 1.3 488.84 86.6
T OR IDUM 3 .95 3.2 -  . - 3.95 . 7
MU L T D U M 23.68 ' 9.4 23 . 68 4.2
FRIDU M 23.4 18.6 23.4 9.3 23.4 4.1
TOTAL 126.05 100 25 1 .04 100 564 . 28 100
The columns show for each variety the absolute 
amounts in DM contributed by each demand and cost
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variable. A second row shows the contributions as 
percentage of the total price of each individual pair 
of spectacles. The most interesting feature is the 
influence of the demand variable. It is derived by 
multiplying the actual cost of the raw materials by
2 . U 2 . ^ ^ 6  x t  can be seen that the influence of the 
demand based variable, i.e. RAWCOST, is the principal 
determinant of price, as it accounts for 58.6 % % 71.3
% and 86.6 % of the respictive total prices. This can 
be interpreted as being proof of price 
discrimination. Roughly, this is the method employed, 
for instance, by Deakin1^ ,  Bryan1^® and Shneorson
However, it is also possible to go a step further 
and construct cost based prices for spectacles in the 
manner pioneered by Zerby and Conlon. With spectacles 
these prices are calculated slightly differently. 
They are made up in the same way as far as the 
constant is concerned. The constant is the basis of 
the price of each variety. Separate costs are then 
added as estimated by the multiple regression. In the 
case of spectacles additional data are available 
concerning 2 categories of separate cost which is not 
available in the freight rate data. A cost category 
which Zerby and Conlon’do not have to pay attention to 
simply because it does not exist for freight rates on 
international routes is value added tax. It Is taken 
here account of by deducting VAT from total revenue. 
The second cost category is the actual cost of 
ravjmaterial. To avoid any confusion, it is necessary
I
to be quite clear about the double role which RAWCOST 
plays in the estimation of spectacle prices. On the
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one hand RAWCOST multiplied by the coefficient derived 
from the regression is a measure of the influence 
which RAWCOST has on the actual price of spectacles. 
This is 2.42 times its value in money terms. On the 
other hand, the price of raw material is in fact a 
separable cost attributable to products, but this time 
expressed in money terms. It is only in the second 
sense that RAWCOST goes into the calculation of a 
cost-based price. The calculation of cost based or, 
to use the terminology of Zerby and Conlon, implicit 
prices proceeds in the two steps. The first step 
consists in adding the value of the raw material and 
the values of the estimates of the coefficients from 
the hedonic regression to the value of the Intercept. 
This first step in the calculation of the cost-based 
prices of the three exemplary pairs of spectacles is 
shown in Table 5 .
TABLE 5.
Cost Based Prices of Spectacles, First Step 
in Calculation.
LOW MEAN  HIGH
PRICE PRICE PRICE
INTERCEPT 24.81 24.81 24.81
RAWCOST 30.53 '74.03 202.0
F R IDUM  23.4 23.4 23.4
TORDUM 3.59 3.59
M U L T D U M  23.68 23.68
2.33 145.92 277.48
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When all individual prices are calculated in this way 
they will not add up to total revenue, as explained 
before in the exposition of the Zerby and Conlon 
method. Therefore the second step is made. According 
to these authors it consists in the estimation of a 
scale factor, kg. such that by multiplication of the 
individual cost-based prices by the factor total 
revenue is accounted for and by employing this factor 
to arrive at the implicit prices. This factor is 
calculated according to Zerby and Conlon by the formula;
I p i Qj
a I x ij
The factor k g .was duly calculated and found to be 
1.661. In the next step implicit prices of all the 
Individual pairs of spectacles were calculated by 
multiplying the cost figures calculated in the first 
step in the manner suggested by Zerby and Conlon by kg 
and then adding VAT. These "implicit" prices were 
matched to actual prices. Following the method 
suggested by Zerby and Conlon the resulting pairs of 
actual and implicit prices were then ordered in 
ascending order of actual prices yielding 450 pairs of 
prices. In Table 6 every tenth pair is displayed.
k =
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Actual and Implicit Prices of 
Every Tenth Pair of Spectacles.
COUNT ORDACT ORDIMPL
1 13.25 50.78
10 31.05 99.51
20 44.00 64.31
30 61.40 76.54
40 64.50 110.43
50 67.85 112.97
60 72.70 116.38
70 73.45 123.69
80 73.60 123.65
90 76.35 118.95
100 78.70 96.38
110 84.00 99.25
120 89.85 135.23
130 95.05 132.12
140 106.10 108.03
150 112.40 119.24
160 123.15 158.68
170 136.00 135.85
180 149.50 152.15
190 158.70 178.22
200 168.00 177.73
210 177.00 190.56
220 184.35 194.98
230 198.00 172.72
240 213-80 190.62
250 233.30 230.02
260 241.00 242.37
270 248.60 245.44
280 259.90 242.04
290 277.30 255.70
300 300.10 306.00
310 322.35 298.90
320 340.10 321.90
330 352.30 318.55
340 359.00 325.50
350 371.80 336.23
360 385.00 346.78
370 398.80 394.12
380 419.00 378.18
390 450.60 409.04
400 490.70 413.12
410 569.60 743.01
420 605.50 546.55
430 659.80 610.89
440 713.80 599.68
450 876.40 751.00
where,
COUNT = CASENUMBER, ORDACT = Price actually charged sorted in 
ascending order, ORDIMPL = "Implicit" price of ORDACT.
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A pattern similar to that reported by Zerby and Conlon 
in their comparison of actual and implicit freight 
rates emerges. At the low end of the price scale the 
price actually charged is DM 13.20. The calculations, 
however, imply that a price of DM 6 9 . 0  is the implicit 
price. At Count 101 the discrepancy has decreased to 
some extent but the actually charged price is still 
considerably below the implicit price. At count 220 
almost exactly at the mean of the sample, actual and 
implicit price are almost equal. From then on a 
discrepancy opens up in the opposite direction; the 
implicit prices are now below the actual prices. This 
discrepancy widens the higher the actually charged 
prices become. If it is assumed that the implicit 
prices calculated according to the method suggested by 
Zerby and Conlon are indeed cost-based, then, in the 
lower half of the price scale for spectacles actual 
prices do not cover cost, whereas in the higher price 
scale they exceed cost. The existence of price 
discrimination in the market for spectacles has then 
been proven and a numerical measure has been put on it 
by using the device of estimating cost-based prices by 
the method suggested by Zerby and Conlon. The actual 
and implicit prices can can also be depicted 
graphically. This is shown in Fig. 1.
- 140 -
sso
+
+
ng. i u
2
* 22^ * 
*
T
*2^2
If**
**/*3* 
* *  
**4f**
*  * 2 '^ * * £1
22 "^22
2 2043 
^3J?792
2*^3377** 
4 22243 
* f>£66-**
2*32452 
*8963 *
*  *5 jf8 ^ 7 4  *
* 85^8365S '
* £££93 
6^884
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
RETP RI CE
880
IMPPRICE
830
:***
*4
43 *
92
2*^SS377**
3fi?43
RETPRICE
880
Fig. la shows a scatterplot of the implicit prices 
with their regression line. Implicit prices are
- 1U1 -
measured along the vertical axis and actual prices 
along the horizontal axis. In Fig. lb the line of 
actual prices is added. it now becomes even more
evident that at the low end of the price scale the 
implicit prices ly below the prices actually charged 
in the market, i.e. these items are sold at prices 
which do not cover cost. The discrepancy becomes 
smaller with increasing actual prices until at point b 
actual price = implicit price. Beyond this point 
profits are made.
6.a CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE HEDONIC METHOD.
It is necessary now to consider in some detail a 
number of objections to the principles underlying the 
hedonic method in general and the Zerby and Conlon 
approach in particular. These objections apply to;
1. Cost estimation when different varieties of a
commodity are produced.
2. Incorporation of the distinction between
horizontal and vertical product differentiation
and between second and third degree price
discrimination.
3. Estimation of cost-based variables in a 
monopolistic environment.
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6 . 1 1 . 1  Cost Estimation when Different Varieties of a 
Commodity
are Produced.
The regression equation obtained from regressing the 
independent variable on one or several ’’explanatory” 
variables almost invariably results in an intercept or 
constant term of considerable magnitude in addition to 
the estimates of the coefficients of the ’’explanatory 
variables” . This is generally a puzzling feature of 
hedonic regressions. Usually, the constant term is 
interpreted as representing common cost. Hay and
-i/ll
Morris discuss the point. Zerby and Conlon have 
difficulties with the intercept, although they do not 
admit to it explicitly. They distinguish between 
separate, or, in their terminology, ’’separable” , and 
common costs. Separable costs to them are those costs 
which find expression in the calculation of the 
cost-based variables. This can be expressed 
mathematically.
As total revenue = separable costs + common costs + 
profits, then:
9
i p i^i - n  scijQ i t « ( 5
where P^ » price of the i-th commodity,
= quantity of the i-th commodity, SCi = 
separate cost of the ith good, SC^^ cost of 
the ith good in its d-th activity and e = 
residual of common cost and profit.
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Zerby and Conlon calculate IIsC ^ Q ^ , the sum of 
separate costs from the regression equation. The sum 
of common costs and profit is then the difference 
between total revenue and the sum of separate costs. 
This difference is denoted by Zerby and Conlon as the 
residual e. They treat the residual e, which contains 
them both, as a cost factor. The problem of 
allocation however, they attack in two steps. First, 
in effect, they treat the constant term (intercept) in 
the regression equation as a separate cost. Their sum 
of separate cost, then is:
l s c ± = « [ « !  + II bixi3«i ( 6 )
Secondly, they estimate the residual e by treating the 
intercept as a common cost and adding to it the 
revenue contribution of the demand based variables. 
Obviously they are not fully aware of the logical 
contradiction which lies in treating the intercept in 
the first case as separate cost and in the second case 
as common cost. It will later be argued that this 
contradiction is resolved when the distinction between 
the theory of joint cost and that of price 
discrimination is fully understood. Leaving this 
problem aside it is proposed to follow the argument of 
Zerby and Conlon for the time being.
When the sum of separate costs defined in their 
manner is calculated then it does not add up to total 
revenue because the revenue contribution of the demand 
based variables is left out. As has been shown Zerby 
and Conlon go on to estimate a scale factor, k2 . by 
dividing total revenue by the sum of separate costs
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estimated according to their formula and then multiply 
the separate cost of each individual good by this 
factor in order to arrive at what they consider to be 
its marginal cost. Zerby and Conlon treat the cost 
figures estimated in this way as the "implicit prices” 
of the different varieties of the commodity, namely 
transportation of goods. But thereby they employ a 
method of cost allocation which has been denounced as 
lacking any rational basis in almost all discussions 
of joint cost. P.Q.D. Wiles puts the point 
succinctly:
"Joint costs are usually inallocable on 
technical grounds alone, just as the 
physical product is inallocable between 
several factors of production.”1^2
Zerby and Conlon argue this point themselves:
"there is no way of justifying them 
empirically” .ia3
However, it is possible to argue that the problem of 
common cost allocation is not as grave as appears at 
first sight. To make the matter quite clear it is 
necessary to address once more a problem which has
briefly been mentioned before in this study. It
concerns the distinction between the theory of joint 
production and the theory of price discrimination. 
This distinction has been very clearly stated by
Phlips:
" To invalidate the concept of price
discrimination, it suffices to proclaim that 
two varieties (of a commodity) are in fact
two different commodities...........If these
commodities result from a "joint” production 
process, then the theory of joint production 
is relevant. The latter theory offers an
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alternative analytical framework, . . ......
Only a detailed analysis of a particular 
case will make clear whether a model of 
price discrimination is relevant or whether 
one should set up a model of joint 
production.
Phlips demonstrates the difference in the light of the
debate between Taussig and Pigou about the theory of
railway rates. Taussig maintained that the
commodities transportation of coal and transportation
of copper were jointly produced commodities and that
therefore their costs had to be allocated according to
their demand prices, in the same way in which the
respective prices of wool and mutton are determined by
their respective demand functions and the marginal
cost of providing the joint bundle.1^3 Pigou argued
that transportation of copper and transportation of
coal are the same commodity and that different prices
for the two commodities therefore are discriminatory.
In "The Economics of Welfare" Pigou dedicated an
entire chapter to the theory of railway rates. He
argued that under competitive conditions
transportation of copper and transportation of coal
would be provided at equal prices. Pigou also argued
that differences between different passenger classes
are often far in excess of cost differences between
these two varieties of the same good and therefore,
just as price differences between freighted goods,
constitute an effort to collect consumers surplus by
1 Zlfiway of price discriminating. Phlips goes on to
demonstrate that the age old debate is just as valid 
today by discussing the question of whether air fares 
are discriminatory or not. In his opinion, price 
differences between freight and passengers can be 
explained by the theory of joint production and would
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therefore also occur in a competitive environment; 
differences between tourist and first class service in 
excess of differences in separate costs, however, are 
discriminatory .and would be absent under pure 
competition.
Returning now tfro the discussion of Zerby and 
Conlon’s methods it can be said that the intercept a 
which is a constant and the same for every 
differentiated variety is a cost "common" to all 
varieties and therefore common cost and not a 
separable cost as implied by the calculation of 
implicit prices by Zerby and Conlon.
However, it is possible to argue that the problem is 
not as grave as seems at first sight. A case can be 
made for the argument that Zerby and Conlon have found 
a correct solution for an incorrect reason. If the 
constant term indeed represents common cost then, by 
apportioning an equal sum to every product as they do 
in their calculations they employ a defensible method 
of cost allocation. But this contention needs an 
explanation which they do not make explicit. Only for 
single product firms can common cost be allocated by 
dividing the block of common cost by number of units 
produced and allocating to each individual product 
this cost f i g u r e . A s  differentiated goods consist 
of one common characteristic and are differentiated by 
containing additional characteristics for every 
variety, then it can be argued that a rational method 
of allocation is division of the block of common cost 
by the number of goods produced and apportioning to
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each its share of common cost. Inadvertently, then, 
Zerby and Conlon have applied a defensible solution - 
but only up to this point. For now they change their 
procedure. When the sum of separate costs is 
calculated according to Zerby and Conlon*s definition, 
then it does not add up to total cost because the 
demand-based variables are left out. Zerby and 
Conlon, as was shown estimate a ’’scale factor** k2 by 
dividing total revenue by the sum of separate cost 
estimated according to their definition - and then 
multiply the ’’separate cost** of each individual good 
by this factor in order to arrive at what they 
consider its marginal cost.This procedure must be 
regarded as arbitrary.
There is, however, a defensible solution to this 
problem. If it is accepted that the output of a firm 
consists of a single product split up into a number of 
differentiated commodities then the firm is a single 
product firm and average cost can be calculated by 
dividing total cost by the number of units produced.
In the discussion of the model of second degree 
price discrimination in the presence of product 
differentiation developed by Jacob and Jacob, and in 
the extension to product differentiation of Clemens’s 
model of third degree price discrimination developed 
by the author, it was shown how product 
differentiation at a cost can be incorporated into the 
theory of price discrimination. If products are 
differentiated at a cost, then the cost of each 
variety consists of the cost of the undifferentiated
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variety, i.e. average cost and to it there has to be 
added the separate cost to arrive at the marginal cost 
of each variety. When there are no separate costs 
average cost is simply calculated by dividing total 
cost by number of units produced:
AC =
Q
When separate costs are present then each variety has 
its own separate cost and average cost is calculated 
by dividing total cost with separate cost ’‘netted out” 
by number of units produced:
AC - T C .-_jsc1 ( 7 )
Q
Where, AC = average cost, Sci = separate 
cost of the ith product, TC = total cost per 
time period, and Q = number of units 
produced in that time period.
Thus it would appear that the calculation of costs of 
different varieties can be achieved by a slight change 
in Zerby and Conlons’s method. Instead of calculating 
AC^ in the multiplicative manner employed by Zerby and 
Conlon it would appear that a superior method of 
calculating the marginal cost of different varieties 
of a product has been found. The marginal costs of 
different varieties of a product would be found by 
first calculating ACi by formula (7) and then adding 
SC^ calculated from the regression coefficients of the 
hedonic regression.
- m g -
However, the matter is more complicated than that.
Two important reservations have to be made. They 
concern:
1. The necessity to incorporate the distinction 
between vertical and horizontal, and , 
consequentially, the distinction between second 
and third degree price discrimination into the 
model.
2. The nature of cost estimation by the hedonic 
method in a monopolistic environment.
6 . U . 2  Incorporation of the Distinction between
Vertical and Horizontal Product Differentiation.
It has been shown in Division in the
discussion of the theory of price discrimination that 
contrary to a widely held opinion second degree price 
discrimination is a feasible profit-maximizing 
strategy for firms which exert some monopoly power and 
are in a position to differentiate between different 
varieties of products produced or marketed. The 
discussion showed further that with differentiation 
between different varieties of a product it is to be 
expected that additional costs are incurred and that 
this differentiation at a cost plays a decisive role 
if -second degree price discrimination is to be 
successfully implemented. Furthermore a model was 
developed which showed that third degree price 
discrimination is also a profit-maximizing price
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strategy which might well be encountered in practice 
when different . varieties of a product are 
differentiated at a cost.
-1 hO
It has further been shown that products and
varieties of a product may be differentiated 
vertically as well as horizontally. Louis Phlips 
suggests that horizontal product differentiation goes 
hand in hand with second and first degree price 
discrimination, as in this case the market is split 
into segments horizontally and that third degree price 
discrimination is associated with vertical product 
discrimination §.s then the market is split 
v e r t i c a l l y . I t  can therefore be suspected that both 
types of price discrimination may occur together. 
Quite apart from the well- known implications for 
welfare theory, i.e. that second degree price 
discrimination is Pareto- efficient in
contradistinction to third degree and that it also 
plays a central role in the theory of ’’second best” 
there is a very practical reason for making the 
distinction explicit pertaining to the market for 
spectacles: It has been s h o w n 1 ^ 0 that spectacles
supplied under the German National Health system in
3
principle are supplied free of charge but that 
approximately 80 percent of consumers choose a better 
quality in which case the National Health payment is 
deducted from the price of the glasses and therefore 
constitutes a subsidy payment. In effect, the 
consumer therefore pays out of pocket only for the 
additional characteristics, not for the basic 
commodity - correction of faulty vision. It is
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therefore the prices of the additional characteristics 
which determine his reservation prices. As 
differentiation according to additional
characteristics constitutes horizontal product 
differentiation, then, if there is price 
differentiation between these products it must be 
second degree. National Health funds pay differential 
prices according to the power of the glasses 
supplied. Differentiation according to lens power was 
shown to be vertical product differentiation implying 
third degree price discrimination. The optimal set of 
prices and output of additional characteristics will 
therefore be determined according to the model of 
second degree price discrimination, that for the basic 
characteristics by that of third degree. It is easy 
to imagine that in this complicated situation it is 
imperative to discern between horizontal and vertical 
price- and product differentiation in order to arrive 
at an adequate picture of the pricing structure under 
observation.
6 . U .3 Estimation of a Hedonic Cost Curve in a 
Monopolistic Environment.
It might appear as though the hedonic method affords 
a satisfactory measure of separate and common costs. 
The hedonic regression allows one to estimate separate 
costs for differentiated varieties. But,
unfortunately, once the assumption of pure competition 
is dropped a formidable objection has to be made to
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the method. Zerby and Conlon recognize themselves 
that for their cost figures to be taken as implicit 
prices pure competition is a necessary assumption.1^1 
This is explicitly stated in the model suggested by 
Rosen1^2 and K.S. Palda1^  raises the point. The 
coefficients of the demand based variables are a 
function of the monopolistic power at the disposal of 
the seller and can therefore only occur in a 
monopolistic environment. If there were pure 
competition the coefficients of the demand variables 
would equal unity. The prices would indeed be cost 
based and there would be no need to employ a scale 
factor in order to arrive at the implicit prices. The 
quantities of goods sold valued at these prices would 
add up to total revenue in any case. As it is, 
however, the coefficients of the demand based 
variables considerably exceed unity. Quite rightly, 
Deakin, Bryan et alii conclude that demand variables 
exceeding unity are a sign of price discrimination. 
They stop at this point, whereas Zerby and Conlon go 
on to estimate their implicit prices by multiplying 
the cost variables including the constant term by the 
scale factor k2. The explanation they offer is that:
”The artificial set of prices represents a 
considerable improvement over estimates of 
the long - run marginal costs per unit of
output with separate costs not taken into
account” .1^
The same point is made by other researchers who use 
the hedonic method . ^ ^ 5  Zerby and Conlon themselves 
admit:
"A more inhibiting feature of the method
is the explicit assumption that the quantity
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weights remain unchanged with a new,
artificially determined set of prices......
the new set of quantity weights is likely to 
  produce a new set of implicit
p r i c e s . " 1 ^
A further weakness of the method, admitted by Zerby 
and Conlon, but also discussed by Spady and 
Friedlaender, are the severe data limitations usually 
encountered by researchers. They often necessitate 
the use of proxies and constructed indices. Thus 
Zerby and Conlon, in order to measure cost influences, 
use subjectively constructed indices for ease of 
loading and for port efficiency. The impact of the 
need for special handling and for refrigeration they 
assess by using dummy variables. It will be seen 
later that in the empirical estimation of the demand 
and cost variables it is not possible to avoid the use 
of proxies altogether, particularly as there is no 
realistic substitute for them as far as estimation of 
a hedonic price schedule is concerned. It will be 
shown, however, that work measurement according to 
conventional principles can greatly improve the 
significance of the cost estimation.
A further point of criticism was raised in a 
discussion between Y. Barzel and Ohta and 
Griliches,^-^  The hedonic method is essentially "ex 
post". Separate costs which do not find expression in 
price differences can never be detected by the 
investigator. This objection only applies in a 
monopolistic environment because in pure competition 
cost differences would necessarily find expression in 
price differences. Also, the set of characteristics 
on which the regression is performed has to be guessed 
by the investigator. No matter how careful he may be
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in trying to select all the relevant variables, there 
is always a chance that important variables are left 
out and that the estimates of the coefficients are 
consequentially distorted. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to avoid most of the ambiguities connected 
with the hedonic method at least as far as the 
estimation of separate costs is concerned. In order 
to establish the existence of price discrimination it 
is sufficient to show that prices of . different 
varieties diverge by more than is justified by 
differences in separate cost. It is possible to 
estimate separate costs directly by methods well 
established in conventional cost accounting. 
Separate costs are termed "prime" or "direct" costs by 
cost accountants and measuring them is
straightforward. In spite of this, normally, such 
cost studies are not available for empirical research, 
either because such studies do not exist or, because 
they are not made available by firms for obvious 
reasons. There are no studies available concerning 
the optical retail trade . However, there was no 
difficulty in conducting such a study in one of the 
authors own optical practices.
A much more difficult task is that of disentangling 
common cost and profit. In any model of price
discrimination the assumption is made that
(pricediscrimination results in a monopoly profit to
1
the price discriminator. In the model of Jacob and 
Jacob .the assumption is made that prices of 
differentiated varieties of a commodity are made up of 
three components, namely common cost component,
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separate costs and a profit component. Thus, profits 
have to be determined also. Profits are the
difference of total revenue and total costs. An 
attempt to estimate this difference is undertaken in 
the cost study as a second task. It will be shown 
that the relevant cost concept is that of long-run 
marginal cost, i.e. costs under total adaptation and 
these costs will be estimated in a kind of engineering 
cost study. This cost estimation is greatly
facilitated as it can be shown that marginal costs are 
constant. It will then be possible to calculate the 
profit residual. However, in the literature it is 
acknowledged that this is one of the most difficult 
undertakings theoretically as well as empirically. 
The results of such estimation can therefore only be 
tentative.
It is, however, possible to estimate on a completely 
disaggregated basis separate costs of each individual 
differentiated product contained in the sample. It is 
then possible to compare prices achieved in the market 
with differences in separate costs, thus to obtain a 
meaningful measure of price-discrimination and test 
the predictions of the model of Jacob and Jacob.
6 . U . I X  Conclusion.
The criticism of the hedonic method suggests two 
avenues worthy of exploration:
1) A model of price discrimination has to be
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developed which incorporates the distinction between 
vertical and horizontal product differentiation.
2) Separate costs and average costs under total 
adaptation have to be estimated in a kind of 
engineering cost study.
These tasks will be addressed in the next two 
chapters.
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Chapter 7
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION COMBINED WITH PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HORIZONTAL
AND VERTICAL 
DIFFERENTIATION INCORPORATED.
7.1 HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PRICE 
 DISCRIMINATION.,.
7.1.1 The General Model.
Pilati's diagram describes very adequately vertical 
and horizontal product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 1 ^  xn order to 
show price discrimination, however, it is necessary to 
incorporate costs into the picture. It has been 
established how second ar?d first degree price
discrimination can be implemented with the help of 
product differentiation at a cost.
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Fig. 1
Second Degree Price Discrimination with Product 
Differentiation at a Cost.
DM
MC = AC
Fig* 1 is drawn following Jacob and Jacob. It
illustrates diagrammatically how a rational monopolist 
would set prices for a line of 8 differentiated
products. Prices and quantities of each variety would 
be determined in accordance with formulae x in
paragraph x. which assumes linear demand and cost
functions. The lowest price, 8. will dust cover the
marginal cost of product 8, which will be the basic 
variety produced at marginal cost MC, here assumed to 
be constant and therefore equal to average cost. 
Variety 7 will entail marginal cost MC plus separate 
cost Sy but will be sold at price Py which is higher 
than MC+S7 . Variety 6 will be sold at price Pg where 
the gap between price and cost is still greater, and 
this gap will increase with every variety as the
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vertical axis is approached from right to left. Draw 
lines Joining to Pg and to Cg to give demand
curve DD* and cos.t curve CCf respectively.
7.1.2 With Price of Basic Commodity Regulated.
Now consider the case where price Pg, i.e. the price 
of the basic commodity has been set by a regulator 
below MC. This regulated price is shown as Pr. Such a 
situation is not compatible with traditional price 
theory except in very special circumstances, as it 
contradicts the assumption of profit maximising 
behaviour. From what has been said concerning 
taxation by regulation, however, such a situation may 
well arise in a regulated industry. It is shown 
graphically in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2
Second Degree Price Discrimination with Product 
Differentiation at a Cost: Prices for Basic
Variety regulated.
DM
0 q2 Q X
Variety 8 will be provided at price Pg, i.e. at the 
regulated price Pr which does not cover marginal cost 
and the quantity sold will be determined by the demand 
function: It will obviously be greater than the
quantity produced in the absence of regulation and 
will be sold at a loss. The rationale for price 
discrimination, however, will not be changed by the 
imposition of a regulated price below cost if the 
seller is free to offer differentiated products at 
unregulated prices in the market. If the seller were 
to offer only the regulated variety then his loss 
would be equal to area A Sg Pg B. By offering 
differentiated varieties, some of which may even be 
below MC + S his losses are reduced and may even be 
turned into profits. Losses are shown in the figure 
by the doubly shaded areas and profits by the singly 
shaded areas. In the limiting case of perfect price
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discrimination his profit or loss would be the
difference between triangles G F E and E Pg Sg. Hence, 
by the impostion of a regulated price below MC the
strategy for setting optimal prices remains the same 
as in an unregulated market, with the additional 
condition that prices below marginal cost will be set 
such that losses will be minimized.
7.1.3 With Regulated Prices and Subsidies.
However, the intricacies of the German National
Health system make the situation more complex. The 
insurance funds provide the basic variety free of 
charge to the consumer and the price paid by the funds 
normally does not cover cost.
Fig. 3
Second Degree Price Discrimination and Subsidies.
DM
C'(MC=AC)
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Assuming that demand curve DD f and cost curve CC' 
are not changed when provision is free of charge this 
situation is depicted in fig.3* As the consumer is 
provided with, the basic variety at zero cost, ,
quantity demanded, will now be determined by the 
intersection of the demand curve with the X-axis. If 
the producer were to provide variety Pp only, losses 
incurred would equal area A C* Pr B. As discussed 
above, by setting discriminatory prices for different 
varieties the producer can either minimize, compensate 
or overcompensate his losses depending on the demand 
and cost functions he faces. Assuming linear demand 
and cost functions and first degree price 
discrimination, losses or profits will ' be determined 
by the difference between areas G E F and E CV Pp ^E. 
For second degree price discrimination the difference 
will be an approximation to this.
In Germany, however, the consumer does not have to 
be content with the basic quality provided by his 
fund. He is free to choose any frame or any type of 
lens if he is prepared to pay the ’’private” , i.e. 
unregulated price. Contrary to practice in the U.K. 
he does not lose the sum which his insurance fund 
contributes towards the cost of his glasses. This sum 
is deducted from the ’’private’’ price and paid by the 
fund directly to the optician. Over 80% of consumers 
in Germany choose either a better frame, better lenses 
or both. To them the insurance payment is in effect a 
subsidy payment, reducing the price of their 
spectacles. In Lancastrian terms, the consumer 
receives a basic commodity, correction of faulty
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vision, free of charge and buys addtional 
characteristics at his own expense.
Fig. 4
Second Degree Price Discrimination with Subsidies 
and Regulated Prices.
DM
Qr Q X0
Fig. U illustrates this situation. Whereas under 
normal conditions the demand curve and revenue curve 
are identical, there now exists a separate revenue 
curve for the seller. This is curve R R f. It is 
parallel to the original demand curve DDf and shifted 
by the amount of the subsidy to the right as far as 
point G, where RR* has a discontinuity as the seller 
cannot take advantage of potential reservation prices 
from this point onwards, because the area is 
regulated. He is, however free to offer any 
differentiated variety at prices higher than that set 
by regulation. By the same argument as before he may 
compensate or overcompensate for his losses which are
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equal to area G H Pp Pg by profits which in the 
limiting case approach area R G C.
7.2 VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PRICE
DISCRIMINATION.!.
7.2.1 Some General Considerations.
So far the assumption has been made that different 
individuals have different reservation prices for 
horizontally differentiated varieties of a product, 
and that these differences give rise to second and, in 
the extreme case, first degree price discrimination. 
But products are differentiated not only horizontally 
but also vertically. In chapter 5 it was shown that 
spectacles are vertically differentiated if they are 
of different lens power, are multifocus as opposed to 
single focus or provided either with or without new 
frames. Price discrimination between vertically 
differentiated goods is typically third degree as 
prices are set in various submarkets where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost and insofar as price is 
higher in one market, buyers in that market are 
excluded who have reservation prices at which they 
would still be served in another market. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for third degree 
price discrimination are':
1. that trading between vertically differentiated
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groups is either impossible or possible only at 
considerable cost,
2. that there exist differences in demand 
elasticity between the different markets.
Consider the first condition. Since it is normally 
the case that consumers require different 
prescriptions, trading is virtually impossible as 
glasses of different prescriptions cannot be 
substituted for each other. As far as substitution 
between multifocals and singlefocals is concerned, 
this is also possible only at a cost which is the 
inconvenience of the alternative of having to use two 
pairs of single'focals with different prescriptions as 
previously described. Trade between spectacles which 
include the provision of a new frame and those which 
do not may also be ruled out as a practical 
possibility. As regards condition 2), it can be 
argued on a priori grounds that demand elasticities 
differ between different groups of customers. For 
instance, customers requiring a prescription of -lo 
dpts will have a more inelastic demand curve as a 
group than those requiring a prescription of only -0.5 
diopters, since the first group will be almost blind 
without correction whereas the second group can get by 
reasonably well without glasses. Similarly, those who 
require multifocals would be in a predicament if they 
had to make do with two different pairs for reading 
and distance, so that their demand curve will be 
highly inelastic. It is further likely that that 
group of consumers who require a new frame with their
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new prescription either because the old one is rather 
worn, or because he or she is fashion conscious and 
desires a change, will have a more inelastic demand 
curve as a group than those who think they can make do 
with their old frames. How would the rational 
discriminating monopolist set prices for these 
vertically differentiated products? Traditional 
theory again does not provide a ready answer as it is 
mainly concerned with the single product case.
It is true that in contributions discussing problems 
of public goods and price discrimination, H. 
Demsetz,1^0 Ekelund and Hulett1^1 and P.O. Steiner1®2 
discuss the possibility of price discrimination 
between different goods sold by the same seller. They 
derive a formal apparatus for dealing with the problem 
of price discrimination when goods are in joint 
supply. Spectacles are not, however, produced in 
fixed proportions. A joint supply model is therefore 
not applicable. At one point Demsetz explicitly 
recognizes the possibility that there may be price 
discrimination between different goods sold by the 
same seller and which are produced in variable 
proportions, but he goes on to state that:
"whether this can be called price
discrimination is a matter of one's
perception".
Louis Phlips recognizes the problem explicitly but
goes further. He argues that price discrimination 
should be expected in the multi-product case when
products are produced in variable proportions. He 
goes on to derive criteria for optimal product
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selection in the 2- and 3-Soods case. His approach 
assumes, however, that the seller is in a position to 
vary the quality content of his products, at given 
prices. Such variability, however, is not possible in 
the case of spectacles. Prescriptions are 
individually specific. Moreover, the quantity of a 
particular prescription is predetermined. The 
incidence of visual errors follows the law of normal 
distribution, with a peak at value +l,o dpts for 
spherical values. In Fig. 5 the distribution of
visual errors with a cylindrical compenent is shown.
Fig. 5
The Normal Distribution of Visual Errors.
40
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Source: Jalie, M., The Ophthalmic Optician, Jan. 1980.
From the distribution of visual errors it follows 
that quantities in each powerbracket, i.e. power
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bracket + - 2.o, + -4, +-2/2 will be predetermined with
the larger quantities at the low end of the scale and 
quantities becoming smaller and smaller as lens powers 
become higher in value.
7.2.2 An Adaptation of a Model by Eli Clemens.
One model of price discrimination which is applicable 
to the case of spectacles was described as early as 
1951 by Eli Clemens. Fig. 6a recalls his model. 
However, a major adjustment has to be made if it is to 
be applied to the case at hand. Clemens assumed that 
marginal cost is the same for different products 
offered by a multiple product firm. His model has to 
be adjusted to take account of different separate 
costs traceable to different varieties. Once this is 
done it can then be very usefully deployed. This 
device is essentially the same as that used in the 
treatment of separate costs in the second degree price 
discrimination case discussed by Jacob and Jacob.
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Fig. 6
Third Degree Price Discrimination with Product 
Differentiation at a Cost.
DM DM
MC=AC MC=AC
0 o2 q3 Q X 0 Q X
6a 6b
Fig. 6a shows Clemens’ original model. Although he 
claims to deal with the multi- product case his model 
is more adequately interpreted as depicting a single 
product firm producing different varieties of the 
product. That is, labour time expended in the 
different shop dobs can be treated as differentiated 
goods. Prices and quantities are then determined by 
the intersection of the different marginal revenue 
curves derived from the different demand curves with 
the common marginal cost curve.' In. order to adapt 
this model to the case of different varieties produced 
at a cost all that needs to be added is the estimate 
of separate costs for the different varieties produced 
in the different submarkets. Fig. 6b shows how this 
additional assumption changes the set of optimal 
prices. Again, prices and quantities are determined 
by the intersection of the marginal cost and the
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marginal revenue curves, but now MC is increased by 
the separate costs for different varieties shown by 
the shaded areas. What happens to prices and output 
when separate costs are explicitly taken account of? 
This effect is apparent from Fig. lb. It shows that 
prices are higher and output lower when additional 
costs have to be incurred. The question that has to 
be answered next is what happens to profits when 
separate costs have to be incurred. The answer is 
shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7
Profits under Product Differentiation without 
Cost Compared to Profits under Product 
Differentiation with Cost.
DM
MC=AC
In Fig. 7. for a product produced at MC = AC Price 
P^ * and quantity are determined by the intersection 
of the MC curve with the MR curve. If separate cost S 
is incurred the intersection of the MC+S curve with 
the MR curve now determines price P2 and quantity Q 2 •
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Profit at price P^ equals area A P1 G B. Profit at 
price Pg equals area E P2 F C < area A P^ g B 
seemingly indicating that product differentiation at a 
cost may not be an optimal strategy. But this 
argument is not a valid one as separate costs are 
often inescapable. Consider the case of spectacle 
wearers requiring prescription +/-2 dpts as opposed to 
those requiring prescription +/-10 dpts. Raw material 
price of the uncut lenses is higher, there is more 
labour time required in the workshop to fit the 
stronger lenses to the frames, more time is spent with 
the customer in selecting the proper frame and in 
after-sales, service, . etc.. These separate costs are 
therefore inescapable costs and as they do exist, when 
demand elasticities differ between the two sets of 
- consumers in question, optimality requires that prices 
and output should be determined as shown in fig.6b. 
It then follows that differences in prices P^, 
Pg....Pn are not equal to differences in separate 
costs and therefore constitute price discrimination. 
In the case of spectacles even more can be said *a 
priori*. Recall the fact that the incidence of 
refractive errors is exogeneously determined. The 
quantity of each variety is therefore predetermined. 
Prices are then the only variable and when profits are 
to be maximized, then they have to be set such that 
marginal revenue equals marginal common cost + 
separate cost and under the assumption that price 
elasticities are a decreasing function of lens power,
i.e. demand is more elastic the lower the lens power, 
then prices, output and profits for spectacles of 
different lens power should be as depicted in Fig. 8
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Fig. 8
Prices and Quantities of Spectacles Sold under 
Third Degree Price Discrimination.
DM
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In Fig. 8 an important change is made. In contrast 
to the diagrammatic representation commonly used since 
Pigou's original contribution prices are plotted in 
ascending order of magnitude. In Fig. 8 prices
are plotted in ascending order along the vertical 
axis. Along the horizontal axis the quantities 
dispensed in each lens power category are plotted. 
For example, the quantity of spectacles sold in the 
category lens power 0 to 2 is represented by the
distance = - 2 which is the lowest price category. It 
accounts for 15% of the total number of
prescriptions. Thus the distance 0 to 2 represents 
13% of the total quantity demanded and provided. The 
category lens power 2 to l l is represented on the
horizontal axis by the distance from 2 to U . It 
accounts for around 13% of total quantity sold etc.,
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and so on. Costs in each power* bracket are made up of
average cost, here assumed to be constant, and
separate cost which increases .with lens power. The
assumption of predetermined quantities, increasing 
separate costs with increasing lens power and 
decreasing demand elasticities with increasing lens 
power then lead to the situation as shown
diagrammatically.
When prices are set by a regulator it can be assumed 
that prices do not cover cost. The situation is then 
analogous to that described for horizontal price
discrimination and is illustrated in Fig. 9 .
Fig. 9
Prices and Quantities of Spectacles Sold under 
Third Degree Price Discrimination: Regulated 
Prices for Basic Varieties.
Y
DM
7Z & #y777 ////777? AC
30+30/6 Q (LENS POWER) X2/2 6
4/2 8 6/2 10
In Fig. 9 prices P^ to P1Q on the price line P are 
prices set by the regulator who has retained the
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pricing schema developed before regulation. Prices 
start off far below AC + SC for the lowest-priced 
variety, and Just as in the absence of regulation 
profits increase with increasing lens power, now 
losses decrease with increasing lens power until at 
the high end of the scale a profit is made.
7.2.3 Further Types of Vertical Product 
Differentiation.
Lenses are not only differentiated vertically 
according to their lens power, giving rise to a price 
schedule such as shown in Fig. 8 and 9. They are also 
differentiated according to whether two lenses are 
dispensed into the client’s frame or whether a new 
frame is included, and whether they are singlefocal or 
multifocal, where, again, a new frame may be included 
or not. Thus spectacles can be divided into further l l  
subsets.
1. Single focus lenses supplied without frames
2. Single focus lenses supplied with frames
3. Multi focus lenses supplied without frames
IX. Multi focus lenses supplied with frames.
In each of these subsets the of prescriptions are
normally distributed as described previously. Scope
for price discrimination is given within each set in
the same manner and for the same reasons as shown
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above. But there is also scope for price 
discrimination between the H sets. Consider first the 
situation which would come about in an unregulated 
environment. Costs and, consequently, prices would be 
higher the more quality is contained within each 
category, i.e. spectacles including a frame will cost 
more than two lenses dispensed into a given frame and 
multifocals will command a higher price than single 
focals, again with the difference of including a frame 
or not. But, most important, the gap between costs 
and prices will also differ between the subsets. The 
situation is pictured diagrammatically in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10 .....
Prices and Costs for U Subsets of Spectacles.
DM
sue
In Fig. 10 prices are plotted along the vertical 
axis and the quantities of each of the U subsets along 
the horizontal axis. Line SL shows prices and
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quantities for single focals only, line SF for single 
focals including frames. As the price of frames is 
here taken to be that of the basic variety only, the 
two lines are parallel. Line ML shows prices and 
quantities for multifocals and line MF multifocals 
including frame. For each price curve there is a cost 
curve. Under competitive conditions cost curves and 
price curves would tend to be identical. But it has 
already been shown that under circumstances conducive 
to price discrimination the slope of the cost curves 
should be less steep than that of the price curves 
because of price discrimination between different lens 
powers. Additionally, there is also scope for price 
discrimination between the different subsets such as 
multifocals and singlefocals and each of these 
including frames or not. As demand' elasticities 
decrease from the subset single focal lenses only to 
the subset single focals + frames to the subset 
multifocal lenses and the set multifocal lenses plus 
frame, the distance between the cost line and the 
price line will increase and in the absence of 
regulation the outcome should be as shown.
In reality, however, as the prices of the basic 
varieties which are under discussion are set by the 
regulator they may or may not cover costs or may even 
exceed cost. This effect is shown in Fig. 11.
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Fig. 11
Prices and Costs for 4 Subsets of Spectacles: 
Prices for Basic Varieties Regulated.
DM
0 Q X
In Fig. 11 the result of a cost study which will be
described in detail later is incorporated. Curves SL,
SF, ML, MF are the price curves for the basic variety 
of single focus lenses without frames and with frames, 
and multifocal lenses only and multifocals including 
frames. Curves SLC, SFC, MLC and MFC are the cost 
curves pertaining to the respective price curves. It
can be seen that many items do not cover their costs, 
while for instance multifocals, in the main, more than 
cover their costs. The differences in length of the 
price and cost lines of the U subset reflects the fact 
that the four subsets are demanded and provided in
different quantities. Single focus lenses including 
frames, for instance, account for approximately 60% of 
all sales whereas single focus lenses without frames
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make up approximately 20% of sales effected. A 
further 6% are multi focus without frames with multi 
focus including frames accounting for the remaining 
ia%.
7.3 HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; 
THE
COMBINED EFFECT.
Every lens power comes in a multitude of horizontally 
differentiated varieties e.g. tinted, antireflex 
coated etc. This fact can be allowed for by 
introducing a third dimension.
Fig. 12
Price and Cost Planes.
DM
PRICE
MARGINAL COST
Q ADD. CHARACTERISTICS X0
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In Fig. 12 the prices and costs for the subset 
single focus including frames are plotted in monetary 
terms along the vertical axis. Additional 
characteristics and their .quantities are plotted along 
the X-axis. The quantities of each lens power are 
plotted along the Z-axis. Costs as well as prices are 
plotted. This results in a price-plane from which the 
price of any lens power in any of its horizontal 
varieties can be read and a cost plane giving costs of 
each lens power in any of its horizontally 
differentiated varieties. Lens powers and additional 
characteristics are ordered in ascending order of 
magnitude. Consequently, the planes slope upwards 
along the X-axis and along the z-axis. The cost plane 
is shown as the shaded area. Costs are made up of the 
.cost of the . basic variety denoted .by the intercept of 
the plane with the Y - axis and separate cost. As 
separate costs are an increasing function of lens 
power and of the additional cost entailed in
horizontal product differentiation the cost plane must
slope as drawn, i.e. sloping upwards as one goes
along the horizontal axis starting from the origin. 
Costs are given for each differentiated variety under 
the assumption of total adaptation and given state of 
the art. The rationale of price discrimination
determines the position of the price plane in relation 
to the cost plane. From what has been said previously
it is to be expected that the gap between cost and
price will be larger the lower the elasticity of
demand. It will have a minimum at the origins of the
price and cost planes, i.e. on the Y-axis, as these 
points represent the variety with the highest
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elasticity of demand. As demand elasticities decrease 
in both directions, i.e. with lens power as one moves 
along the Z-axis and with more and more costly 
differentiation as one moves outward on the plane 
along the X-axis, the price plane is tilted more 
steeply than the cost plane in both the directions 
indicated. Pairs of price and cost planes exist for 
all H subsets of spectacles as explained previously 
and demonstrated in Fig. 10. Just as in Fig.10 the gap 
between the cost plane and the price plane is always 
smallest where the planes originate in the Y-axis. But
furthermore, this gap can be expected to be larger for
spectacles of the basic variety including frames as 
opposed to spectacles provided without frames because 
the demand elasticity will be higher in the former 
case. The same reasoning applies for spectacles with 
single focus as well as with multi focus lenses. 
Therefore the gap between price and cost at the origin
becomes wider the further one moves upwards on the Y -
axis. This is shown in Fig.1 3 .
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F ig .13
Price and Cost Planes for 4 Subsets of Spectacles
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7 . U PRICE AND COST PLANES WITH BASIC PRODUCTS PROVIDED 
BELOW 
COST.
Under the German National Health scheme the basic
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varieties of spectacles are in the main provided below 
cost. This fact has considerable bearing on the
relative positions of the ptfice and cost planes. The
effect is shown in Fig. 1 U , which shows price and cost
planes for the subset comprising spectacles of
singlefocal prescription including new frames.
Fig. 14
Price and Cost Planes: Basic Varieties Regulated
DM
•PRICE
■MARGINAL COST
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Revenue for the basic variety +-2.o is given at 
point A, cost at point B. As one moves outwards along 
the edge of the planes in the direction of the Z-axis, 
point C is reached at which revenue equals cost;
- 183 -
beyond it revenue exceeds cost. When more expensive 
varieties of prescriptions + - 2.o are sold this is 
shown diagrammatically as a movement along the X-axis 
until again a point of equality between revenue and 
cost, D, is reached, after which revenue exceeds 
cost. Revenue and cost planes therefore have the 
relative positions illustrated.
The relative positions of the revenue and price 
planes are different for the four subsets of 
spectacles, i.e. single focals with and without 
frames and multifocals with and without frames. Their 
positions follow from the explanation given for Fig. 
13 in the chapter and are illustrated in Fig. 15*
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Fig.15
Price and Cost Planes for 4 Subsets of 
Spectacles: Basic Varieties Regulated.
Y
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The basic varieties of all lens powers account for
about 20% of the total. As this part of sales has
only one price, there is no horizontal differentiation 
and the price plane as well as the cost plane run
parallel to the X - axis for the first 20% of their
lengths. This situation is shown in Fig. 16:
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F ig .16
Price and Cost Planes: Effect of Regulation
"Netted Out."
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where SF = price plane single focus 
including. frames, SFC = cost plane single 
focus including. frames
It has been shown before, that the sickness funds 
which operate the German national health system 
provide the basic quality of spectacles free of 
charge. It has also been shown that approximately 80%
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of consumers choose a superior quality and that the 
sum which the insurance fund pays for the basic 
variety is then deducted from the price of the
superior quality. The payment by the insurance fund,
then, constitutes a subsidy towards buying glasses 
which has the effect that the consumer only pays for 
the better quality, or, to put this matter into 
Lancastrian terminology, he pays "out of pocket” only
for the additional characteristics. The price plane
which the consumer faces is then the price plane of
the additional characteristics. The private payment
plane is shown in Fig. 17* It shows a theoretically
derived set of the 3 planes for the subgroup single
focus spectacles including frames.
Fig .17
Price, Cost and Private Payment Planes
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SF
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PSF
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In the same manner, private payment planes can be 
drawn for the subsets single focus without frames and 
multifocus with frames and without frames.
The graphical representation of the effect of second 
and third degree price discrimination occurring 
simultaneously in the market for a single ■ but 
differentiated product has so far been derived in 
completely theoretical terms. It is now proposed to 
attempt an empirical estimation. In the section 
"Price Descrimination and the Hedonic Method” it has 
been demonstrated how a hedonic demand curve can be 
derived. The price plane is nothing but a hedonic 
demand curve derived for two "explanatory" variables 
and depicted in a three-dimensional graph. Thus, its 
estimation can easily be implemented using the 
traditional hedonic method.
Construction of the cost planes, however, is a less 
simple task. The theoretical discussion has shown 
that derivation of a hedonic cost curve in a 
monopolistic environment is methodologically unsound. 
It has been shown that the construction of a cost 
plane as envisaged in the graphical representation 
requires an empirical estimation of costs at a 
completely disaggregated level. How this can be 
achieved with methods borrowed from conventional cost 
accounting and how these cost accounting methods can 
be reconciled with the assumptions of economic theory 
will be shown in the following chapter.
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Chapter 8
COSTS OF DIFFERENTIATED 
PRODUCTS.
8.1 MEASUREMENT OF MARGINAL COSTS: THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS.
In order to establish whether price discrimination 
exists in the case of spectacles it is necessary to 
measure the relevant cost of each variety, namely its 
marginal cost . It is worth recalling the two elements 
present in the concept of marginal cost. In the first 
sense it is incremental cost, in the second 
"avoidable” cost. The two expressions are often used 
synonymously, but there is more involved than a 
difference of semantics. The term avoidable cost 
stresses the opportunity cost aspect whereas the term 
incremental draws attention to the time aspect.
Incremental cost will vary according to the time 
horizon under consideration. It will be argued that 
it is long run costs which are relevant in the context 
of pricediscrimination. The problem then arises of 
estimating longrun, marginal costs in practice. The 
cost figures which are available are from financial 
accounts. These refer to prescibed time periods such
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as the financial year. They also depend on the volume 
of activity attained in that time period. They have 
to be standardized for the normal level of activity. 
The opportunity cost element, while obvious enough in 
theory, poses different problems for empirical work. 
In order to estimate the cost of a resource in its 
best alternative use it is necessary to have recourse 
to imputed or implicit costs. For example, when a 
business is run wholly or partially with proprietary 
capital, then interest has to be imputed. Then 
further questions arise. What is the relevant
interest rate? How many percentage points above the 
official discount rate? Should a premium for risk be 
included in the interest rate?
A- further complication arises from the fact that 
most firms in practice do not produce a single 
product, the standard assumption of the traditional 
theory of the firm, but are multi - product firms. 
Thus difficulties arise out of the necessity to 
allocate costs to different products. This is an 
often discussed problem. While the existence of a 
satisfactory solution remains in the opinion of many 
authors in doubt, the empirical researcher has to 
apply some cost estimate. Some costs can be 
unambiguously traced to products. These are separate 
costs: but their estimation is not quite as
straightforward as is implied by many textbooks.
The problems involved in an estimation of marginal 
cost can be summarized under the following headings:
1. Defining longrun marginal cost.
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2. Longrun costs and economies or diseconomies of 
scale.
3. Imputed costs. 
ft. Separate costs.
5. Common costs and their allocation.
I8.1.1 Defining Longrun Cost.
I
Empirical estimation of longrun cost, whether 
average or marginal poses particular problems. The 
classical discussion of this issue is provided by J. 
Johnston^^ Caleb A. Smith, and A. A. Walters1^®.
Empirical cost estimation has to rely to a 
considerable extent on data from financial accounts. 
Such data are by their very nature shortrun. They are 
explicitly made up for a limited timeperiod, usually 
the accounting year. They will therefore contain 
costs which are invariable with output, an example 
being the cost of fixed capital, causing average and 
marginal cost to vary with the level of output 
actually attained in a particular period. The problem 
is perhaps better understood when the terminology 
suggested by P. G. D. Wiles is used.1^  jje recommends 
substitution of the term partial adaptation for the 
usual expression 'short run* and total adaptation for 
the long run. Then it becomes immediately clear that 
under total adaptation (the long run) all factors of 
production can be adjusted to a firm’s requirements.
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Longrun costs (costs under total adaptation) are then 
those costs which would accrue if the entrepreneur
were able to adjust all factors necessary to the 
present rate of production in an optimal fashion. 
Take, for instance, the computation of rent. Assume 
that 3000 pairs of spectacles are dispensed per year 
in a particular firm. The firm operates from premises 
which cost DM 30 000 per year, but would be sufficient 
in size to accommodate a normal production of ft200 
pairs. Then the rent cost per pair of spectacles is 
not DM 30 000/3000 = DM 10.0, but DM 30 000/ft200 = DM 
7,1ft per unit. This criterion has to be applied to 
any of the costs which are fixed under partial 
adaptation. As in the above example, the optician’s 
shop contains furniture adapted to the sale of
spectacles. A number of display units has to be
provided at which clients can seek advice as to the 
frames and type of lens that would suit them best. 
The number necessary will depend on the number of 
customers per day, but there is an important proviso 
to be made. The number necessary should be estimated 
taking into account any necessary stand-by capacity to 
cope with fluctuations. As J. S. Bain puts it:
’’The plant or firm will have a somewhat 
fluctuating output, over time, and at a
given scale will thus operate at a number of 
somewhat different output rates.
Correspondingly, it will have a certain
’’load factor” reflecting the ratio of
average actual rate of use to the capacity 
of best rate ofuse, and this load factor 
will generally be smaller than one. In that 
circumstance the relevant relationship of 
unit cost to scale .... is thus subject to a 
typical ’’load factor” on its capacity.”1^0
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These problems of optimal capacity have been 
extensively discussed in the literature on the 
"queuing problem” and its mathematical solution with 
the help of linear programming.1^1
A mathematical solution of the capacity problem 
cannot be employed in this study due to the lack of 
data. It is proposed to substitute an "informed 
estimate” for the more rigorous method. Data on the 
optimal size of particular factors of production can 
be obtained from the suppliers of optical equipment. 
There exist in Germany specialized suppliers of 
shopfittings or workshops. The author has obtained 
from them estimates of optimal production units for a 
particular annual output of spectacles. These 
estimates will be used in the calculation of the unit 
costs of factors of production. Also, it shall be 
demonstrated in the detailed computations that the 
firm which will serve as the basis of a detailed cost 
study is more or less of optimal size in the sense 
that its assets can be shown to be well geared to the 
capacity actually required to meet production needs 
over a period of time.
In order to derive unit costfigures total cost over 
the entire life of these factors of production has to 
be estimated and divided by the total number of 
products produced. Some costs are incurred over a 
definite timeperiod e.g. rent. Unit rent costs are 
then easily calculated by dividing rent cost per time 
period by the number of goods produced in that period, 
where the number produced, of course, means not the
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actual volume of production, but. that volume which can 
be achieved under normal circumstances. But if usage 
of a factor stretches over several accounting periods 
as for instance with depreciation of machinery, then 
further difficulties arise. When machinery is being 
used in the production of goods, part of the 
depreciation is due to wear and tear, part to 
technological obsolescence, part to cost of capital, 
and some, and often considerable part, is due to 
operating costs and rising maintenance costs with 
increased use. It is important to distinguish between 
costs which are a function of use and for which the 
term user cost has been coined, and those which are
not. User costs can be measured directly. 
Obsolescence, capital cost and various other overhead 
expenses are not a function of use but most costs of 
maintenance, wear and tear as well as operating costs 
are. For the others the procedure described above 
should be used. I.e. the total useful life and the 
number of units produced should be estimated. Unit 
cost can then be arrived at by simple arithmetic.
A further important problem is the question of
historical as against replacement cost. It is the
latter which will be used in this study. To give an 
example, sighttesting equipment is for all practical 
purposes not subject to any wear and tear. Thus in 
the writer’s practice a trial case was in use until 
recently which had been acquired by his grandfather. 
The cost of using this piece of equipment would 
therefore seem to be infinitesimally small.
Nevertheless, the replacement cost of a modern trial
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case is several times its historical cost. Moreover, 
the time-honoured way of performing sight-tests is now 
being superseded by computer-aided alternatives which 
permit a much faster and therefore more economical 
operation and are necessary for prestige reasons. If 
the useful life of the trial case is then estimated at 
only 3 years, a realistic economic life, its unit cost 
will obviously increase considerably.
8.1.2 Long Run Costs and Returns to Scale.
In the paragraphs dealing with the optimal pricing 
structure under price discrimination the cost curves 
used were based on the assumption of constant returns 
to scale. This assumption, although very convenient 
in that it simplifies the exposition considerably, is 
not a necessary condition.
If, however, constant returns to scale are assumed, 
then marginal and average costs coincide reducing the 
problems of cost measurement by a whole dimension. A. 
A. Walters gives an overview of empirical evidence on 
LRAC c u r v e s . T h i s  evidence, although not completely 
conclusive, suggests that the theoretical concept of a 
U-shaped cost curve is not supported. Rather, LRAC 
curves decrease more or less steeply in the beginning, 
until a "threshold” efficient scale has been reached. 
Thereafter they only decrease very gently or not at 
all, indicating, for all practical purposes, constant 
returns to scale over a wide range of output. This 
has come to be adapted as the modern theory of 
costs.1 7 ^
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Whether in the case of spectacles dispensed by 
opticians constant returns to scale are present is, 
then, a matter of empirical observation. For this 
purpose it is necessary to obtain data for the 
industry as a whole, or at least a representative 
cross-section of it, from which a longrun average cost 
curve can be constructed. An alternative method of 
testing for constant returns to scale would be the 
construction of a production function. If the 
production function is specified in the form of a 
Cobb-Douglas function with two explanatory variables
Q  V-,
of the form P =$L . K , then, if the exponents add up
to a value which equals or is close to unity, this may 
be taken as an indication of constant returns.
8.1.3 Opportunity Costs.
It has already been pointed out that cost accounting 
figures have to be converted into opportunity costs. 
Often these costs, which are a very substantial part 
of costs, do not show up in financial accounts at 
all. They then have to be "imputed” . Thus, opticians' 
firms are usually run by the owner. If the firm, as 
is usually the case, is not run in the form of a 
limited company, the owners’ salary does not show up 
in the accounts and has to be estimated. Similarly 
rent is not shown if the optician operates from his 
own premises. Nor is interest on the owner’s capital 
shown. These costs have to be imputed. Computational 
difficulties may be encountered here. Once again this 
straightforward principle becomes less simple when the 
computation of imputed costs is attempted in
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practice.
8.1.ft Separate Costs.
The concept of separate cost plays a central role in 
this study. A separate cost is one which can be 
identified with a unit of operation, e.g. a product, 
a department, or a process.^ 5  jn this study the main 
interest is in the separate costs of products, an 
aspect which does not receive wide-spread attention in 
microeconomic theory where separate costs are only 
casually mentioned in connection with the costs of 
Joint products, for instance in the classic treatment 
of the "subject provided by Marshall.^ 6  jn
accountancy, however, separate costs play an important 
role. They are known as "direct" or "prime" costs1^  
and distinguished from indirect or common cost on the 
basis of traceability to different products. It is 
the accountant’s definition which is useful in the
estimation of the costs of differentiated products 
which is so important in this study. The estimation 
of separate cost does not present any great problems 
conceptually as they can be clearly traced to products 
and measured. These aspects are particularly well 
treated in German textbooks of cost accounting, for 
instance, H a b e r s t o c k , A  test of separability would 
be to ask whether an activity could in principle be
contracted out. An estimate of the price at which a
service used in the production of a good could be 
supplied from outside would then seem a valid estimate 
of its (separate) opportunity cost. Some separate 
costs are fairly obviously defined. For instance, the
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nrawmaterial used in the production of a good can
I
easily be measured and quantified. Thus the lenses 
and frames used in the production of a pair of glasses 
constitute a separate cost. More difficult is the 
measurement of auxiliary material used, e.g. oil used 
for hinges. Here it may become necessary to have 
recourse to averaging over the output covered. 
Similar problems occur when the user cost of
machinery, premises etc. have to be assessed. It 
will be shown in the paragraph dealing with the 
estimation ofalong-run cost curve how depreciation
charges can be estimated on a per unit basis. In
order to trace such costs to individual products,
however, such averages are not sufficient. To give an 
example: in the optician’s workshop lenses are edged
on an automatic edging machine which contains 
diamond-studded wheels. The wear and tear on these
wheels is a considerable cost factor. A lens of -2o 
dpts. wears much more out of the diamonds than one of
+1 dpt. If the cost of 1 minute’s use of the edging
machine is calculated, then, according to the
different time used up in the edging of lenses of
different power, cost can be traced to the different 
lenses, i.e. products. Even interest is traceable to 
products. From the value of raw-materials and their 
average ’’turnover’’ measured in weeks capital cost can 
be estimated when the interest rate on capital is 
known. The most important separate cost in the
’’production’’ of a pair of glasses is direct labour
cost. It would seem that this can easily be measured 
unambiguously. Practical measurement is not at all 
easy, however, as a multitude of different operations,
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often performed by different people go into the 
production of a pair of glasses.
8.1.5 Cost Allocation.
No matter how careful one is in estimating separate 
costs, many of the costs incurred, such as management 
expenses, advertis^ing outlay, some part of rent for 
premises etc. cannot be traced to individual varieties 
of products. As mentioned before this type of cost is 
commonly known as "overheads" and gives rise to the 
problem of cost allocation. In single-product firms 
un-separable costs such as depreciation charges raise 
certain problems, i.e. those arising when costs are 
incurred in one period but have to be properly 
attributed to several accounting periods. These 
problems are, however, relatively minor ones. In 
multiple-product firms, however, the problem of 
allocating unseparable or common costs among the 
different products is generally considered to be more 
or less insoluble except in an ex-post manner, as 
there is no logical way in which costs incurred in the 
Joint production of goods can be divided up between 
them, although there is no lack of attempts to do so, 
especially by accountancy methods. Nevertheless, as 
P.G.D. Wiles put it:
"All these methods are arbitrary. ,?1?9
In accountancy separate costs serve as a base which is 
used in order to allocate common costs to different 
products, activities or "cost centres".1®0
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Economists denounce all such attempts at cost
allocation as arbitrary. Particulary outspoken in
1 A 1this respect was P.G.D. Wiles ox But accountants also 
voiced doubt about such procedures; i.e. W.J. 
Vatter,182 A. L. Thomas,183 M.C. Wells,184 and D. 
Briggs.18-* In the case of spectacles at first glance 
it might appear that these problems of cost allocation 
might have to be faced. However, spectacles 
constitute a ’’product line” which is essentially made 
up of the same commodity, albeit differentiated, and 
can therefore legitimately be treated as if they were 
produced by a single-product firm. The unseparable or 
common costs of each individual product are then found 
by simply dividing total common cost per time period 
by the number of units produced. To this cost figure, 
which may be called! average common cost must be added 
those additional costs which are unambiguously 
traceable to each individual differentiated product. 
These may be called separate costs.
It is important to note that the distinction between 
separate cost and average common cost must not be 
confused with that between variable and fixed cost.
' 4  O f
This point was discussed for instance by Joel Dean.xo 
Separate costs as well as common costs in the short 
run may be fixed as well as variable. The problem can 
perhaps better be understood when put into Lancastrian 
terminology. It is assumed that spectacles are 
bundles of characteristics made up of a basic 
characteristic which they all have in common, namely 
correction of faulty vision and additional 
characteristics such as more standing, comfort etc.
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which characterise each differentiated variety. When 
only one variety is produced average cost is found by 
simply dividing the total cost per time period by the 
number of units produced. When separate costs are 
present, each commodity has its individual separate 
cost and its share of common cost. This share is 
found by the formula:
ACC = IC. I SCi
Q
and, as separate costs of varieties A, B, C ...... N
can be estimated, the cost of any variety i, is:
ACi = TC - I SCi + SCi 
Q
where: ACC = average common cost, ACi = 
average cost of the ith product, TC = total 
cost, Q = quantity, SCi = separate cost of 
the ith product.
8.2 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF PRICES AND 
COSTS.
The empirical estimation of the costs and prices of 
the differentiated products called correction of 
faulty vision will involve the following steps:
1. It has to be shown that marginal costs exhibit 
constant returns to scale.
2. Marginal costs under total adaptation have to be 
identified.
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3. Separate costs have to be identified and traced 
to different varieties of the product.
H , Prices of different varieties of spectacles have 
to be identified from the recommended retail 
pricelists for lenses and from the "calculators" 
for frames.
It will then be possible to compare the prices of 
the differentiated varieties of spectacles with their 
costs and to test whether prices and costs behave in 
the way predicted by theory.
8.2.1 Estimation of an LRAC-Curve and a Cobb-Douglas
Production Function.
8.2.1.1 The available data.
Before the technical details of the empirical 
estimation can be addressed it is necessary to 
describe in some detail the actual data available. 
Two data sets are available:
I. Cross-sectional data on turnover and costs of 
approximately 160 optical firms covering the 
years 196fc-68187 and 1972-83.188 The data which 
is very detailed covers a period of 16 years. 
Unfortunately, this dataset is not published and 
has been treated as confidential by the Federal 
Association of Opticians. In spite of this the 
author has been able to obtain part of it.
2. An analysis of costs conducted in the writer’s
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own optical practice in Spring 1984 with a view 
to measuring the common marginal costs and the 
separate costs of the individual varieties of 
spectacles.
Cross sectional data.
Although the cross-sectional dataset covers the 
years 1964-83 only the data set for 1977 will be used 
in this study. This set contains data on the number 
of spectacles produced per firm per year, a question 
which was not covered by the data procured for the 
following years. This information, it will be readily 
understood, is crucial for the construction of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. It is also the 
basis on which an estimate can be made of the long-run 
average cost curve which is more accurate than can be 
obtained from figures on turnover. The data was 
collected by one of the most renowned firms of 
chartered accountants in Germany, the Treuarbeit AG in 
Frankfurt/Main, at the request of the Federal 
Association of Ophthalmic Opticians. The Federal 
Association advertised the project in the 
trade-Journals and received answers from 751 optician 
who expressed readiness to complete a questionnaire 
prepared by the chartered accountants in cooperation 
with the Federal Association of: Opticians. Only 165
firms, however, responded. Of these 10 returns were 
so incomplete that they could not be used.
Thus 155 firms make up the- sample for the year of 
1977. 134 of which had already taken part in the
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surveys conducted in the preceding years. The size of 
the sample is sufficiently large to be statistically 
significant. The size distribution of firms is shown 
in the following table:
TABLE 1.
Size Distribution of Firms Participating in the Survey,
TURNOVER UP
TO DM (000S): 250
NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES 2.2
TURNOVER
DM (000S) 203
NUMBER 13
OF FIRMS
500
3.5
377
67
1 MIO
6.1
707
51
<1 MIO 
13. 3
1490
25
In the survey for the year 1977 the following data 
were collected:
1. Revenue, divided into the following subgroups:
- turnover from the dispensing and repair of 
spectacles divided into "private” payments 
and those made by the sickness funds.
turnover from "related items” , i.e., 
contactlenses, hearing aids and others, for 
instance binoculars, magnifying glasses, 
microscopes etc. Turnover is "net", i.e. 
rebates, discounts rendered to customers 
etc. have already been deducted. "Other 
revenues” such as revenues from rent, sale 
of assets and non - operative profits are
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not contained in the revenue figures.
2. Costs:
- labour costs.
- rawmaterial cost. 
advertising cost.
- local taxes.
- other costs.
One of the main criticisms usually levelled against 
cost studies of this nature is that the cost figures 
are "outlay costs” as shown in the profit and loss 
account. They, therefore, have to be converted in to 
what the economist means by longrun marginal cost. 
This requirement is rarely met by cost studies. In 
this particular case, however, this has been done by 
the firm of chartered accountants carrying out the 
study.
The following adjustments were made:
Labour costs include all salaries and wages 
including all indirect costs, statutory and 
voluntary. In those cases where labourcost did not 
include a wage for the owner - entrepreneur or his 
relatives, such costs have been imputed according to 
the following schema:
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Number of Employees Salary per owner
up to 2.5 DM 60000
5.0 DM 65000
>5.0 DM 75000
For family members working full time in the firm half 
these amounts were reckoned.
Working space costs include the power costs, costs 
of cleaning, heating and repair costs of premises.
Advertising costs include the cost of window 
dressing, the cost of business entertainment, as well 
as travelling costs to trade shows etc.
Local taxes are mainly, the "Gewerbesteuer", a tax 
comparable to rates in Great Britain.
Other costs mainly consist of the cost of company 
cars, consultation fees, postage and administrative 
costs.
Under the heading 'other costs' there is also an 
estinate of the imputed interest on working capital 
and, where appropriate, imputed rent.
In order to calculate the imputed interest on 
working capital the asset side of the balance sheet 
[excluding premises] was added up and. shortterm 
liabilities including reserves were deducted. On this 
working capital 7% ‘interest was imputed.
In cases where the optician works from his own 
premises rent was imputed. For this purpose the 
opportunity cost of rent was estimated by asking 
respondents to give figures of rents which could be
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obtained in alternative use. Depreciation and 
interest on loans for buildings was then deducted from 
cost.
Tables 2 and 3 show further interesting data which 
were collected: In table 2 the sample is subdivided 
according to the number of outlets per firm.
TABLE 2.
Number of Outlets per Firm.
NUMBER OF 
OUTLETS
NUMBER OF 
FIRMS
124
21
10
156
79. 5 
13-5 
6.4
.6
100. 0
In Table 3 the sample is broken up according to 
location, i.e. whether in small, medium-sized or 
large cities, and if in large cities, whether in the 
city-centre or suburb:
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TABLE 3-
Location of Firms.
LOCATION NUMBER OF %
(INHABITANTS) FIRMS
< 30000 78 20.5
> 30000 > 250000 78 50.1
> 250000 CITYCENTER 18 11.5
> " SUBURB 28 17.9
156 100.0
The data set described will be used to estimate:
1. A long run average cost curve.
2. A production function.
From these estimates, in turn, inferences can be made 
as to the nature of longrun costs, i.e. whether they 
are increasing, decreasing or constant.
8.2.1.2 Decision as to the appropriate type of cost 
study.
Before embarking on the process of estimation, it is 
necessary to decide which type of cost study is most 
suitable to the available data set, and to determine 
how well the quality of the data stands up to the 
criticisms which are normally and legitimately 
levelled against empirical cost studies of this 
nature.
There are four types of cost studies:
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statistical cost studies,
studies based on questionnaires to firms, 
engineering cost studies and
- studies based on the ’’survivor technique.”
The first question to ask, then, is which of these 
methods should be selected in this study. The answer 
is more or less predetermined by the nature of the
data set. The data do not lend themselves to the
’’survivor technique” . This method assumes a time
series covering, if possible, the whole of an
industry, and a very long time-span, perhaps 40 years 
or more. Obviously this condition is not fulfilled 
here as only approximately 160 out of a total
population of 5000 firms are contained in the sample. 
Moreover, the mix of firms varies from year to year, 
and the time-span covers only the relatively short 
period of 20 years.
Studies based on questionnaires require different 
questions from those asked in the present cost study.
An engineering cost study would also require quite 
different data. It would have to be based on 
estimates of the optimal costs for different sizes of 
firms and not, as is available here, merely the actual 
cost figures.
There remains, then, the statistical approach. This 
consists in the application of regression analyses to 
time series or cross-sectional data. For long - run
- 209 -
statistical cost estimation it is cross-sectional data 
which are the most useful. Exercises based on time 
series analysis require that technology should remain 
constant over the period. Technology usually changes 
considerably. On the other hand, "state of the art" 
may be presumed to be given within an industry thereby 
removing this problem for cross - sectional studies. 
It has been argued that even within a cross-section of 
an industry technology will vary between firms. Large 
firms may be presumed to employ more modern production 
techniques than smaller firms. This argumen.t is 
probably valid for many industries, but there are good 
grounds for believing that it does not apply to 
opticians. It is not easy to substantiate this claim 
rigorously. But it .is borne out in the experience of 
the author of this study who has very intimate 
knowledge of the industry based on lengthy 
experience. He runs 5 different outlets ranging 
considerably in size. All of them use very similar 
technology. It has to be admitted that the data from 
the industry-wide cost study show astonishingly wide 
variations in average cost between individual firms at 
all firmsizes. Such variationes must, therefore, be 
attributable to factors other than size. But
different technologies do not supply the explanation. 
In fact, it will be shown that the cost differences 
are mainly due to differences in the price of labour 
and differences in the efficiency of the labour 
employed. When these price- and efficiency 
differences are accounted for by introducing them as 
explanatory variables they account for nearly 80% of 
the cost differences.
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A major criticism levelled against statistical cost 
studies, states that accounting data do not include 
the opportunity cost elements ideally required for an 
estimation of marginal cost. In the present data set, 
however, it has been noted that the most important 
opportunity cost elements which are missing from the 
accounting data have in fact been Imputed.
A further criticism of statistical cost studies 
concerns depreciation expenses. Accounting figures 
should ideally be converted to user cost. In their 
conventional form they include full depreciation 
figures which cover the cost of the obsolescence of 
equipment which is invariable with use. In the case 
of this data set the argument has to be recognized as 
valid. However, depreciation costs only account for a 
minimal part of costs. Depreciation charges taken 
from the accounting figures do not therefore distort 
the result significantly. Furthermore, as the 
equipment used is more or less uniform over the 
industry, any errors attributable to different methods 
of depreciation employed by different firms tend to 
cancel each other out.
The present data set covers not only spectacles but 
also contactlenses, hearing aids and merchandise which 
is related to spectacles. There is a problem of cost 
allocation here. The authors of the data set deal 
with this problem by dividing costs between the output 
of spectacles and these other outputs in proportion to 
the number of employees engaged in the respective 
fields of production. It must be admitted that this
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procedure is arbitrary and open to all the criticism 
which has been levelled by economists against any
method of cost allocation. However, the error
introduced in this case is relatively small, as only a 
small percentage (approx. 16%) of turnover consists of 
outputs other than spectacles.
Furthermore, the greater proportion of output other 
than spectacles consists of the fitting of
contactlenses and hearing aids, a type of service
which is akin to the production of spectacles and very 
similar in its cost structure. Therefore, any error 
introduced is probably extremely small and will not
distort the results of the cost study significantly.
To summarise the discussion it can be said that the 
data set at hand is particularly well suited to an 
estimation of an LRAC curve and a production function
by regression methods. Of those criticisms usually
levelled against empirical cost studies of this nature 
the most important, i.e. the lack of imputed costs 
and the different state of technology for different 
firms do not apply. Remaining possible errors have 
been shown to be of minor magnitude which can safely 
be neglected.
8.2.2 Estimation of a Long Run Cost Curve by Multiple
Regression.
The empirical estimation comprised the following 
steps:
The data on output (in physical volume) and costs
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(in money terms) from the data set collected at the 
behest of the optical association were fed into the 
computer, using an appropriate statistical program or 
"package", in this case microstat, developed by 
ECOSOFT Corporation of the U.S. and implemented on an 
I.B.M. personal computer. The measure of output were 
the number of spectacles dispensed per year per firm. 
It is also possible to take the revenue per year per 
firm in monetary terms as a measure of output. This 
second measure was also fed into the computer and has 
been used as a check on the physical output measure.
Next, the cost figures had to be fed into the
computer. The cost figures available in the original
data are rather broken down in considerable detail.
They consist of data on raw material cost, labour
cost, working space cost, advertising cost, local
taxes and other cost. These individual cost figures
were fed into the computer. The costs of each firm
have to be added and divided by number of spectacles
produced in order to arrive at a measure of this LRAC
of each firm. More insight into the nature of the
LRAC curve can, however, be attained if rawmaterial
I
cost is left out of the estimation. It has been shown 
that raw-material cost is the main separate cost and 
it may vary with the mix of varieties produced by 
individual firms thus giving rise to bias against 
larger firms if they sell, as is likely, a higher 
proportion of spectacles with a higher raw-material 
cost. Raw-material cost was therefore left out of the 
calculation of average cost per firm. A linear 
function was now fitted to the average cost-output
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observations thus defined yielding a curve of the 
form:
AC = a + b^ Q + u
where AC = total labour and other cost Q =
output mesured in pairs of spectacles a =
intercept u = random variable.
If the coefficient b^ is positive, this indicates 
increasing costs the larger the firm and therefore 
decreasing returns; if b^ = 1  there are constant 
returns to scale and if b^ is negative this is a sign 
of increasing returns. If the coefficient of
p
determination, R , is low this may indicate that a 
linear curve does not fit the data very well. It is 
then possible to try and fit curves of a higher 
order. For instance a quadratic curve of the form:
AC = a + bj Q + b2 Q2 + u.
A cubic of the form:
AC = a + b1 Q - b 2 Q2 + b^ + u
p
might result in a higher R fc indicating a U-shaped 
cost curve. The result of the various estimations of 
these curves can be summarized:
The linear equation exhibited a T-ratio of 2.35 
for the coefficient of the explanatary variable 
supporting a 95 % level of confidence, i.e. the 
result is statistically significant.
The R 2, the coefficient of determination.
-  2 1H  -
however, was only .035, indicating that only 3.5 
% of the variation could be traced to the 
influence of size.
Fitting a quadratic and a cubic function did not
2improve matters, R remained low.
Another method used to attain a better fit of the
regression line would be transformation of the
variables, i.e. converting them to logarithms etc.
before estimation of the line of best fit by OLS.
Several transformations were tried. The best result
was obtained with a log/log specification. In that 
2case R increased to .10 and the t-value of the
regression coefficient was - &.16. These small
improvements cannot be regarded as satisfactory. It
must be concluded from these equations that there are
other causes responsible for differences in cost level
between firms apart from size. In such a case it is
still possible to arrive at a logical measure of the
influence of size on average cost. If the other
influences can be traced and estimated by introducing
them as further independent variables, then, if there
is truly a correlation between them and the dependant
variable, i.e. average cost, then their introduction
2will increase R significantly, when the coefficients 
o'f the explanatory variables are being estimated by 
multiple regression.
Instead of estimating functions of the form:
AC = a + b1Q + u
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and related functions of a higher order containing 
only the one explanatory variable Q, it is now 
proposed to introduce a function with several
explanatory variables. If these additional variables
f l ­
are dustiably included in the model, then this should
2show in an increase of R while at the same time the 
T-ratios of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables should remain at confidence levels above 
95%.
Additional explanatory variables are not difficult 
to find from the data set:
The average cost of a firm will obviously be 
influenced by the biggest block of costs in its 
cost structure. This is the average wage paid.
- The productivity of labour employed.
The average price of a pair of spectacles should 
be included as the sale of higher-priced items 
may be presumed to entail a greater cost in 
selling effort, promotional expenses etc.
Location should be included as another factor as 
a location in the center of a large city tends to 
imply higher rents, higher wages etc.
Measures have to be assigned to these concepts. For 
average price it is of course the average price 
charged. Location can be incorporated as a dummy 
variable, with 1 for location in city centre and O for 
other locations. A measure of the productivity of the 
workforce would be the number of pairs of spectacles
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produced per year per employee. For wages average 
wage per employee is taken because in the case of 
spectacles there is a great likelihood that wages per 
employee may vary considerably between individual 
firms as it is possible to employ a high proportion of 
apprentices. After a year’s diligent training an 
apprentice is able to be substituted for a qualified 
worker, at only a fraction of his cost.
Taking the measure of output, i.e. pairs of 
spectacles produced per year per firm as the
independent variable and the other influences as 
constituting the explanatory variables, on the data a 
stepwise multiple regression was performed. In a 
stepwise regression only those variables are included 
which result in a coefficient that is statistically 
significant, the level of confidence being chosen by 
the researcher. In this case a level of 95% was
considered adequate and consequently two variables do 
not enter into the equation. These are location and 
revenue per sale. The following multiple regression 
equation was estimated:
AC = .117 - .00000218 SPECS/Y + .002WAGE/EMP - .000142 SPEC/EMP
(1.973) (12.526) (22.955)
where, SPECS/Y = pairs of spectacles
produced per firm per year. WAGE/EMP = 
average wage per firm and SPEC/EMP = number 
of spectacles per employee produced by a 
firm per year. T-values are given in
brackets.
The results* allow a tentative interpretation: The
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2coefficient of determination, R has now increased to 
.785 This can be interpreted as indication that 7 8 .5% 
of all variations in average cost are distributed 
amongst the explanatory variables of the equation. 
SPECS/Y is statistically significant at the 95% level, 
whereas WAGE/EMP and SPEC/EMP are significant at the 
99% LEVEL. SPECS/Y is significant and has a minus 
sign, indicating increasing returns to scale. 
However, the coefficient of .00000218 indicates that 
for every 1000 pairs of capacity average cost 
increases by DM .28. This effect is almost 
negligible. The result of the statistical analysis 
may then be interpretated as indicating that, when the 
effect of the "suppressor" variables WAGE/EMP and 
SPEC/EMP are taken into account constant returns to 
scale are a fair assumption.
8.2.3 Estimation of a C-D Production Function.
In the preceding section it was shown that the 
estimation of the LRAC curve suggests the existence of 
constant returns to scale. An alternative method of 
testing for returns to scale is the estimation of a 
production function. A production function expresses 
the technical relationship between the physical 
quantities of inputs to the physical quantity of 
outputs produced. The simplest and most widely used 
form of a production function is the "Cobb-Douglas" 
function named after two American scientists who 
invented it in the 1920s.^®^Its form is
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multiplicative:
Q = ALa . Kb 
where, Q = output L = labour K = capital.
This can be generalised to:
Q = AF1 , F2 , .....Fn
for n inputs FI, F2,   Fn.
The Cobb-Douglas function cannot be estimated
regression techniques as it stands because 
multiplicative form is not linear. But if logs
taken one gets:
logQ. = log A + alogL + blogK.
If a stochastic element is added such an equation 
can be estimated from the multiple regression:
logQ = logA + alogL +blogK + u 
where, u = error term.
The Cobb-Douglas function can be used to test for
returns to scale. If the coefficients add up to 1, 
then output has increased in the same proportion as 
inputs and there are constant returns to scale. If 
the sum of the coefficients has a value >1, then 
output is increased by more than the inputs have 
increased indicating increasing returns to scale. If 
the sum of the coefficients <1, then there are 
decreasing returns.
by
the
are
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Many criticisms have been levelled against 
empirically estimated production functions. Ideally, 
a production function can only be estimated at a 
micro-economic level, for a single firm or a single 
homgeneous product, requiring a few homogeneous 
inputs.
In real-life situations, therefore, attempts to 
estimate production functions usually run into 
difficulties. The measure of output refers to 
heterogeneous products; labour input is of varied 
quality; capital input does not measure flow of 
capital services, i.e. user cost, but is, instead, 
usually a static measure of capital actually employed 
per time period, i.e. either actual stock of capital 
employed or interest and depreciation calculated 
according to accountancy principles.
There are various methods of circumventing these 
difficulties to some extent. The most obvious one is 
to use weights for inputs and outputs which would 
convert heterogeneous units of measurements into 
homogeneous ones. For instance, outputs can be given 
their market value or their cost of production, labour 
units can be weighted according to wage levels, 
corrected for different efficiency levels of high- or 
low wage labour cost units etc.
All these objections are more or less the same as 
those which have already been discussed earlier, where 
it was shown that the data used in this study are 
relatively free of these weaknesses. A meaningful 
estimation of a production function can therefore be
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made using the same data as before.
The production function estimated will be of the form:
logQ = logA + alogL + blogK + u.
where, Q = number of spectacles produced 
per firm per year, L = number of man-hours 
worked per firm per year, K = all other 
costs except wages and cost of rawmaterial.
The following equation was estimated:
log Q = 1.298^ + .1697 L + .8216 K
(2.33) (10.5^)
with T-ratios given in brackets. R = 8 5 .8 ,
adjusted for degrees of freedom.
The T-ratios are significant at the 95% and 99%
p
level of significance, respectively, and the R is 
high. The coefficients of logL and logK add up to
0.99. The deviation of the sum of a and b from unity 
is very slight. The hypothesis was therefore tested 
that the sum of the coefficients is not significantly 
different from unity. This hypothesis is supported by 
the test which tested the null hypotheses that the sum 
is not unity at a level of confidence well above 99%. 
The result of this estimation of a CD production 
function is then that the assumption of constant 
returns to scale is not rejected. This result 
therefore reinforces the tentative conclusion reached 
in the preceding paragraph which stated that constant 
returns are a fair assumption.
When there are constant returns to scale LRMC =
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LRAC. This reduces considerably the problems of 
marginal cost estimation, the task which will be 
adressed next.
8.2.a Estimation of Marginal Costs of
Different Varieties of Spectacles.
The object of this section is an empirical 
estimation of the separate and marginal costs of 
different varieties of spectacles.
Estimates of separate costs are not available on an 
industry-wide basis. A cost study was therefore 
undertaken in the writer’s own optical practice.
The theoretical considerations underlying this 
empirical study have already been discussed. It is 
now proposed to turn to their practical application.
8.2.4.1 Estimation of separate costs.
It has already been pointed out that estimation of 
separate costs does not pose particular problems 
conceptually. It is probably for this reason that 
separate costs play only a minor role in microeconomic 
theory. In practice, however, the estimation of 
separate costs is not always easy and procedures for 
estimating separate costs are widely debated in the 
field of cost accounting. In cost accounting it is 
acknowledged that tracing all separate cost - in this 
context called ’’prime” or ’’direct” cost may involve 
problems, particularly in a multiple-product firm. 
Horngren1^0 cites as an example the distinction
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between order Job costing and process posting. In the 
first case the direct costs attributable to a 
non-recurrent activity are measured, in process 
costing an attempt is made at determining a meaningful 
average of separate costs of recurrent Jobs. Also, 
direct costs may not be traceable down to individual 
products; but still the term is applicable if costs 
can be traced to a branch of an enterprice, to a 
division etc. Separate costs are defined as those 
costs which are traceable to a particular activity be 
it division, cost centre, product or, indeed, variety 
of p r o d u c t . T h e  science of workstudy has developed 
methods of separate cost measurement. Although 
work-study ultimately aims at increasing the 
efficiency of opereations it can be used for purposes 
of this study. 1^2 Ag £ar ag estimation of separate
costs is concerned definite procedures of identifying 
separate, in accounting parlance "prime" or "direct", 
costs have been established and are described in 
textbooks of production management.
There is a variety of costs which are separate,
i.e. can be traced to differentiated products. In 
the case of spectacles they are:
1) Raw-material cost
2) Direct labour cost.
3) Other direct costs:
a) ancillary material
b) postage and traceable telephone costs
c) user cost of specialized machinery or furniture
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d) interest for material kept in stock
e) processing cost of bills
f) miscellaneous separate costs.
In order to arrive at a satisfactory method of 
estimating separate cost advice was sought from the 
chief cost accountant of the Volkswagen factory at 
Kassel, G e r m a n y . T h e  Volkswagen factory deploys, of 
course, the most advanced methods of cost 
a c c o u n t i n g 1 ^  which lay the utmost importance on using 
the correct principles to use in the estimation of 
"prime", i.e. separate cost. It therefore possesses 
a wealth of experience in their practical 
application.
The cost accountant made a most valuable 
contribution to the practical problem of measuring 
direct cost. He suggested the problem should be 
solved by employing the principles of work measurement 
by "REFA" methods.
The expression "REFA" is short for Reichsausschuss 
fuer Arbeitszeitermittlung which translates into 
English as The National Committee of Work Measurement. 
"REFA" is the equivalent of methods of workmeasurement 
which ultimately go back to the time and motion 
studies originated by the Americans W.F. Taylor 
(1856-1915) and Charles Bedeaux (1888-1944). Over the 
last 80 years REFA has developed into a body of 
knowledge which goes far beyond the original time and 
motion studies and is widely used in German industry. 
The compendium on REFA methods extends to 5 
volumes .3*95
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Usually separate costs are divided into direct 
labour cost and direct material costs.
In order to measure direct labour cost the following 
principles are suggested by REFA:
- describe an operation, such as the production of 
a pair of spectacles, logically from start to 
finish, by suitable means, e.g. a flow-chart,
- divide the operation up into small elements which 
can easily be measured,
- time each element several times in order to 
ensure accurancy,
- calculate averages.
The object of the REFA studies is the estimation of 
standardardized rates. In this case, however, the 
measurement of traceable costs of each individual 
element of the operation is all that is needed so that 
only the first two of the steps mentioned have to be 
employed.
A more difficult task is that of estimating direct 
materials cost. The REFA methods also suggest an 
important principle which can be stated in a single 
sentence:
"everything that can be traced, quantified 
and measured is a separate cost and can be 
calculated.
The meaning of this principle becomes more obvious 
if it is illustrated by an example: If only "national
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health" frames and lenses were provided by opticians 
then the space required for dispensing would be 
minimal. Dispensing and workshop could be in the same 
room and only a negligible portion of the cost of 
premises and furniture would be incurred at the sales 
point. If, however, as is the case in any traditional 
optician’s premises specialized display units for 
better quality frames and lenses have to be provided, 
then this constitutes an extra cost which is traceable 
to better frames. This cost can be quantified by 
estimating the cost over its entire life. By 
estimating the total time in use in appropriate units, 
i.e. minutes, and dividing total cost by total time, 
cost per time-unit can be quantified. The number of 
minutes which every individual variety of product 
makes use of the specialized furniture can then be 
measured and its separate cost can be calculated by 
multiplying individual minutes of use by cost per 
minute.
It is now proposed to follow the procedure suggested 
by the cost accountant:
1. construct a flow-chart of the production precess
of spectacles and note for each stage of
production the type of separate cost incurred.
2. Decide how separate costs can be measured.
3- Perform the actual calculations and
measurements.
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8.2 . U .2 Constructing a flow chart and 
identifying separate costs.
Fig. 1
Flow Chart: Production of Spectacles.
ORDER FORM, FRAME SELECTION, CHOICE OF LENSES 
SIGHT TEST
ORDERING RAUMATERIAL 
STORAGE OF ORDER JOB 
ADDING RAUMATERIAL 
WORKSHOP; CUT, EDGE AND FIT PROCESS 
NOTIFICATION OF CUSTOMER 
FINAL INSPECTION 
STORAGE OF ORDER JOB 
HANDING OVER COMPLETED JOB 
PROCESSING N.H. BILLS 
AFTER SALES SERVICE.
Fig. 1. shows a flow-chart outlining the ten stages of 
production of a pair of spectacles.
Stage 1:
The production of a pair of spectacles begins when a 
client enters an optician’s practice with a view to 
ordering a pair of glasses. Stage 1 consits in fact
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of 3 activities which cannot be separated:
1. Filling in an order form, which accompanies the 
spectacles during the entire production.
2. Selecting a frame suitable for the customer.
3. Choosing the quality characteristics of the 
lenses to be supplied.
The optician spends a definite period of time on this 
activity and this time can be measured and constitutes 
obviously a separate cost of a pair of spectacles. 
The time measured should include the minutes spent on 
this particular activity, including time spent on 
tidying up frames after the customer has left and time 
spent in carrying the dob to the workshop. The
separate cost will then be calculated by determining 
the cost per minute of the individual optician 
performing the task and multiplying this figure by the 
minutes measured. The labour cost per minute is 
calculated by dividing yearly wages by yearly minutes 
actually spent on the dob. In this way holidays,
premiums, absence for breaks, but also sickness etc. 
are accounted for. The yearly wage includes all 
direct wages, taxes and contributions ect. paid by
the firm. What further costs can be traced to the
differentiated variety at this stage? This questions 
poses some rather difficult problems. It was 
mentioned before that specialized furniture and 
equipment such as^display units for frames, equipment 
for the measuring of pupillary distance and the height 
of the reading segments in multi focus lenses are
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being used at this stage. Display units are only 
necessary when better quality frames are sold, but not 
when the client chooses to have his new lenses 
dispensed into his old frame or makes do with the 
"national health" type of frames. This equipment can 
therefore be traced to individual jobs and consitutes 
a separate cost. How to calculate this type of direct 
materials cost per pair of glasses was discussed in 
the preceding paragraph. It consists of estimating 
total life and total cost of the item and dividing 
total cost by total life, expressed in this case in 
minutes in order to arrive at cost/min. Multiplying 
actual time used by this cost figure gives separate 
cost for the individual pair of glasses. A more 
difficult question is posed by the fact that quite a 
determinate space is required for frame display. 
Should rent, maintenance, heating etc. for this space 
not also be calculated per minute of use and charged 
separately to different varieties of product? At 
first glance it may seen that this question has to be 
answered in the affirmative. However, the sales-room 
is also used for other stages of production, such as 
stages 8, adjusting frames, making payment and stage 
10, after sales service. It then becomes illogical to 
assign cost/min. to these activities as they are 
produced Jointly. Therefore work-space costs are not 
traceable to individual product varieties. They are 
traceable, however, when space is specially used for 
one stage of production only as is the case with the 
workshop and the sight-testing room.
Stage 2:
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When the client comes to see his optician he may 
already be in possession of a prescription, usually 
made out by an ophthalmic doctor. If this is the case 
production goes right on to stage 3 as indicated in 
the flow chart. If not, the optician performs a 
sight-test indicated as stage 2 in the flow-chart. 
Sight-testing entails a separate labour-cost, and will 
be measured the way already described. But 
sight-tests usually have to be performed in a 
self-contained room with specialized equipment. The 
costs of this room are made up of the cost of original 
decoration, furniture and equipment, their
maintenance, heating, cleaning, electricity and rent. 
User cost per minute can be estimated for rent by 
dividing total cost of rent by the yearly minutes the
sight-testing room is in use per year. The cost of
fitting out the room has to be estimated together with 
maintenance cost over the whole life of the room and 
cost per minute can then be calculated. It is also 
possible to measure the separate costs of cleaning, 
heating and use of electricity. But part of these 
costs are provided Jointly for the whole firm.
Stage 3:
This involves the estimation of the separate costs 
of ordering raw material. Here direct labour time is 
expended which can be measured; along with definite
separate materials cost. The cost of postage and
telephone charges incurred in the process. The use of 
equipment and space can be ignored as they are 
infinitesi'mally small.
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Stage l l :
Apart from the direct labour cost which is dealt 
with in the now familiar fashion, at this stage the 
costs of the raw material have to be established. As 
the retail prices are known from the record these 
costs can be read off from the "calculators" and 
recommended retail price lists which contain all 
retail prices and the corresponding raw material 
prices. Any discounts or special rebates conceded by 
manufacturers have to be deducted. Again, there are 
no difficulties as these can easily be derived from 
the normal accounts. A further cost is the interest 
incurred for rawmaterial kept in stock. Ideally, time 
that each item is kept in stock should be recorded 
individually and interest calculated. As this 
procedure would entail enormous cost, it is proposed 
to substitute another method of cost estimation for 
it: average turnover of frames and lenses can more
easily be calculated. A good approximation to the 
desired figure would then be the average interest cost 
chargeable to each individual item of raw material. 
To give an example: frames are turned over n times per
year. Interest per year is 7%> Average interest on 
frames is then (n/7)%. Separate cost due to interest 
of frames is then (n/7)% of the raw material value of 
the frame.
Stage 5:
the cut, edge and fit process. Here, 
labour time can be measured in the usual 
separate costs are room-costs, i.e.
Stage 5 is 
again, direct 
way. Further
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rent, but also the costs of specialized furniture, 
fitting up the room and maintenance costs. These 
costs are estimated in the now familiar manner, with 
Just one variation. One of the major costs is use of 
the edging-machine and here separate costs can be 
traced even more finely. Its diamond-studded wheels 
are worn out in direct proportion to the time the 
machine is used to grind a pair of lenses. This cost 
can be assessed separately if the time of use is 
, recorded separately. Furthermore, for some frames a 
"former" has to be made up specially and if so, its 
cost of DM . t i -0 has to be added. Sometimes a lens or 
frame is spoilt in the process of production, in this 
case its cost should also be recorded at this stage.
Stage 6: ,
Notification of the customer, although seemingly a 
minor item, may entail relatively important separate 
costs. If notification is done by the phone, this, in 
addition to the charge for the call”, often entails 
several minutes of direct labour cost, if the client 
does not answer and one has to try several times. 
Also, phone calls made by impatient customers asking 
about the time of completion of their spectacles cost 
considerable time and should logically be included at 
this stage. If notification is made by mail this 
includes the cost of postage and the postcard.
Stage 7:
At stage 7, final inspection, traceable cost is that 
of direct labour time and this is the only item that
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can be recorded as a separate cost at this stage.
Stage 8:
Handing over of completed spectacles, adjusting 
frame, making payment, again entails considerable 
direct labour cost. Room costs cannot be measured 
separately as the space is the sales-room used Jointly 
with other stages of production. However, often cases 
for glasses are given away free of charge and if so 
they should be noted as a separate cost.
Stage 9:
Processing of "national health" bills, is a rather 
curious cost. The many "sickness funds" require a 
separate bill for every pair of glasses supplied to 
one of their members. This work is contracted out at 
a cost of 1 % of the value of bills and constitutes a 
traceable separate cost. Furthermore, the bills are
paid on average l b  days later than private bills which 
are normally paid right away. Interest of 
approximately .3 % of the value of bills is therefore a
separate cost to be noted at this stage.
Stage 10:
After sales service is the final stage of 
production. It involves refitting a client’s frames 
free of charge as long as his glasses last. If the 
client has second thoughts on the type of frame, it is 
not unusual to exchange them free of charge for
another pair. If he is not satisfied with his visual 
acuity, another sight test will be administered, even
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if the original test had been done by an ophthalmic 
doctor. Sometimes new lenses have then to be given 
free of charge. All these activities will give rise 
to separate labour and/or material-costs which also 
constitute separate costs.
8.2.5 Measuring and Calculating
Separate Cost in Practice.
The flow-chart exhibited in Fig. 1 has to be 
modified a little to ease the actual task of
measurement. This task was greatly facilitated by the
fact that for every pair of glasses produced by an
optician a record is made up in any case. The record 
in actual use only had to be expanded in order to
serve adequately the purpose of the cost study and to
collect on to it all the data which are required in 
order to serve the ultimate purpose of the exercise, 
namely to construct the price and cost planes 
mentioned in chapter 7.
An example of the expanded record is exhibited in 
Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2
W o r k  Sheet: Job Costing.
1 NAME OF CLIENT //UjLU&r
2 PRESCRIPTION 4
3 LENS VARIETY 2
4 RETAIL PRICE RIGHT LENS M.-
5 RETAIL PRICE LEFT LENS
6 RETAIL PRICE FRAME
7 SICKNESS FUND PAYMENT
NAME
WORKER
MINS DM/
MINS
COST MINS DM/
MINS
COST
B SALES ROOM Iwj 1\ .61
" COSTS AC
9 SIGHT TEST So, ft 0 /!7 .52
'• EQUIPM. AT .335
10 ORDERING RAW MATERIAL TS'iviM’ 3 .45
TELEPHONE ETC. i.ho
11 ADDING RAW MATERIAL 2 .45
RAW MATERIAL R LENS 32-
RAW MATERIAL L LENS ?2.-
RAW MATERIAL FRAME /2. -
12 WORKSHOP aj .f?
COSTS /* .172
13 USE EDGING MACHINE H .04
FORMER. .vo
WASTE -
OTHER MATERIAL —
14 NOTIFICATION CUSTOMER (o .61
" POSTCARD 1.20
" TELEPHONE —
15 FINAL INSPECTION 3 .61
16 SALES COMPLETION S..6, i l .52
CIVE AWAYS V.-
17 AFTER SALES SERVICE 8 W / 21 .45
MATERIAL USED 32-
Some of the data in Fig. 2 have already been explained 
in the preceding section. In assigning values to the 
different separate costs additional explanation is 
given when neeeesery.
Row 2: '•
Prescription: a short-hand notation is given to
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indicate the strength of the lenses. Thus, all lenses 
of spherical power zero up to + - 2.0 dpts. are
denoted by 2, all those of spherical power up to +-2 
with an additional cylindrical component of up to +2 
by 2/2 etc.
Row 3:
Lens variety: This is the second type of vertical 
discrimination, described in paragraph 5.1.3.2. The 
information is shown following the notation of the 
dummy.
1 = Single focus lenses supplied without frames,
2 = Single focus lenses supplied including frames,
3 = Multi focus lenses supplied without frames.
4 = Multi focus lenses supplied including frames.
Row 7:
Sickness fund payment: This is the sum paid by the 
sickness fund of which the client is a member.
Row 8:
Sales point. Separate costs incurred here are 
direct labour costs only. The method of measurement 
has been explained before. But an example of the 
actual calculation is shown: The optician Lorenz
received a total yearly salary of DM 66319.2 in 1984. 
He works 40 hours per week or 6.66... = 6.7 hours per 
day. He gets a holiday of 30 working days. There are 
9 statutory holidays in 1984. His average absence for
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sickness over the last 5 years was 6 days. He worked 
32 hours overtime. Converting these figures to hours 
per year:
Gross total = 52(weeks) x HO
- holidays = 5(weeks) x 40
- statutory holidays = 10(days) x 6,7
- sickness = l(week) x HO
+ overtime
Total hours worked adds up then to 1805; multiplied 
by 60 to give minutes/year = 108300. Thus cost per
minute is 66319.2 divided by 108300 = DM 0.61 per
minute.
Row 9:
Sight test: Here, again, the direct cost is
measured. Thie sight-test was performed by another 
employee by the name of Seitz. Direct labour cost per 
minute was calculated in the same manner as before to 
be DM .52 per minute. Since the sight-testing room is 
a self-contained unit user cost per minute can be 
calculated. The sight-testing room measures 8
square-meters. The furniture, fittings and equipment 
of a sight-testing room are not subject to any t
appreciable amount of obsolescence. Their normal span 
of life can therefore be estimated at 18 years.
=  2080 
=  -200 
= -67 
= - H O  
= 1773 
= 32 
= 1805
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Maintenance cost per year is approximately DM 2400.0. 
On average 20% of all clients have their eyes tested
by opticians. 1 sight testing room per 4500 clients
per year is the optimal capacity and estimating the 
average length of a sight-test to be 17
minutes,1^^total user-minutes per year will be 900 x 
17 = 15300 and over the entire life of the equipment 
they will be 900 x 17 x 18 = 275400 mins. Fittings
and furniture of a sight-testing room were estimated 
by the firm of Zeiss1^^to be DM 49500 at current
prices, i.e. replacement cost. Total cost is DM
28000. Total minutes used = 275400. The cost per
minute is therefore DM 49500/275400 = DM .18. To this 
figure has to be added the annual rental cost
calculated at 8 x DM 360 = DM 2880 per year, divided
by the yearly minutes of use = 2880/15300 = DM .183. 
The maintenance cost of DM 2400/15300 = DM .160 per 
minute. Thus the user cost of the sight-testing-room 
per minute = DM .18 + DM .183 + DM .160 = DM .52.
Row 10:
Ordering raw-material: The direct labour-cost of the 
third employee, was calculated to be DM .45 per
minute. He incurred a telephone charge of 9 units at 
DM .26 = DM 2.34.
Row 11:
Adding raw-material. In additon to direct labour 
cost the raw-material price of the frame was DM 12.0 
and the rawmaterial price of the lenses was DM 64.0. 
These prices were derived from the c a l c u l a t o r - 3- ^  a s
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far as the frames are concerned, and from the 
recommended retail price list of the manufacturer 
Rodenstock for the lenses. From the raw-material 
price of the lenses a 25% rebate granted by Rodenstock 
was deducted. For the frame there was no special 
rebate.
Row 12:
Workshop. In addition to the direct labour cost, 
space costs and the costs of specialized furniture and 
machinery can be traced. Cost figures were calculated 
for the practice and checked against figures estimated 
by one of the world’s leading suppliers of equipment 
for optical workshops, the firm of Wernicke, 
Duesseldorf2®0 A workshop with a capacity of 3000 
pairs of spectacles per year occupies 15 
square-meters, which, assuming an opportunity cost of 
DM 360 per square-meter per year gives a cost of DM 
5400 per year. Fitting it out with the necessary 
furniture and equipment costs DM 35000, excluding the 
edging machine. The life span of these assets is
P 0 1estimated at 15 years. A Maintenance costs are DM
2500 per year.202. The minutes of use per year are 
equal to the average minutes per pair of g l a s s e s 2 0 ^ 
multiplied by the number of spectacles produced20^ = 
19min. x 3150 = 59850 min. This figure has to be
multiplied by 15 (years) resulting in a total of 
897750 minutes. Thus one arives at a cost per minute 
of DM 37500/897750 = DM .041 per minute. To this must 
be added rent of DM 5400/59850 = DM .09 per minute and 
yearly maintenance cost of DM 2500/59850 = DM .042 per
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minute. The cost per-minute it then DM .041 + DM .09 
+ DM .042 = DM .173 per minute.
Row 13:
Edging machine. The lifespan of an edging machine 
is approx. 20000 hours. In these 20000 hours 
maintenance costs of DM 24000 will be incurred, mainly 
because every thousand hours the diamond wheels 
costing DM 1200 a set have to be replaced. 20000 
hours = 1200000 min. Total cost of the edging machine 
over its entire life « DM 26000 + 24000 = DM 50000.
The cost per minute is then: DM 50000/1200000 = DM .04
per minute.
Row 15:
Final inspection. At this stage only direct labour 
costs can be traced.
Row 16:
Sales completion. In additon to direct labour cost, 
costs were incurred for a case given free of charge.
Row 17:
After sales service. Separate costs are mainly
direct labour costs, but in some cases new lenses or 
frames are supplied free of charge and their raw 
material cost then constitudes a separate cost.
As already mentioned the actual measurement of 
separate costs was performed in the Hann. Muenden
branch of the author’s firm in April and May 1984. The
cost measurements were taken by the employees under 
the supervision of the author. They yielded 450 dob 
forms representing 450 pairs of spectacles into which 
the minutes used for each operation and the other 
traceable separate costs were minutely entered. As 
every form contains 19 entries approximately 8500 
separate data have thus been collected. To safeguard 
against possible ’’sloppiness” the workers filled in 
additional daily reports in which their daily routine 
was recorded by the minute. Thus a reliable estimate 
of the separate prices and costs of the 450 pairs of 
spectacles produced in that time period was attained. 
To these data average costs have toteadded in order to 
arrive at a measure of marginal cost of each 
individual pair of spectacles.
8.2.6 Estimation of Average Cost.
It has already been shown that returns to scale are 
constant in the production of spectacles. It follows, 
that marginal cost equals average cost. This 
facilitates the estimation of average cost 
considerably, as average cost can be found by simply 
dividing total cost by number of units produced. At 
the same time separate costs have, of course, to be 
deducted before average cost is calculated; recall 
that it was shown that average cost is found by the formula:
AC = TC -[SCI
Q
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where, Q would be the "normal output" per year, i.e. 
the optimal output under total adaptation. The sum of 
separate cost, SCi can be derived from the REFA 
estimates by projection of the sum of separate cost of 
450 pairs to the "normal" 3150 pairs produced per 
year. It is then necessary to calculate total cost.
Total cost has to be estimated for the long run. 
Accountancy figures should therefore be converted into 
those relevant to the economist’s definition of long 
run cost and furthermore include all relevant imputed 
costs.
The underlying principles have been discussed 
already x t  was shown that longrun costs are those
costs which would accrue if the entrepreneur were able 
to adjust all factors of production to the current 
rate of output optimally.
The task is greatly facilitated by the fact that the 
practice under observation can be said to be 
reasonably well adapted to its current rate of 
production in any case.
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TABLE 4.
Number of Specs Produced per Year by Firm
YEAR NUMBER
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983
3083
3343
3107
3142
3175
3101
3219
3092
3380
3295
2829
2989
Table 4 shows number of spectacles produced per year 
over the last 12 years. Output was on average 3146 
pairs of glasses per year with a low of 2829 and a 
high of 3343. With the exception of the firm’s 
premises during those years more or less all assets 
have been replaced at some time or another. There was 
therefore a good chance to adjust any factor of 
production which was too large or too small, and there 
is no reason to believe that this has not been done. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that after some 
adjustments called for and to be discussed presently, 
figures from the financial accounts can be taken to 
represent costs under total adaptation reasonably 
well. Particularly, the average yearly output of 
approximately 3150 spectacles can be taken as the 
’’normal” capacity. Also, the size of the firm and its 
cost structure are very nearly identical with the
average of the industry structure as shown by the ZVA 
study which has been used to estimate the LRAC curve 
and the Cobb-Douglas production function. This 
similarity is born out by Table 5.
TABLE 5.
Costs of Firm under Observation and 155-Firm Average 
Observed in ZVA Study.
Firm ZVA
1) Turnover 656348 648497
2) Raw-material 218 6 6 7 209224
3) Interest received .57
4) Discounts received 5545 4463
5) Non-operative profit 25 -
6) Wages and salaries 223120 216637
7) Depreciation 23609 20477
8) Interest paid 4829 9699
9) Taxes, rates 15348 22356
10) Maintenance costs premises 17931 10341
11) Advertising 19062 17332
12) Rent 22320 23750
13) Miscellaneous 45032 30970
An alternative to using cost data of the firm would be 
to use these industry averages. This is not possible
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because the industry-wide data set does not contain 
estimates of separate costs. However, as the firm 
under observation can very nearly be regarded as 
"representative” in its costs structure, the firm data 
will provide an adequate measure of total cost. 
Another point in favour of this approach is the 
possibility to scrutinize every block of costs and 
make the necessary adjustments for a valid estimate of 
costs under total adaptation.
The obvious point to start from when determining the 
individual items of total cost is the balance-sheet 
and the profit and loss account for the current year,
i.e. 1984 of the practice under observation. The 
profit and loss account has already been shown in
Table 5. Table 6 shows the balance sheet. 206
TABLE 6.
Balance Sheet, Firm of Diplom Optiker Hess Hann.-Muenden Branch
Assets
Tangible Assets
Circulating Capital
Commodities-in-stock
Dept due 
Cash-on-hand 
Bank balances 
Money-in-transit 
Transitory items
93244
87541
51344
150
7940
130
2546
Liabilities
Value adjustments 6795
Bank liabilities 6023
Other liabilities 145
Capital 10013
242897 24289
The. task now is to go through the items of the profit 
and loss account and the balance sheet in order to
-  p/i _
decide whether the figures given can be used in an 
estimation of LRMC as they stand or whether and how 
some of the figures should be changed.
Considering the various items:
- Turnover of DM 656 348 is very much near the 
average turnover of the sample of firms on which data 
were collected at the behest of the optical 
association. The size of the firm under observation 
is therefore very near the average of the industry.
- raw-material cost: this is also near the industry 
average.
- interest received is of no importance.
- discounts received: This sum is approximately. 2 
% of value of raw-material. These Z % have to be 
deducted from the value of raw material when separate 
costs of raw-material are determined in the 
calculation of separate costs.
- non-operative profits: again the sum is of no 
consequence.
- wages and salaries: As mentioned before these 
contain all direct wages, including social security 
payments, provision for pensions etc. but no other 
costs are "apportioned” to this item. Particularly, 
it does not contain any wages for the 
owner-entrepreneur for the firm under observation^0*^ 
whereas the ZVA-data contain imputed wages of 
owner-entrepreneurs where appropriate. It can be
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concluded that wages are at their longrun level.
- depreciation: This, of course, is a difficult
problem. Depreciation as shown in the profit and loss 
account is calculated according to the principles of 
financial accounting which are governed in large part 
by legal principles and requirements of the tax 
authorities. One of the most important requirements 
imposed by the tax authorities is calculation of 
depreciation from historical cost figures. Legal 
rules stress the principle of caution, i.e. assets 
are depreciated more rapidly than warranted by the 
actual life of assets. Another possible factor 
distorting depreciation rates is accelerated 
depreciation.
In the literature, less in practice, it is often 
demanded that compound interest should be taken into 
account. The idea being that liquidity yearly 
received in the form of depreciation, if invested 
again, would increase through interest being 
received. Therefore yearly depreciation rates should 
be valued at their discounted present value. 
However, depreciation charges calculated at their 
discounted present value become increasingly smaller 
every year and depreciation charges would therefore 
vary for every year. Should the compound interest 
method be employed in this study?: Lest there should
be confusion it should be noted that interest paid on 
assets which are depreciated over several years is, of 
course, a cost. This interest charge is covered by 
the interest imputed on necessary working capital.
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20QLoeffelholz 7 discusses the point at some length and 
comes to the following conclusion: disregarding the
cumbersome method of calculation, it only seemingly is 
more exact than straight line depreciation. It is 
only valid under the assumption that money received in 
the form of depreciation will indeed earn interest. 
As amounts received will normally be reinvested in the 
firm this is not necessarily the case, and if interest 
is indeed earned, it is difficult to decide on the 
appropriate interest rate. A falsely estimated 
interest rate would in effect by far outweigh any 
increase in accuracy through the method in question. 
He therefore proposes to follow the method used in 
practice and disregard compound interest.
It is now possible to summarize the discussion 
above: When depreciation rates serve the purpose of 
determining cost under total adaptation they should be 
calculated from replacement costs, life of assets 
should be assessed realistically and depreciation 
should be linear, i.e. in equal yearly amounts.
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TABLE 7.
Asset Sheet, Firm of Diplom-Optiker Hess, 
Hann. Muenden Branch. (*>/*)
(1968)
(1978)
SETS
ND AND BUILDING
CONSTRUCTION 
EMISES
CHINERY (1964)
ND EDGER
LDERING MACHINE (1977)
,ND EDGER (1979)
.'OOVER (1980)
CO EDGING MACHINE (1981)
IUIPMENT AND 
IRNITURE
IT LAMP (1964)
(LATEST (1964)
UAL CASE (1964)
ILEPHONE EQUIPMENT (1971)
IBINET (1973)
15H REGISTER (1975)
JRNITURE SALES ROOM (1978)
JRKSHOP CABINETS (1978)
LU-CHAIR (1978)
3LAR0ID PORTAIT .
\MERA (1979)
CABINET WITH
RAWERS (1981)
JTDOOR SIGN (1982)
HYSIMETER (1983)
OTAL DEPRECIATION
DTAL DEPR. EXCL. LAND 
ND BUILDING
OTAL AVERAGE 
RESENT VALUE
BOOK VALUE
56833
15792
1
1
1
173
14215
1
1
1
1
1
330
17146
368
1
200
952
4653
4230
HISTORIC
COST
71780
REPLACEMENT
COST
280000
ACCOUNTING
DEPRECIATION
Life a^mount in 
in years
years
1660
ECONOMIC
DEPRECIATION
65531 80000 9473 10 8000
420 2500 8 52.5 30 83
2156 800 8 269.5 10 80
2849 3200 .8 356 30 106
868 1200 8 108 12 100
22745 28000 8 2843 7 4000
3102 14000 8 388 30 466
2099 40000 8 262 12 3333
900 3600 8 112 30 120
900 700 8 112 5 62,
337.8 5500 8 422 30 183
5000 3000 10 500 15 300
43601 55000 8 5450 10 5500
1664 2000 8 208 15 44
1762 2200 8 220 20 110
2003 1200 9 250 10 120
1362 1500 8 170 10 150
7755 7500 8 969 20 375
4702 5400 8 588 20 270
21664 23402
12191 23402,5
Table 7 shows the asset sheet of the branch which in 
its conventional form would only display date of 
purchase, book value, historical cost and annual 
depreciation rate of assets. It has been amended by 
estimates of the replacement cost and economic 
depreciation charges.
The theoretical discussion of the preceding section
AVERAGE
PRESENT
VALUE
280000
40000
1250
400
1600
6000
14000
7000
20000
1800
350
2750
1500
27500
1000
1100
600
750
3750
2700
126880
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is supported extremely well by the figures:
The first item, value of business premises and site
is not relevant to the cost estimation as a normal
rent is imputed. However, it shows strikingly how
? 1 obook value and economic value may diverge.
The situation is different with the next item, 
reconstruction of premises. Every 10 years the sales 
room has to be reconstructed because it has become 
obsolete - mainly because it is no longer in fashion - 
but also because of the usual wear and tear. It is 
therefore legitimate to calculate the economic
depreciation charge on the new basis, for 10 years,
and, of course, on the basis of replacement cost
whereas financial depreciation i£> often degressive and 
always calculated from historical cost. The result, 
however, is only a -relatively minor discrepancy 
between the two depreciation charges.
As far as depreciation of machinery is concerned, 
the fact that some machines are still in use which 
have been bought in 1964. again underscores the 
necessity to use realistic estimates of the life of 
assets instead of the rigid 5-8 years stipulated by 
taxation rules. Comparison of historical and
replacement costs also reveals huge differences. 
Replacement cost, however, may be lower than 
historical cost because of technical innovation. This 
is borne out by the items soldering machine and cash 
register. The calculations are more or less
self-explanatory and shall not be discussed in detail 
therefore. Just one item needs special mention: The
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"Polatest". It is required for sight-testing. 
Although it has already served 30 years, and could 
technically probably put in another ten years of 
service, it has become obsolete as new, electronically 
assisted methods of sight-testing are being 
substituted for traditional methods. It will 
therefore be necessary, in order to keep up with 
competitors, to instal modern sight-testing equipment 
estimated at a cost of DM 49500 and a life-span of 12 
years. These figures have therefore been introduced 
and depreciation rate calculated accordingly.211 When 
all adjustments have been made total depreciation 
excluding property is DM 23402, 5 instead of the DM
12191 shown by the financial accounts.
We now turn to the estimation of interest on 
necessary working capital. The profit and less 
account shows only interest actually paid on debts 
outstanding. However, interest on equity capital is 
an opportunity cost which must be imputed. In the 
Optical Association’s cross-sectional date set this 
was found by taking the value of the asset side of the 
balance sheet, deducting from it all short-term 
liablilities as shown on the left-hand side and 
imputing interest at the rate of 7 % to this necessary 
working capital. This method was the best that could 
be done with the data at the disposal of the ZVA. It 
must be admitted, however, that the estimate of the 
necessary working capital is open to some reservations 
and can be improved upon in the present case.
Return to Table 6, which shows the balance sheet of
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the firm under observation: The item tangible assets 
which comprises land, building, machinery and 
equipment shows a book-value of DM 93244. From this 
sum has to be deducted book-value of land and 
building, as a rent is being imputed. This operation 
would have been performed in the ZVA study. But also, 
the items reconstruction premises, machinery, 
equipment and furniture can be assessed more 
realistically. Even if assets are assessed at 
replacement cost, their present, i.e. corrected 
"book-value” will depend on the date of purchase, 
which determines how much is written off. There is no 
guarantee that old and new items will exactly 
balance. To arrive at an exact average it is 
necessary to evaluate each item at 50% of its 
replacement cost. This is done in the last row of 
Table 7» in this chapter. The average value of assets 
adds up to DM 126850.
Stock-in-trade, can be taken at book value, as there 
is no reason to suspect any loss due to obsolescence 
etc.
This also applies to the items cash-on-hand, sums- 
due- from- banks and cash- in transit. There is no 
reason to suspect that these are not the normal 
amounts corresponding to what is necessary on 
average.
Necessary working capital can now be calculated as 
shown in Table 8:
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TABLE 8.
Necessary Working Capital, Firm.
126.850 
85.541 
150 
7. 940 
2. 546 
130 
223.157
14.567 
208.590
Taking an interest rate of 7% imputed interest amounts 
to DM 14601.0 In table 5. the next cost category is 
taxes and rates. This item is made up of local taxes 
and rates, which are partly fixed sums and partly 
depend on income. They are taxes for which the firm 
is liable and are deducted before personal income 
tax. These taxes therefore from an economist’s point 
of view are costs and are justifiably included.
The next items are advertising expenses, postage, 
telephone, maintenance costs and other expenses, which 
can all be taken at their book-values.
Premises, Machinery, 
Equipment
Stock-in-trade
Cash-on-hand
Sums-due-from-banks
Deferred expenses
Cash-in-transit
- Short-term 
liabilities
Tfce profit and loss account can now be changed in 
such manner that it complies as well as practically 
possible with the economist’s notion of total cost 
under total adaptation. This is shown in table 9 ,
TABLE 9.
Profit and Loss Account Under Total Adaptation.
DM
Turnover 656 3*18
Rawmaterial 57
Discounts received 55*15.
non-operative Profits 25
Wages and Salaries 223 120
Depreciation 23 U 02
Interest Paid 1*1 601
Taxes, Rates 15 3*18
Advertising 19 062
Rent 22 320
Maintenance, Repairs 17 931
Miscellaneous 35 032
Total Cost 595 n o
The estimation of average cost has now become a matter
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of simple calculation: normal capacity of the firm, or
rather, plant, was shown to be 3.150 pairs of 
spectacles per year. Total cost per year under total 
adaptation = DM 595 110. From total cost total
separate costs have to be deducted. These have to be 
imputed from the cost study. 450 pairs of glasses had 
a total of separate costs of DM 62 041.5. Separate
cost per pair therefore = DM 137.81. 3.150 pairs then 
have separate costs of 3.150 x 137.81 = DM 434 101.5. Then,
AC = 595 110 - 434 101.6 
3150
= 51.11
If no distinction is made between common cost and 
profit, then the residual of AC and profit, ”e" in the 
article by Zerby and Conlon would be determined by 
subtracting separate cost from turnover and dividing 
by Q.
e = 656348 - 434101.5 = 222246.5
Average of e = 70.55
It is important to note that the way in which 
average cost is estimated in no way invalidates 
conclusions about the presence of price-discrimination 
in the market for spectacles. Price discrimination is 
defined as the sale by the same seller of the same 
commodity- at different prices or as the sale of 
different varieties of a commodity at prices which are 
not equal to marginal cost. AC is therefore a
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constant which only ’’shifts” the cost, plane. Its 
inclination to the price plane will not be affected. 
As it will be shown that prices and costs diverge 
considerably, the contention that the empirical 
findings in the market for spectacles support Posner’s 
theory of taxation by regulation is not invalidated by 
using this approach.
8.2.7 Estimation of Economic Profit.
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see whether 
opticians have succeeded in exploiting the monopoly 
situation conferred upon them in order to reap 
monopolistically inflated profits in the economist’s 
sense.
A t  such an estimate is made the logical consequence
is a quantitative estimate of economic profit.
However, economists are usually extremely cautious if
asked to put a definite figure on economic profits, be
it for an industry or a single enterprise and the
concept has been subject to considerable debate when
the necessity arose, for instance in debates about the
? 1 ?multitude of managerial goalsCAC or in discussions of 
the price and profit consequences of market 
structure21^ Problems of empirical estimation of 
profits were directly addressed by Almarin Philipps21** 
and Dalton and Pen. 21^ The subject is further explored 
in discussions of efficiency implications of monopoly 
for instance in the famous article by Harberger.21  ^
The general picture one receives from these 
discussions is the need of extreme caution in any
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assessment of economic profits, which in turn implies 
equal cautiousness in empirical estimation of long-run 
costs as the one implies the other. It was probably 
the awareness of this controversy which led Zerby and 
Conlon in their study to refrain from disentangling 
profits and common costs. It was shown, however, that 
their method of allocating common cost and profit is 
rather doubtful.
In textbooks of management accounting21^ and 
especially in textbooks on managerial Economics21^ 
less reservations about the feasibility of a 
meaningful estimation of economic profit are heid.
From the figures an economic profit can be calculated
TABLE 10.
Calculation of Economic Profit
Turnover
+ discounts
- total cost
Which amounts to 8.4 % of turnover. The definition 
of an acceptable rate o f ‘economic profit is a much 
debated topic in the economic profession, an intensive 
discussion of which would lead too far afield. The 
following estimates are made in accordance with
656348
5157
651191
595110
56081
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piosuggestions by Joel Dean: 7
It can be said, that there is probably agreement as 
to the fact, that a premium for risk should be 
deducted before profit. If this is set, admittedly 
rather arbitrarily, at 5 % of necessary working
capital, then 5 % of DM 208590 = DM 10429 have to be 
deducted from profit which leaves a profit estimate of 
DM 56081 - DM 10429 = DM 45652 = 6.9 % of turnover.
Calculated as rate of return on capital of DM 
208.590, DM 45652 are 21.9 %* which is 3«1 percentage 
points below the rate of return General Motors aims 
for and which is often considered adequate. We can 
therefore conclude that some monopoly profits may be 
suspected but it can be ruled out that they are 
excessive by any standards. Some interesting 
implications of these profit estimates will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter.
8.3 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF PRICE. COST AND PRIVATE
PAYMENT PLANES.
It is now possible to construct empirically the 
price, cost and private payment planes. Individual 
prices, separate costs and the sums paid by sickness 
funds which make up the sample of 450 pairs of 
spectacles contained in the cost study were fed into 
the computer. The price of each individual pair of 
spectacles was then derived by adding the price of the 
frame, the price of the right lens and the price of
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the left lens. Private payment is the difference 
between the price thus calculated and the payment made 
by the sickness fund. The cost of each individual 
pair of spectacles is the sum of the separate cost of 
each pair to which is added the average cost of DM 
51.11. Next, the data set was divided up into 4 
subsets:
1. Single focus without frames.
2. Single focus including frames.
3. Multi focus without frames.
4. Multi focus including frames.
It has been mentioned that approximately 20% of sales 
consist of the basic variety paid for by the funds. 
Here only lens power differences are involved. These 
varieties do not contain additional characteristics. 
If the planes for the 4 subsets were estimated 
including these basic varieties the resulting 
estimates of the price. cost and private payment 
planes would consequently be distorted.220 Therefore 
each subset was divided into 2 further subsets; a 
subset comprising those spectacles for which a private 
payment was made and one for which such payment was 
not made. There are therefore 8 subsets:
1. Single focus without frames: no private 
payment. ( 1 TOTNOP).
2. Single focus without frames with private 
payment. (1 TOTPRIV).
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3» Single focus incl^ frames: no private payment. 
(2 TOTNOP)
ft. Single focus incl. frames with private
payment.(2 TOTPRIV).
5. Multi focus without frames: noprivate payment.
(3 TOTNOP).
6. Multi focus without frames with private
payment. (3 TOTPRIV).
7. Multi focus including frames: noprivate
payment. (4 TOTNOP).
8. Multi focus incl. frames with private payment.
(4 TOTPRIV).
The names for each subset are given in 
brackets.
The individual varieties contained in each subset are 
defined by
1. The power of the lens.
2. The quality content of the pair of spectacles 
represented by the raw material cost.
The power of the lens was represented by assigning
digits starting with 1 in ascending order to each
power bracket. Thus, the power bracket +-2 is
represented by the digit 1, +-4 by 2, +-2/2 by 3
p p l
etc. The proxy for quality is the value of the 
additional characteristics contained in each 
individual variety. Consequently, it is not the
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actual raw material cost of each pair of spectacles 
that is relevant, but the raw material cost of the 
additional characteristics. This value was found by 
subtracting in each case the raw-material cost of the 
basic variety from the observed raw material cost. 
The proxies for quality, raw material cost of 
additional characteristics, were then sorted in 
ascending order of magnitude and represented by the 
digits 1, 2, 3. ....n for the n varieties of each
subset. The name QADDCH was assigned to the ordering, 
which represents the "quantities" of each variety. 
For each subset 3 multiple regressions were performed, 
taking as dependent variables:
1. Price.
2. Marginal Cost.
3. Private payment.
and as "explanatory" variables the variables QADDCH 
and QPOWER of each subset. The regressions yielded 
the following result:
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1 TOTNOP
17 Cases RETPR 24.77 - 1.47
(4.06)
MC 75-92 - • 1.45
(2.84)
1 TOTPRIV
89 Cases RETPR 12.49 1.85 -39
(18.24) (3.87)
MC • 79.21 1.20 .21
(17.96) (3.08)
PRIVPAYM -3.10 1.76 .11
(17.94) (1.08)
2 TOTNOP
62 Cases RETPR 61.86 - 1.68
(24.68)
MC 94.27 - 1.54
(2 .01)
2 TOTPRIV
191 Cases RETPR 45.28 2.17 .22
(39.67) (4.08)
MC 89.60 1.44 .10
(34.72) (2.36)
PRIVPAYM -10.3 2.14 .06
(43.51) (1.28)
3 TOTNOP
i
1 Case no regression possible
3 TOTPRIV
23 Cases RETPR 106.76 16.67 5.68
(12.07) (4.31)
MC 110.11 12.44 4.53
(10.16) (3 .88)
PRIVPAYM 6.64 14.47 .95
(20.80) (1.42)
4 TOTNOP
5 Cases RETPR 179-24 - 6.45
(16.59)
MC 182.05 - 6.56
(3.93)
52
35
80
80
79
91
18
89
87
91
88
84
96
98
84
4 TOTPRIV
62 Cases RETPR 201.90. 9-12 1.70 .97
(41.31) (7.7)
MC 196.87 5.79 1.00 .89
(22.58) (3.93)
PRIVPAYM 26.27 9.1 .12 .96
(43.90) (.61)
RETPRICE = price of each variety, MC = 
marginal cost, PRIVPAYM = "OUT OF POCKET" 
payment for each variety. T - values are 
given in brackets, names for the subsets 
have been explained on page 262.
The regressions "predict" the value of the retail 
price, marginal cost and private payment for each 
variety in each subset in the following way: multiply 
the value of QADDCH by the appropriate coefficient, 
multiply value of QPOWER by its coefficient, add the 
results to the constant. For instance, the retail 
price of the variety single focus spectacle without 
frame QADDCH 89. Power 1 is found by the following calculation:
89 w 1.85 = 164.65
+ 1 • 0.39 = 0.39
+ constant = 12.49
Predicted value = 177.53
It is possible to construct from the results of the 
regressions price, cost and private payment planes for 
each subset. For instance, in order to construct the 
planes for the subset 2 TOTPRIV the endpoints for each 
plane have first to be calculated. These calculations 
are done in Table 12.:
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TABLE 12.
Calculation of Endpoints for Price, Cost and Private 
Payment Planes.
PRICE PLANE COST PLANE PRIVATE
PAYMENT
PLANE
Observed Xi value:
1 QADDCH
2 QPOWER 
calculated Y value
= 0 
= 0
45.29 89.60 -10.30
observed Xi value:
1 QADDCH
2 QPOWER 
calculated Y value
= 0 
= 191
87.21 108.37 1. 68
observed Xi value:
1 QADDCH
2 QPOWER 
calculated Y value
= 191 
= 0
459.27 356.80 397.80
observed Xi value:
1 QADDCH
2 QPOWER 
calculated Y value
= 191 
= 191 
= 501.20 384.65 409.78
The calculated Y - values give the four endpoints of
each plane and these planes are then represented in a
3-dimensional graph in Fig. 3»
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 Fig. 3
Empirically Estimated Price, Cost and Private
Payment Planes: 1 Subset of Spectacles.
DM
RETPRICE
L 2  T O T P R IV
In like manner, the planes for each of the 8 subsets 
were constructed. In the theoretical discussion of
the planes in chapter 7 it was proposed to depict all 
price and cost planes in one graph. However, the 
result would be extremely confusing in the present 
case as most of the planes would not become visible. 
Therefore the graphs have been drawn for each subgroup 
separately, but have been assembled on one single page 
in Fig. k .  The numbers of each graph correspond to
those of the 8 subsets described on page 262.
-  _
Payment Planes: 8 Subsets of Spectacles.
DM
RETPRICE
■PRIV. PAYM.
MC
0 Q ADD. CH. X
DM
•RETPRICE
PRIV. PAYM.
0 Q ADD. CH. X
7. A TOTNOP 8. A TOTPRIV
DM
RETPRICE
MC
PRIV. PAYM.
0 Q ADD. CH. X
DM
0 Q ADD. CH. X
5. 3 TOTNOP 6. 3 TOTPRIV
DM
RETPRICE
DM
XS PRIV PAYM. 
MC
MC
RETPRICE 
PRIV PAYM.
Q ADD. CH. 
3. 2 TOTNOP A. 2 TOTPRIV
DMDM
MC
RETPRICEMC
PRIV. PAYM.RETPRICE 
PRIV. PAYM
X °2 0
1. 1 TOTNOP 2. 1 TOTPRIV
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The question has now to be asked, whether the 
empirically derived planes correspond with the 
predictions about their relative positions which 
follow from the theoretical considerations derived in 
chapter 7; and whether the predictions of Posner’s 
theory of taxation by regulation are verified, i.e., 
whether those varieties which are sold at regulated 
prices are subsidized by revenues from varieties sold 
at unregulated prices. In chapter 7 the follwfcng 
predictions about the relative positions of the price, 
cost and private payment planes were made:
1. Prices increase more rapidly than costs when 
additional characteristics are added. In the 
graph this would result in: slope retprice > 
slope MC.
2. Prices increase more rapidly than marginal cost 
with increasing lens power. Hence: slope QPOWER 
> slope MC.
As one moves from the lowest priced varieties to the 
highest priced varieties the excess of marginal cost 
over price decreases until MC equals RETPRICE. 
Thereafter, the difference to RETPRICE which is now 
greater than MC, increases. In Fig. U the difference 
between MC and RETPRICE decreases as one moves upwards 
from the lowest priced varieties, e.g. 1 TOTPRIV to 
2TOTPRIV. At 3 TOTPRIV the difference tends to zero,
i.e. there is no difference between MC and RETPRICE. 
From 3TOTPRIV to ^TOTPRIV, i.e. as one moves to the 
higher priced varieties the excess of RETPRICE over MC 
increases.
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For those varieties which entail. additional 
characteristics the private payment planes should be 
parallel to the price planes. \ This arises from the 
fact that the subsidy payment is a fixed sum. For 
those varieties which do not entail additional 
characteristics the private payment planes lie on the 
horizontal X - Z surface. From Fig. 4 it can be seen 
that the empirically estimated price, cost and private 
payment planes correspond extremely well with the 
theoretically derived curves in chapter 7. But the 
predictions of Posner's theory of taxation by 
regulation are exactly verified only for the subsets 
1TOTNOP AND 2TOTNOP but not for 4TOTNOP: an exception
which will be explained later. Consider figure 4: For
1TOTNOP point a^ indicates the price of the lowest 
priced basic variety and point b-^  indicates marginal 
cost of that variety: a = DM 24.77 and b = DM 75-92. 
The difference between price and marginal cost is 
therefore DM 51.2. Hence, price covers no more than 
approximately 3 3 %  of cost. As one moves outward from 
a in the direction of the Z-axis prices increase 
continuously indicating that price increases with 
increasing lens power. As one moves outward in the 
direction of the X-axis one moves, for all practical 
purposes, parallel to the X-axis, an indication that 
additional characterstics are absent. The private 
payment plane lies on the surface formed by the X- and 
Z-axes; iust as predicted.
Now consider 1 TOTPRIV: the difference between a2
and b2 is DM 79.21 - DM 12.49 = DM 66.72: price covers 
no more than approximately 1 6 %  of cost. As one moves
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in the direction of the Z-axis prices increase as 
expected and marginal cost increases also, but less 
steeply; i.e. the predicted outcome. The same holds 
true of the increase in price and MC as one moves 
outwards along the X-axis, i.e. with an increase in 
additional characteristics costs increase less rapidly 
than prices; again the predicted outcome. The private 
payment plane increases only very slightly with 
QPOWER, but increases in step with additional 
characteristics; again the outcome which is 
predicted. For 2 TOTNOP again the relative positions 
of the planes are as predicted; a^ = 61.86 and b^ =
94.27. The difference between cost and price is 
therefore DM 94.27 - DM 61.86 = DM 32.41. The price of 
the lowest priced variety therefore covers 
approximately 66% of cost, while for 1 TOTNOP it 
covers only 33%.
For 2 TOTPRIV, with increasing lens power and with 
the addition of characteristics, prices and marginal 
cost increase as expected and again the slope of MC is 
less steep than that of RETPRICE. It is interesting to 
note that, as one moves along the MC-plane in the 
direction of the X-axis, point d2 is reached, where 
price equals marginal cost. Thereafter price exceeds 
marginal cost and beyond point e2 even the private 
payments are greater than MC. The private payment 
plane slopes upwards parallel to the price plane for 
additional characteristics, dust as predicted.
For multi focus, however, shown as 5» 6, 7 and 8,
only for the subsets TOTPRIV are the relative
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positions of the planes as expected. Thus, MC rises 
less steeply than RETPRICE. For the lowest priced 
item, in 3 TOTPRIV, MC still exceeds MC, but only by 
DM 3«35» whereas for k TOTPRIV price exceeds cost by 
DM 5.03 indicating that the vertical product 
differentiation between the two sets results in an 
increased gap between prices and cost. Turning now to 
the subsets 3 TOTNOP and k TOTNOP it has to be 
admitted that here the predictions of the theory are 
not confirmed; for 3 TOTNOP a regression could not be 
performed, as, out of 2k varieties contained in the 
set only 1 variety had been sold without a private 
payment being made. For the important corrections in 
vision requiring lenses it is the case that additional 
characteristics are more frequently sold. As regards 
k TOTNOP, only 6 out of 67 multifocus spectacles 
including frames had been sold without a private 
payment. The regression shows that price is higher 
than marginal cost for approximately 70 percent of the 
cases contained in the subset.
Before this observation which seemingly contradicts 
Posner's theory of taxation by regulation is 
discussed, the results derived so far are assembled 
and shown in table 13:
TABLE 13.
SLOPE MC SLOPE MC PRIVATE PRIVATE DISTANCE
< SLOPE < SLOPE PAYMENT PAYM. A -B >
RETPRICE QPOWER PLANE PLANE THAN IN
PARALLEL PARALLEL PREVIOUS
COS 
> P 
ICE
(heading c o h t m  * ed on
X - AXIS PRICE 
PLANE
SUBSET
1 TOTNOP YES YES YES n.a. YES
1 TOTPRIV YES YES n.a. YES YES
2 TOTNOP YES YES YES n.a. YES
2 TOTPRIV YES YES n.a. YES YES
3 TOTNOP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
3 TOTPRIV YES YES n.a. YES YES
k TOTNOP YES YES YES YES ' YES
k  TOTPRIV YES YES n.a. YES YES
From Table 13 it can be seen that the prices of 
spectacles behave exactly as predicted with only one 
exception. Approximately 7 0 %  of the prices paid by 
the sickness funds for multifocus spectacles i. e. 
4TOTNOP are not set below cost as one would expect 
from Posner's theory of taxation by regulation.
This exception can be explained. In the early days 
of the funds they provided payment for rather 
unsightly bifocal lenses for their members, the 
socalled ,,solid,t bifocals at prices below cost. The 
opticians offered as an alternative ’’fused" bifocals 
which were aesthetically much more pleasing and 
charged prices which were set considerably above 
cost. Figure 5 shows the two kinds of bifocals.
YES
PAR
YES
PAR
n . a
NO
PAR
NO
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Fig. 5
Bifocal Lenses.
Fused Reading Solid Reading
Segment Segment
In 1974. the '’Ersatzkassen” (substitute funds) which 
compete with the MRVO - Kassen” (state insurance
funds) for members, struck a deal with the 
"Zentralverband der Augenoptiker” (Association of 
Ophthalmic Opticians) in which they agreed that their 
members could receive the better quality fused 
bifocals and that the substitute funds would pay the 
higher prices. The motives behind the deal are very 
interesting:
In the early days of state insurance and up to the 
second world war the substitute funds provided
superior services. This advantage was gradually 
eroded. The substitute funds saw in the provision of 
the better quality lenses an easy means of
demonstrating to their members the superiority of 
their services. The state insurance funds at first 
refused to take up the challenge; but, approximately 2 
years later they also provided fused bifocals and 
agreed to pay the higher prices. Although there are 
many interesting aspects to the outcome .of this
duopsony situtation between the two types of funds a 
discussion of them would lead too far afield. In the
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present context it is sufficient to note that the 
price of the better variety was set only 5 % below the 
prices in the recommended retail price lists of the 
firms of Rodenstock and Zeiss and that when the state 
insurance- funds later Joined the agreement they 
accepted prices as high as those paid by the 
substitute funds*
The inconsistency posed by the prices for multi 
focus is therefore explained in a satisfactory 
manner.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS.
The empirical estimation of the price- cost and 
private payment planes yields results which give 
strong support to Posner’s theory of taxation by 
regulation; basic varieties of spectacles sold at 
regulated prices, with the exception of multi focus 
spectacles, do not cover cost and are subsidized by 
those varieties which are sold at unregulated prices. 
The exception posed by the multi focus spectacles can 
be accounted satisfactorily for by a harmony of 
interests; in this particular instance, between the 
sickness funds, a duopsony of buyers, and the 
opticians, essentially organised as monopolistic 
sellers. The outcome was the concession of profitable 
prices for these particular varieties.
It is shown that in order to achieve the desired 
taxation by regulation an extremely complex pricing 
structure has been erected and maintained in the 
market for spectacles. This structure can only be 
fully understood by employing the model of price 
discrimination with horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation at a 'cost which is developed in this 
thesis. This new hybrid model was built upon two 
simpler models. The first of these was developed by
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the German economists H. and M. Jacob who showed that 
contrary to a widely held opinion, horizontal product 
differentiation at a cost in conjunction with second 
degree price discrimination is a rational strategy for 
sellers exerting some monopoly power. Jacob and Jacob 
described the set of profit-maximising prices, costs 
and output pertaining to that situation. A second 
model, based on work done by Eli Clemens shows that 
vertical product differentiation combined with third 
degree price discrimination also leads to a rationally 
determined set of prices, cost and output. 
Incorporation of the two types of price discrimination 
into a single model is achieved by a three-dimensional 
representation in Lancastrian characteristics space. 
Prices and costs are measured on the Y - axis, 
quantities of the differentiated commodities on the X 
- and Z - axes. In this way not only the existence of 
price discrimination in the market is demonstrated; 
the model also permits the precise identification of 
those varieties of a differentiated commodity which 
are sold below cost, those which cover cost and those 
which are sold above cost.
Further applications of the model suggest 
themselves. Pilati has shown that motorcars are 
differentiated vertically as well as horizontally. In 
Pilatifs model however, only a rough measure of 
vertical differentiation is employed. He
distinguishes between different models of cars, i. 
e. between a Renault 4 and a Renault 5* Phlips, 
however, argues that vertical product differentiation 
also occurs when a particular model is, for instance,
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transformed into a hatchback, offered in a "GTI" 
version, etc. All these vertically differentiated 
varieties are in turn offered with a multitude of 
’’options", i.e metallic paint, power steering etc. By 
determining the price and cost planes in the way shown 
in this thesis a configuration of costs and prices 
similar to that demonstrated for the market of 
spectacles may well become apparent. It may well be 
that basic varieties are in fact sold at prices which 
do not afford a profit or may incur a small loss which 
is compensated for by increased profits from varieties 
with more additional characteristics. The dangers of 
such a strategy become at once apparent; a competitor 
may bundle a considerable amount of options with his 
product and place it below the prevailing price line. 
If he does not offer a basic variety at or below cost 
he may well be able to offer his product at a lower 
price and still make a profit. It would seem that 
such a strategy has often successfully been employed 
by Japanese car manufacturers.
Further applications of the model suggest themselves 
in the health care sector in Germany. It is very 
likely that the pricing structure for instance for 
dental care is similar to that for spectacles. Here 
basic varieties of dental prostheses made of stainless 
steel are provided at regulated prices and it may well 
be that they are cross - subisdized by varieties made 
from gold and sold at unregulated prices producing 
revenues in excess of cost.
The model also provides the possibility of
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demonstrating the effect of subsidy payments. In the 
market for spectacles In Germany the subsidy payment 
takes the form of a lump sum payment. It is shown how 
this results in a shift of the revenue curve to the 
right resulting in an increase in quantity demanded 
and sold.
Both the cross - subsidisation effect and the 
increasing divergence between cost and prices as more 
and more additional characteristics are introduced 
pose a welfare issue. It has not been the purpose of 
this thesis to discuss the complex welfare issues 
arising when both vertical and horizontal price 
discrimination at a cost are present. Its objective 
is rather to provide a means of describing more 
adequately than has hitherto been possible the complex 
situations which cause such issues to arise.
The need for precise description may be suggested by 
an example. It has been shown that the prices paid by 
the sickness funds for single focus spectacles fail to 
cover cost by a considerable margin whereas the prices 
paid by the funds for multifocus spectacles afford a 
profit. If it is felt that it is difficult to Justify 
a situation where consumers with greater needs, i.e. 
those requiring multifocus spectacles are subsidizing 
those with less needs, then a change in this pattern 
of cross subsidisation would be a natural policy 
recommendation. The extent of the undesirable cross - 
subsidisation could be decreased if the prices paid 
for multifocal spectacles were lowered and the prices 
of single focus spectacles were increased. The
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respective increases and decreases could be calculated 
in such manner that the total sum paid by the sickness 
funds remained unchanged. In this way the price 
planes for single focus spectacles would be shifted 
upwards, those for multifocus spectacles downwards and 
the distortion in the pricing structure would be 
alleviated at no cost. Care must be taken, however. 
This measure will have an effect on the private 
payments. As the payments made by the sickness funds 
are increased for single focus spectacles the private 
payment planes for these varieties are lowered. By 
symmetrical reasoning the private payment planes for 
multifocal spectacles will be shifted upwards. The 
opticians could then increase the unregulated prices 
of the single focus varieties while leaving the prices 
for multifocus spectacles unchanged. Depending on the 
respective elasticities of demand, i.e. if demand 
elasticity for multi focus spectacles is less elastic 
than for single focus spectacles, then total revenue 
would be increased whereas total cost remains 
unchanged resulting in an increase in the optician’s 
profits. Only if the opticians either refrained from 
increasing the prices of single focus spectacles or 
lowered the prices of multi focus spectacles 
appropriately could the changes in the regulated 
prices be advocated without reservations. The 
argument highlights the usefulness of the model 
developed in this thesis. Without it it would be 
extremely difficult to make valid Judgements about the 
overall effects of policy changes.
In summary the research presented here finds several
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interesting features in the market for spectacles.*
Posner’s theory of taxation by regulation which 
stipulates that often commodities sold at regulated 
prices are subsidized by commodities sold at 
unregulated prices is supported extremely well. This 
cross - subsidisation results in an extremely complex 
pricing structure. In order to describe this pricing 
structure a model of price discrimination has been 
developed in this thesis which exhibits several novel 
features.
1. Cross - subsidisation is achieved by price 
discrimination.
2. Price discrimination is implemented with the 
help of product differentiation other than 
spatial differentiation.
3. The terms vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation are introduced and shown to have 
considerable explanatory power.
U . A 3 - dimensional representation of price- and 
cost- planes in Lancastrian characteristics 
space makes it possible to demonstrate visually 
the details of price discrimination within a 
market.
A type of cost study has been employed which 
introduces methods of work - measurement in order to 
arrive at a measure of costs of differentiated 
products which is compatible with the economist’s 
notion of marginal cost.
-  2 7 9  -
Finally, applications of the model have
suggested for other fields where, it is hoped, 
model can usefully be deployed.
been
the
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